| Draft
please do not quote
In
this essay I will discuss the stark contrast between the lack
of attention paid to changing family patterns, and specifically
to the topic of divorce, in sociological research, and the
excessive emphasis placed on the family in political and everyday
communication. The reference to families and family values
has been the common denominator - strongly supported by public
opinion - of the socio-political policies of the various governments
since the democratic transition. The politicians were right
to rely on the presumption, supported by various researchers,
that the family, and the security afforded by a family, are
at the top of the hierarchy of values of the Hungarian population,
a preference that does not depend on whether the people who
were polled were themselves living in a family or not. This
unquestionable support for the family is hard to explain when
we realise that families themselves have gone through significant
change in the past decades, and that these changes, despite
the radical effects on all aspects of society of the democratic
transition of 1990, seem to be the continuation of a process
that has started earlier.
The
changes in family patterns can be characterised by the processes
that are present in the rest of Europe as well. The main trends
are identical, even if specific phenomena may appear, spread,
and turn up in statistical data later in some countries than
in others. These general phenomena - the downfall of the traditional
family, e.g. the increase in the number of divorces, the first
rising, later falling incidence of second marriages, the postponing
of marriage, the conscious refusal to get married, the spreading
of living alone as a lifestyle, as well as of unmarried cohabitation,
the falling number of children per family - have attracted
the attention of social policy makers and socio-political
experts in Hungary as in the rest of Europe. While the trends
are the same everywhere, there are of course country-specific
factors that influenced and shaped these processes of change.
Also, the way these changes were received by public opinion
- feeding back into the processes of change themselves - depended
to a large extent on the given political system, the governing
ideologies, the economic and social circumstances, etc. Considering
all of the above, it is worth taking a look at which societal
processes shaped the changes that have taken place in family
patterns in Hungary, at how the political decision makers,
the policy measures, institutions, and communicators that
form public opinion responded to these changes, and last but
not least, how were they dealt with by the scientific analysts
of the time, i.e. the sociologists, demographers, and psychologists.
Perhaps
it is because of my personal involvement in the topic that
I remember the period when I started working as a sociologist,
the end of the 70s, beginning of the 80s, as a time when the
family was a topic that attracted the attention of the leading
sociologists of the time. It would be easy to explain this
by saying that at that time, there was a peak in the rate
of change in family life: although these changes had begun
after the second world war, when the communists came to power,
they had now reached a critical stage, and seemed to threaten
the 'healthy functioning' of society. Therefore, political
leaders were now eager to understand and possibly influence
these tendencies. This, however, would be too simple an explanation.
Knowing the personal history and the motivation of the leading
sociologists and the junior researchers they worked with,
I think that the family as a research topic was a refuge,
a way of guarding one's political neutrality, for those who
would not or could not deal with other important but politically
charged topics (the structure of society, economy and society,
etc.). The family was a safe haven that protected people from
the aggressive interference in personal life of socialist
politics and its subservient economical politics, not just
at the level of daily life, but also for researchers who,
by dealing with this topic, were able to avoid having to take
a clear political stance. Among those who did research on
topics such as families, divorce, and remarriages, there were
experts considered 'politically unreliable' whose personal
history included being sentenced to prison in '56, then released
in the mid-60s, but also researchers who represented traditional
bourgeois values and who integrated into the system only with
their professional expertise. Perhaps that is why this was
the heyday of family sociology: the rare current research
on this topic still mostly refers to publications from that
period.
The
researchers of those years agreed that the socialist-style
modernisation, which was forced onto the population and therefore
perhaps did not unfold organically, coincided with the weakening
of the economic function of the family. The increasing level
of education of women and their taking on paid jobs in large
numbers, hence the dominance of the two-earner family, the
intensive urbanisation and social mobility, internal migration,
and the spreading of urban life styles led to the formation
of nuclear families that derived their legitimacy from the
emotional needs of the family members, rather than from their
economic interdependency. However, relationships based on
emotional ties are less stable than family systems cemented
by economic partnership and dependency. With the decline of
religiosity and traditional persuasions - which state socialism
consciously and rigorously tried to remove from societal communication
- the control of the social surroundings over families, both
at micro and macro level, also became less strong. From the
point of view of the people - especially young people, more
specifically (since these were significant changes for them)
women - all of this led to the increased appreciation of personal
freedom, the spreading of individualism, and the establishment
of the right to assert personal interests.
While
the researchers registered these phenomena, and considered
them the necessary result of the sociological and historical
processes taking place in Hungary, they themselves contributed
to, or at least did not prevent the 'crisis of the family'
from being presented as such in political and societal discourse,
as a crisis that requires measures to be taken, state interference,
and political reactions. The big research waves of the 70s
and 80s and the accompanying discussion in the media and in
public discourse - e.g. the recurring discussion on the demographics
of the Hungarian population, or the so-called 'deviancy research'
- blamed the changes in family patterns for the falling birth
rate, alcoholism, the rising incidence of suicide, and the
tragically low life expectancy for men. In this discourse
women, whose social roles went through greater change than
those of men in the preceding decades, were covertly or sometimes
even overtly presented as scapegoats, since both in traditional
thinking as well as in the family image shared and propagated
by the political and cultural elite, it is primarily women
who are held responsible for ensuring reproduction as well
as for the harmonious functioning of the family.
During
the mid-60s, after the forced industrialisation of the 50s
and the radical transformation of the economy, when total
employment had been reached as women were now included in
the labour market, economic growth started to run out, and
it was feared that there was not enough work to maintain full
employment. This was also a period of political consolidation
and détente after the reprisals and the depression
that followed the revolution of '56. Two seemingly independent
phenomena - on the one hand, the turning away from obligatory
and ideologically strongly supported state socialism, something
which was never openly declared but still happened, i.e. the
liberalisation of economic and societal relations, and on
the other hand, as a result of opening up to the West, the
infiltration of certain new ideas into the socialist world,
which had until then been ideologically sealed - were connected
in a paradoxical fashion. The massive labour requirements
of forced industrialisation had been replaced by a need for
fewer, but more highly educated employees, and as a first
step it was deemed expedient to withdraw women from the labour
market. This goal - even if it was dictated by economic interests
- was usefully served by the psychologists and sociologists,
who by this time were allowed to work and publish again, and
who wrote and spoke about the importance of women's family
roles, about the indispensability of early bonding between
mother and child. This legitimised the institution in 1967
of the Child Care Allowance (GYES), which in appearance maintained
mothers in their status of employees, but which in reality
kept them at home again for years for the benefit of raising
their children and running the family.
The
sociologists of the period realised that in the process of
the emancipation of women, the introduction of GYES was a
step back towards the reconstruction of traditional family
patterns, but they were still mostly positive about the introduction
of this family-political institution, as it offered an alternative
to the uniformity of the nurseries and kindergartens, as well
as to women's double burden, that was gladly accepted by the
Hungarian population - including women. The institution of
GYES and the discourse it has generated from its inception
until the present shows how serious social problems were degraded
to socio-political questions, were simplified to a matter
of redistribution. In the discussions on GYES, few words were
spoken about one of the main and never revoked principles
of the socialist ideology, about the equality of rights, about
equal chances for women and men, about sharing household tasks,
or about the institutionalisation of household and child care
tasks, about the development of such public services. With
women 'winning back' the primacy of their status as mother
and wife, even if only for the period of infant care, public
opinion came to connect women more closely to their reproductive
functions than to their status as citizens with equal rights.
Society blamed women for the falling birth rate, for the inadequacies
in the care for children and the elderly, for the high abortion
and divorce rates. As a consequence, these social problems
were marginalised as women's problems; social discourse continuously
tries to make women feel guilty (Adamik, 2000).
It
was not only the family sociologists, who keep track of economic
and sociological trends, that were concerned about the 'crisis
of the family', first and foremost about the steadily rising
divorce rate. Since politicians and decision makers consider
marriage and the family to be the cornerstones of society,
they too were worried to see enthusiasm for marriage falling,
to see people getting married at a higher average age, shorter-lived
marriages, a rising divorce rate, and less second marriages.
The literature on this topic is full of data that supports
the view that being married leads to greater wealth, a better
health, greater happiness, and a less stressful life, when
compared to unmarried life. However, research has also thoroughly
documented that bad marriages have a negative effect on fertility:
firstly, because dysfunctional marriages reduce the willingness
to have children, secondly, because divorce can be an obstacle
to having more children, thirdly, because there is an increased
danger of deviance, i.e. of children growing up to be problematic
teenagers and adults, which negatively influences their (the
next generation's) attitude towards marriage. Obviously, socio-political
policy measures are not enough to increase people's willingness
to get married, or to improve the stability of marriages.
The institution of marriage can only be strengthened by improving
the quality of marriages.
All
of this prompts the following questions: what leads men and
women to get married, and why are some marriages stable, while
others are not? There is a huge international and a relatively
large Hungarian body of literature on this subject. The lion's
share of the literature consists of a variety of psychological
approaches, from the documentation of fantasies about the
ideal partner and methods for measuring the quality and stability
of a marriage, to various theories such as social exchange
theory and balance theory, and the research done within these
paradigms. (Gödri, 2001). However, even these theories
cannot disregard the socio-historical factors that influence
at the cognitive or behavioural level the propensity of individuals
to get married or divorced. They have to take into account
the social norms, role requirements, models of behaviour that
are present in society at a given time, and by the acceptance
or rejection of which individuals shape their own life route.
In Hungary, during the four decades of state socialism, there
was a changing but nevertheless always present ambivalence,
a contradiction that constructed the social representations
of marriage and the family. The traditional concept of the
family as maintained and passed on by family socialisation
was seemingly in conflict with daily life, since the bourgeois
ideal family with the working husband and the home maker wife,
who raises the children, could not be realised in practice.
What is more, this bourgeois ideal was not even thought entirely
desirable anymore, with women now being more highly educated,
professionally trained, and actively participating in the
workforce. Despite all of this, public opinion polls and other
research continued to prove that the family as an ideal had
not lost any of its popularity. The entire arsenal of methods
of cognitive dissonance reduction was needed to maintain the
notion that the family, more specifically the family with
children, is the primary source of happiness, against a background
of real life decisions on divorce, getting married again,
cohabitation.
Many
have tried to explain this ambivalence, some by exploring
the 'double bind' social pressure which the political leadership
and its subservient economic-scientific-cultural elite exerted
on society. The so-called 'state feminism' was such a pressure:
the top-down introduction and acceleration of the emancipation
of women. Part of this project was the total inclusion of
women in the labour market; it was asserted that taking part
in the production process was the best guarantee to be regarded
as a member of society with full and equal rights. At the
same time, the category of 'inactive workers' was created,
which effectively drove women from the labour market, degrading
them to the status of second-rate labour force, thus maintaining
women's subordinate position. This external, macro-societal
pressure was compounded by the patriarchal notions on gender
roles shared by the members of society themselves, as a result
of their upbringing or of their aversion to external pressure.
On top of the interference of the authoritarian society into
private life, and the difficult social and financial situation
of the families, this meant an additional emotional burden
that was difficult to bear and that led to the frequent breaking
up of marriages.
The
changes that marriage and the family went through raised the
attention not only of family sociologists and psychologists,
but also of researchers in the area of social stratification.
The stratification-theoretical approach looks at the question
of how society's openness or closedness is reflected in marriages.
Measuring homogamy and heterogamy in marriage gives an indication
of the extent to which the social parameters of the couple
are similar, e.g. as far as education, class, and religion
are concerned. Since after the second world war a new system
was born in Hungary, that had as its goal the discontinuation
of class society, i.e. the creation of communism, and that
really did radically see to the destruction of the old older,
to the abandonment of private property, to the obliteration
of differences of descent, it was to be expected that these
factors would have a smaller effect on the selection of the
partner. There is indeed a strong increase in mobility between
social strata between 1948 and 1960, i.e. the indicators of
homogamy are lower. However, this trend breaks and from the
beginning of the 80s homogamy is stronger again in certain
occupational groups (managers, intellectuals, trained workers).
(Bukodi, 2000) This reflects on one of the contradictions,
typical of the socialist period, between the declared goal
and reality, the effect of which on the fate of individuals
and families cannot be ignored. Under the banner of 'we're
all equal', the habits and fossilised traditions of the hitherto
feudal society were truly disrupted for a few years, decades,
and during the first years of socialism there were many relationships
that would have been unimaginable earlier, e.g. between a
child of a Jewish bourgeois family and the child of an uneducated
peasant. However, both intergenerational and intragenerational
mobility leads to a continuous clash between the cultural
and moral values and norms of the various social groups. Experts
on this period, at least those who do not use the simpler
technique of scapegoating, have often connected this deep
reorganisation of the social system not just to the rising
number of divorces, but also to suicide, alcoholism, and to
other forms of behaviour considered deviant.
The
measurement of the homogamy of a marriage can be based on
the social class, or the religious - cultural orientation,
but also on the level of education of the marriage partners.
The traditional family approved of, even considered it advantageous
if the husband was more highly educated and therefore had
a better social position, since the income of the family was
based on the employment of the husband. The continuous improvement
in the level of education of women, which has now in the younger
age groups reached, even surpassed that of men, has necessarily
led to an increase in educational homogamy. This - together
with women's independent employment and career development
- has shocked and undermined the traditional marriages based
on the authority of the husband. Since in social exchange
theory the stability and quality of a marriage are strongly
determined by the extent to which the partners can realise
their expectations, by whether they profit from staying together
or from breaking up, it is evident that women are much less
at the mercy of their husbands because of the increasing independence
afforded by having their own income. It is not accidental
that along with the steady rise in the number of divorces,
we also see that by far the majority of divorces are initiated
by women.
From
the 70s until the present there were also mostly demographic,
but also family sociological studies done that simply attempted
to document the facts. When looked at at this level, the first
signs of the process of modernisation appear in the Hungarian
marriage statistics. While up until the 70s the so-called
non-European type of marriage habits were characteristic of
Hungary - i.e. most people were married in their twenties
- after the second half of the 70s the marriage ratio started
on a long-term decline, while at the same time the average
age of getting married went up, and having children was postponed
(Csernákné, 1996). From the 80s onwards there
was a so-called 'marriage deficit', i.e. per year more marriages
were terminated than there were couples getting married, and
this trend continued after the democratic transition of 1990.
Since 1949 the number of couples married per year went down
from 11.2 per 1000 inhabitants to 5.2 in 1994. The ratio of
people remarrying after a divorce also fell significantly.
While in the 50s 270 out of 1000 divorced men remarried, this
number went down to 35 in the 90s. For women this same ratio
went down from 115 to 23. In other words, first marriage was
postponed or consciously avoided, while the readiness to remarry
fell. This clearly shows that society's ideas about marriage
changed. Marriage is no longer the only imaginable type of
relationship between a man and a woman, which is proven by
the frequency of cohabitation and by the high proportion of
people already living together before marriage. Opinion polls
show that for many, marriage has more disadvantages than advantages,
and this is especially true of urban, young, educated people,
i.e. they are more sceptical and critical of marriage, than
older, less educated people who live in the countryside (Tóth,
O. 1994).
The
ambivalence towards the family is also apparent in the way
divorce is dealt with. While society as a whole, public opinion,
and individual families expect young people to get married,
they are also resigned to the fact that they get divorced
if the marriage does not work out. While the number of marriages
fell, the divorce rate continued to go up - in 1995, there
were 464 divorces per 1000 marriages, and if we look at the
sum of all marriages then one-third ended in divorce in the
90s. Of the couples who were married in the last few decades,
18% were divorced within 10 years, which also shows that divorce
mostly affects young people (typically people in their thirties),
and especially, in three-quarters of the cases, families with
children. Not just the practice of divorce, i.e. its use as
a way of resolving conflicts, but also the way it is judged
has changed over time, and not just in the age groups affected
by it. We do, however, see that women tend to agree with a
statement such as 'Divorce is usually the best solution when
a couple can't seem to work out their marriage problems' more
than men, and that divorce is more generally accepted in the
higher strata of society than among people who are less well
educated and who live under less favourable circumstances.
(Tóth, 1997).
A
study of the middle classes' attitudes and habits with respect
to marriage and divorce, performed after the democratic transition,
compared practice with the opinions on this topic of three
distinguishable layers - lower-middle, middle, upper-middle
- of the people who rated themselves middle-class in a country-wide
representative sample. It was found that the proportion of
divorced, unmarried partners, and single people was 12.3%
of the entire sample, 16% of the lower-middle class group,
and 27% of the upper-middle class group. It also turned out
that the higher the socio-economic status of the respondent,
the more acceptant s/he is of cohabitation, divorce, or living
apart together (Utasi, 1996). The traditional values were
characteristic of the more disadvantaged social groups. Women,
less well educated people, and people living in villages were
more likely to disapprove of changes to the traditional forms
of marriage, and the older the respondents were, the stronger
their disapproval was.
It
is evident that statistical data and attitudes with respect
to marriage and alternative forms of living together are undergoing
continuous change. This brings us back to the question of
why the academic and political representation of the current
situation is so different from that of the 70s and 80s, when
the changes that traditional families underwent and the accumulation
of related problems provoked extensive media attention as
well as comprehensive and thorough research efforts. We established
above that the analysis of 'the crisis of the family' inspired
the very best researchers of the socialist period, and that
this topic received a lot of public attention in a period
of limited publicity, whereas now there is hardly any research
on this topic, and if there is, then the results - i.e. further
proof of the downfall of the traditional family - do not get
much attention in the now free media.
In
the meantime, 'family' - undefined, without the article -
became the main keyword in politics, and this is especially
true of the conservative, right-wing parties that have been
in government twice already since the democratic transition.
Family refers implicitly to young families with children;
the elderly, lonely people, or those who have already raised
their children do not seem to fit the category anymore. The
current leading government party's famous slogan, 'three children,
three rooms, four wheels', as a goal to be reached and an
image of the future, does not even attempt to address those
who because of their age or their marital status cannot take
part in the realisation of this petit bourgeois dream. The
traditional motto of one of the other parties in the coalition
- God, Homeland, Family - also promises the reinstatement
of traditional values. A good example of the need there seems
to be for reviving traditions is the astonishing announcement
of the leading government party (they are called 'young democrats'),
aimed explicitly at the young people concerned, but in fact
meant for the less well educated, older age groups, in which
they promised to enact that church weddings have the same
status as civil ones, thus giving up the more than a century
old institution of civil marriage. The notion of the family
has become political again, once again politicians consider
the family to be the basic unit of society, rather than addressing
individuals - men, women, pensioners, young people, city-
or village dwellers, Hungarians or members of other ethnic
groups - based on a realistic interpretation of the processes
taking place in society. The collectivist approach of politics
to families is also evident in e.g. the distribution of social
allowances, or the introduction of family-based taxation.
The individualisation that has taken and is still taking place
in society is not reflected in the views of the politicians
that are currently in power.
So
why is it that sociologists, who are familiar with demographic
statistics, with the way public opinion develops, with the
likely effects of policy measures on various population groups,
do not react to the policies and plans of the political decision
makers, that are based on a conservative ideology rather than
on reality? I would like to present two, partially related
hypotheses, but I have to admit that even together they do
not give a satisfactory answer to the above question.
The
first hypothesis has to do with the peculiar situation that
the social scientists found themselves in, in a Hungary that
has as its official goals the establishment of a democratic
society and a market economy. The transition of 1990, which
affected all areas of society and brought about essential
changes, resulted in a kind of live laboratory for social
scientists, with a broad range of topics to study. Which changes
were actually studied was partially dependent on the interests
of Western- European or American researchers and foundations,
and also on what types of research it was possible to find
funding for. The most frequent question among social scientists
at the beginning of the 90s was: who won, who lost as a result
of the changes. It is not accidental that the Western-European
and American activists and researchers of the second wave
of feminism were primarily interested to see whether women,
who under socialism were emancipated, worked, and relied on
professional child care, would be able to hold on to the quasi-equal
position that had been forced onto them from above, or would
go back to the patriarchal family model of bourgeois society.
The Hungarian family sociologists - by now exclusively women
- that the Western feminists got in touch with, were used
to dealing with the subject of women primarily through the
study of changing family structures and roles. Now they started
to see the decades-old trends in a new light. The 'transitological'
studies that were typical of the early 90s were a suitable
background for the question of what the consequences of the
transition were for women, why there were no women's movements,
why did feminism not get stronger when all quantifiable indicators
showed that women were being pushed back into the private
sphere? How did women react to their rapidly falling participation
in the labour market, in parliament, in politics? How did
they respond to the reduced child care services - nursery
schools, kindergartens - and social allowances, that they
relied on under socialism? In the past decade countless volumes
were published in the USA and Western-Europe co-authored by
Central and Eastern European sociologists (who had hitherto
done research on families), which dealt with the above questions
on the relationship between women and the transition (Basu,
1995, Funk-Mueller, 1993, Rueschemeyer, 1994, etc.). These
researchers did not add to the literature on the sociology
of the family; instead, they became the founders of new women
studies or gender studies programs and academic departments,
or they worked on the curricula of these new programs, thus
becoming the Hungarian representatives of the various branches
of feminism.
The
second hypothesis is also connected with the processes of
change in Hungarian society after the transition, and with
the academic response to these processes. The change to a
market economy now threatens to rapidly divide society in
two; previously, society was artificially homogenised and,
at least at the publicly visible level, free of extremism.
For the young, the educated, the people who adapt well to
changing circumstances, the new system has brought success,
wealth, and spectacular career opportunities, whereas the
majority of society has lost out as a result of the transition
both objectively and subjectively. Freedom and security, both
positive terms, became antagonistic concepts. Those sociologists
who previously studied daily life, the extent to which society
determines human relationships, and the relationship between
power and people, seeing the dramatic changes that the transition
brought about, now turned their attention to important questions
such as poverty, powerlessness, and ethnic discrimination.
The qualitative methodology used in family sociology could
easily be adapted to research programs that no longer targeted
the general crisis phenomena of the family, but rather specific
topics, such as the situation of the largest ethnic minority,
the Gypsies, in Hungarian society. In other words, the intellectual
capacity, the social sensitivity and commitment of the limited
number of researchers was already tied down by these new topics,
which are in a way related to the work they did previously,
but now seemed more important and more exciting than their
prior area of expertise, which had lost its novelty.
Perhaps
a third hypothesis can be added here. However offending the
sanctified concept of the family, as it is used by politicians,
is to many, the family sociologists still have to acknowledge
that from the point of view of most people, the only thing
that was not touched by the society-wide changes is the family.
For the average person the family - no matter what its connotations
are, no matter what changes it went through - is still the
only type of human contact that is based on solidarity, helping
each other out, the gratification of instincts and emotions,
and that is immune to at least the direct interference of
the various political systems. It is difficult to interpret
the ambivalence between the popularity of the concept of the
family and the continuous change that the meaning of the concept
is going through, especially when we also look at the ambitions
of the various governments apparent in their family policies.
Apart from the complexity of the topic, scepticism may have
also been responsible for the fact that researchers do not
study this topic anymore: the decision makers are not interested
in being confronted with reality, for them the family is not
a reality but a political slogan with positive associations.
We
have established that there is a lack of complex family sociological
research. However, the Hungarian part of an international
comparative research project is underway. (Improving Policy
Responses and Outcomes to Socio-Economic Challenges: changing
family structures, policy and practice). This international
research aims firstly to inform policy by developing the knowledge
base on the social situation in the European Union and applicant
states, such as Hungary; secondly, to increase the understanding
of the policy process, the policy options available to meet
socio-demographic challenges, and their possible social and
economic impacts; thirdly, to make recommendations for improving
the efficacy of policy responses and outcomes to socio-economic
challenges at EU and member state level, taking account of
national diversity. This research will enable us to interpret
the family-related ideology, the decisions, and policy measures
of the political elite using actual data on people living
in various family forms, and on their expectations of the
state's family policies. We will be closer to answering the
complicated question of what the family, marriage, and divorce
mean for individuals and for society as a whole.
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