

Addenda Eudemea^{*}

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For H.B. Gottschalk †

ABSTRACT: This paper presents 16 fragments of the Peripatetic philosopher Eudemus (c. 350-290 BC), which were not printed in the (still) standard edition of Wehrli (1955; revised 1969), but which had been signalled in passing by De Lacy (1957) and Gottschalk (1973). The aim is to provide a text with translation and brief annotation, to be included in a future edition, and to argue that context can add to our understanding of these passages. Their importance lies in bringing greater comprehensiveness to the collection, offering at least five additional (near) quotations, and illustrating the new trend in fragment studies to contextualize fragments on several levels in order to gain further insight into their value and reception.

1. Preface: *déjà vu?*

In a recent paper¹ I have argued that Wehrli's edition of the fragments of Eudemus (*Die Schule des Aristoteles* vol. VIII, 1955; revised 1969) is badly in need of revision. Apart from serious flaws in his editorial methodology I pointed to a number of omissions—in addition to those already indicated by other scholars. I listed the missing passages by page and line numbers with brief notes, but refrained from a fuller treatment of the text as the paper was intended as a broad and critical assessment of Wehrli's approach, not as a philological commentary.

The present paper aims to present the texts of all the missing passages with notes: it is a modest start to facilitate a revision of the Eudemean collection, presenting the additional material relevant for Eudemus' *Physics* not found as fragments in Wehrli.² Obviously some overlap with my previous publication will occur, in particular with regard to the interpretive framework of how we may understand Eudemus' methodology (§2), some of the notes to the fragments, and in the preliminary thoughts I formulate on how the critique of Wehrli may inform the approach to a new edition of fragments (now §5). But I have as a rule referred back to the main arguments of the earlier paper, giving only the gist of them here, while providing more extensive philological notes on the passages (including a few minor corrections).

^{*} My title is a deliberate reference to that of H.B. Gottschalk (†) 'Addenda Peripatetica' in *Phronesis* 1973 (see also below n.8) to whom this paper is dedicated in gratitude for his inspiring scholarship and learned advice which he gave me when he was my 'second Doktorvater' (1989-1993) and after. I regret I was unable to attend the conference on Heraclides of Pontus (Leeds, 2003) celebrating his long and productive career. I am confident he would have accepted this paper as a token of my respect; whether it succeeds in meeting his exceptionally high standards of scholarship is another matter.

¹ Baltussen 2002b, 127-156.

² I have currently no intention to prepare a full new edition myself, as I have too many other commitments (see Bibliography, Baltussen forthcoming 1 & 2).

Most (but not all) omitted passages come from Simplicius, the Neoplatonic commentator of Aristotle, who wrote his voluminous works around AD 530 (see Appendix 1). His importance for recovering information about the philosophy of many ancient philosophers is well known.³ His sources range from Parmenides (6th c. BC) down to thinkers of his own day (e.g. Damascius). One will find quotations, name references and book titles scattered all over his commentaries: for instance, he quotes from Alexander of Aphrodisias' (lost) commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, from Porphyry's (lost) commentary (books 1-4) and synopsis (books 5-8) of Aristotle's *Physics*, and from Themistius' paraphrase of Aristotle's *Physics*.⁴ In the case of Eudemus of Rhodes our knowledge of the fragmentary work also depends to a large extent on Simplicius' references, as can be easily seen from Wehrli's fragment edition.⁵ For physics no less than 102 fragments (nos. 31-123 with subdivisions into a, b etc.) are listed and commented upon in that volume, and all but 2 are taken from Simplicius.⁶

In 1985 H.B. Gottschalk remarked that 'in collecting fragments completeness is an aim in itself'.⁷ I here intend to follow his injunction by gathering together the missing fragments known so far.⁸ First, for the sake of clarity and convenience, I summarize the main points of my previous analysis of the overall structure and plan of Eudemus' physics (§2), then I list and discuss an additional 12 passages with name reference from Simplicius' commentary to Aristotle's *Physics* not in Wehrli as well as other omissions (§3).⁹ Finally, as there is no easy way to conclude a philological commentary in a synoptic manner, I shall briefly list what I believe are the main results, adding a few recommendations for further work.

2. Eudemus' φυσικά: content and nature of the work¹⁰

The fragments on physics show Eudemus as an exegete and interpreter of Aristotle's *Physics*. It is generally assumed that his *Physics* consisted of lecture notes used to teach Aristotle's physics in his own 'school' in Rhodes. I believe that this may also explain the fact that Eudemus' comments seem to possess a dogmatic and systematizing tendency (*pace* Wehrli, n.14 below). His work follows the order of Aristotle's treatise closely (see below) and it is already

³ Though not sufficiently studied: Parmenides, Empedocles and Anaxagoras are the best examples of Presocratics whose *ipsissima verba* we get mostly from the Neoplatonic commentator. See O'Brien 1969; Sider 1981; Perry 1983; Hadot 1987; Tarán 1987.

⁴ For a more complete list of authors in Simplicius see Tarán 1987, 247 and *CAG* Index. I have given a tree diagram mapping out his main sources in Baltussen 2002a.

⁵ *Die Schule des Aristoteles (SA)* vol. VIII (1955, revised in 1969 with some additions, one of which was already mentioned in the appendix to volume X (1959) 'Addenda', pp.198-200, at p.199).

⁶ Fr. 49 is from Plutarch, fr. 89 is from Diogenes Laertius; see also below **T15-16**.

⁷ Gottschalk 1985, 543.

⁸ Gottschalk was also one of the first to stress the importance of context in editing these philosophical fragments, see e.g. Gottschalk 1980, 154, where he points to a recurrent flaw in Wehrli's editorial activity: 'these texts [*SA* Heraclides fr. 98] have been printed without their context in Wehrli's edition, so that much of their meaning has been lost.'

⁹ I discuss references found in the index to vol. X and in commentary vol VIII.

¹⁰ This section is a summary of Baltussen 2002b, §3. See also Sharples 2002.

commented upon in antiquity that he passed over book 7.¹¹ From the remarks in Simplicius we can get a fairly good idea in what order and in how many books he wrote down his clarifications. On the basis of the references to specific books we know that Eudemus' work contained at least 4, possibly 5, books. This indicates that a certain degree of compression and/or editing had taken place. The correspondences with Aristotle's work cannot be established accurately, but Simplicius refers to:

book 1 Aristotle, **book I.1**, 10.3 ἀρχόμενος τῶν φυσικῶν (= fr. 32W; see also I.2, 48.6 = fr. 34W); **I.3**, 133.21 ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν φυσικῶν (= fr. 44W; **II.1**, 263.20 = fr. 50W)

book 2 Aristotle, **book III.1**, 411.15 ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν φυσικῶν (= fr. 59W; see also **III.4**, 459.25 = fr. 62W)

book 3 Aristotle, **book IV.1**, 533.14 ἐν τρίτῳ τῶν φυσικῶν (= fr. 75W; see also **IV.7**, 662.25 = fr. 81W; **IV.11**, 710.33 = fr. 85W; **IV.11**, 717.6 = fr. 86W; **IV.11**, 723.36 = fr. 87W); **IV.12**, 732.24 ἐκ τοῦ τρίτου τῶν φυσικῶν (= fr. 88W); (**V.2**, 860.9 ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ φυσικοῖς = fr. 93aW)

book 4 Aristotle, **book VI.2**, 942.18 ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῶν φυσικῶν = fr. 101W; see also **VI.5**, 989.26-30 = fr. 104W; **VI.6**, 991.29 = fr. 105W)

book 5(?) Aristotle, **book VIII**¹²

This list shows that the work discussed subjects which Aristotle dealt with in books 1-6 and 8.¹³ He clearly needed fewer books than Aristotle did.¹⁴

The main features of Eudemus' method and the nature of his exegesis as they emerge from Simplicius' reports can be summarized as follows.¹⁵ Possibly one of the reasons why Simplicius (and perhaps Alexander and others before him) found Eudemus' comments useful is that his approach towards Aristotle's text was helpful in understanding it.¹⁶ In his comments one can observe an attempt to

¹¹ Simpl. *in Phys.* 1036.14f. τοῦτο [i.e. book 7] παρελθὼν ὡς περιττὸν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ τελευταίῳ βιβλίῳ μετῆλθεν.

¹² A similar but shorter list already in Spengel 1870, viii (very close to Brandis 1860, 215ff.: see Spengel, p.vii). Here I build on and expand on Schöbe 1931, 9-10; Sider 1981, 24. Wehrli does not attempt to reconstruct the structure of Eudemus' work in detail (see his commentary, pp.87-8).

¹³ On the system for numbering books see Baltussen 2002b, 131-2 n.16.

¹⁴ From this it has been assumed that Eudemus' *Physics* was an abbreviated and reworked version of Aristotle's. So Wehrli p.87: 'Aus den Fragmenten ergibt sich das Bild einer verkürzenden Bearbeitung der aristotelischen Physik, welche deren Anordnung und Problemstellung beibehält und nur in Einzelheiten der Behandlung selbständig ist.' See also Sharples 2002, 107-8 and n.18 below.

¹⁵ Here I present a summary of Baltussen 2002b, 130-6.

¹⁶ Cf. Wehrli p.88: 'Die ... erhöhte Verständlichkeit machte E.s Physik zum bequemen Ausgangspunkt der Aristoteleskommentatoren'; Sharples 2002. Wehrli also points out (p.87) that Alexander was not the first to use Eudemus for elucidation of Aristotle's text, as Andronicus is mentioned in fr. 98W, and we know of a Eudemean interpolation into the text from the time of Andronicus (reference to Diels *ad loc.*).

clarify Aristotle's words further: he is drawing out implicit or tacit assumptions and reformulating them as explicit stages in his reasoning, thus spelling out what Aristotle expressed in a more compact style. Simplicius' qualifying remarks before quotations from Eudemos support such an interpretation: for instance, Eudemos is said to follow Aristotle closely in the main topics of his treatise (fr. 98W and 109W) often using shortening paraphrase (fr. 113W and 35W) without necessarily losing in clarity (fr. 149W).

From Simplicius' descriptions one is inclined to think of these lecture-notes as a shorter version of Aristotle's *Physics* with some comments added, since they are both shorter in terms of the general line of argument (note κεφαλαίους 1036.13 and the number of books) and more elaborate in terms of clarification (φιλοκόλως, σαφῶς ἐκτιθεμένην, ἀσφαλῶς).¹⁷ Wehrli (p.88) also infers that, because of both shorter and longer treatment, 'muß E. einzelne Abschnitte übergangen haben', adding that E. skipped 'vermutlich solche [Abschnitte], die seiner systematisierenden Tendenz widerstrebten (cf. z.B. zu fr. 78)'. It is tempting to think of them as 'commentary', but this is not a matter of philological commentary, but rather one of philosophical response to the content in such a way that the doctrine changes through paraphrase, refinement and correction.¹⁸ It is safe to say that he seems quite independent vis-à-vis the treatise (more so than Theophrastus apparently: see Sharples 2002) creating a reworked version of some of Aristotle's ideas on physics while keeping to the main layout and structure. Compared to Theophrastus, Eudemos may be trying to replace Aristotle's work with an independent reworking of it, whereas his colleague is selectively commenting on it in an aporetic fashion.¹⁹ Thus the master's works became only slowly canonised as authoritative expressions of a particular view, as they still considered it possible to correct and explicate his work rather than rejecting it.

The amount and detail of Simplicius' information, illustrated in particular by the numerous references to the individual books (listed above), make it more than probable that he had a copy of Eudemos' work. Yet a few remarks in Simplicius suggest that he had a less complete copy than Alexander.²⁰ Obviously the situation is complex, because Simplicius is referring to and quoting from Eudemos' comments alongside those of e.g. Alexander, Porphyry and Themistius, and Alexander himself also quotes from Eudemos, so that Simplicius on several occasions reports Eudemos *via* Alexander (e.g. 133.21 = fr. 44W,²¹ 930.34 = fr.

¹⁷ This cannot be proven: see Sharples 2002, 112-17 and Baltussen 2002b, 133.

¹⁸ Space does not allow me to deal with this problem of adaptation and its impact on the form of the work here (see Baltussen forthcoming 1). To characterise the work as 'notes on (Aristotle's) physics' might imply that Aristotle's text was considered to be canonical (as Bob Sharples pointed out, e-mail May 6 1997). Wehrli seems to waver between incidental characterisation as elaboration (cf. p.87) and (some form of?) commentary (p.107, on fr. 103).

¹⁹ The question whether the nature of treatises on physics by Aristotle's pupils is an indication of their differing motivation (commenting or replacing) needs further study.

²⁰ See Sider 1981, 25f. (whom I partly paraphrase here) and Wehrli p.88.

²¹ Fr. 43W is more complex: τοῦτο δὲ εἰ μὲν ἀλλαχοῦ ποῦ γέγραφεν οὕτως σαφῶς Εὐδήμιος, οὐκ ἔγω λέγειν ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς περὶ Παρμενίδου τάδε γράφει, ἐξ ὧν ἴσως συναγαγεῖν τὸ εἰρημένον δυνατόν. Here Simplicius seems to be reporting on two separate works from Eudemos, or at least from two different sources (μὲν ... δὲ) and one of them is the

100W).²² But when he states that he was unable to find the words which Alexander quotes from Eudemus (e.g. *in Phys.* 133.26 = fr. 44W Ἀλέξανδρος φησιν· ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐχ εἶδρον ἐν τῷ Εὐδημείῳ τὴν λέξιν ταύτην) we should be on our guard. Of the three suggestions made so far to explain this remark I prefer the one which assumes his copy was incomplete.²³ So we cannot exclude the possibility that Simplicius' copy of Eudemus' notes on physics was less complete than Alexander's.²⁴

3. *Addenda Eudemea*: subject matter and method

The majority of Eudemean fragments presented here are found in Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* and all but one contain Eudemus' name. Wehrli may have felt he could omit them because most do not offer much in content which is not already known from other passages.²⁵ However, as I indicated above, I agree with the view that in collecting fragments, and especially of material otherwise not extant, completeness is an aim in itself. Moreover, I also intend to show that the immediate context of fragments should be used more extensively to glean relevant bits of information from them. It can be argued that context contributes to a better understanding of the fragments. Finally, at least *five* passages added here purport to give a 'quotation' from Eudemus' work, that is, they offer wording which may be taken as (close to) his actual statements. In prose texts it is admittedly very difficult to distinguish between paraphrase and 'quotation' (or even reminiscences) but in these cases Simplicius indicates (in different ways) that he is reproducing accurately the author's words from a written source.²⁶ In my conclusion I shall come back to the issue of (supposed) duplication of quotations—presumably another reason why some of these texts were excluded in Wehrli.

In terms of procedure the following elements will be presented: all the passages discussed refer to Eudemus by name. I note that all passages were

φυσικά (it seems unlikely he is twice quoting from the φυσικά, and that two *passages* are meant here).

²² On some aspects of Simplicius' use of quotation see Baltussen 2002b.

²³ The three options are: (1) either a less complete version than Alexander's (Schöbe 1931, 72) or (2) Alexander's paraphrase obscures the Eudemean material (Wehrli p.95) or (3) Simplicius criticizes Alexander for extreme brevity (Sider 1981, 26: 'a not very oblique criticism of Alexander's scholarship'). Incompleteness is supported, among other things, by fr. 122b (1355.28ff., not mentioned by Sider). For the full argument in favour of this interpretation see Baltussen 2002b, 133-6.

²⁴ Even if—as both Sharples 2002, 115 n.25 and Sider (personal communication) have pointed out to me—in *this instance* Simplicius is relying on Alexander for information. Since we know from several examples that manuscripts did come in different versions, it is not unlikely to have been the case here (see e.g. *in Phys.* 167.33ff. where 168.2 τὰ μὲν εἰς ἐμὲ ἐλθόντα βιβλία τοῦτο τὸ ῥησείδιον οὐκ ἔχει shows that Alexander had a more elaborate text than Simplicius, and cf. *Alex. in de Sensu* 86.2-3, *Simplicius in Phys.* 440.12-15, where a difference between MSS is mentioned). See also Moraux 1985, 231-2.

²⁵ Even De Lacy admits that (1957).

²⁶ I hope to return to these terminological problems another time. For some judicious remarks on this topic see Wildberg 1987, 29-31 (on Simplicius) and van den Hoek 1996, 227-29 (on Clement of Alexandria).

already noted (not discussed) by Phillip De Lacy in his acute review of *SA VIII* in 1957. While pointing to Wehrli's selectivity of references to Eudemus by name he lists the following passages he thought were not included by Wehrli:²⁷ *in Phys.* 11.17; 48.26, 28; 63.19; 69.22; 74.29; 118.6, 9, 19; 120.6; 121.9 [quote at 13]; 138.29 and 30; 433.13; 717.15; 725.23. I shall discuss the additions and/or parallels mentioned by Gottschalk after the passages from S.²⁸ In defense of Wehrli one might perhaps say that this kind of omission can be explained because indexes of earlier editions—usually the first (and often only?) source of passages for modern (pre-TLG?) editors—were incomplete. Yet in this particular case this cannot be the whole story: Wehrli at times includes texts *not* in the *CAG* index, but he also leaves out texts which *are* in the *CAG* index.²⁹ The new count established by the addition of the texts discussed below amounts to 132 passages with name reference; Spengel had indicated 116, the *CAG* 125. Wehrli does refer to some of these passages in several places, but his reasons for this approach are far from obvious, or poorly justified.

4. Texts, translation and commentary

In this section I shall go over the passages in order of occurrence and importance, listing brief name references first (SECTION A, texts 1-7) and more extensive reports and/or 'quotations' second (SECTION B, texts 8-12); in addition four more texts not from Simplicius are listed (SECTION C, texts 13-16; see n.28). In each case I give:

- (i) a provisional number (e.g. **T1** for Text 1)
- (ii) the lines of the text as printed (some context may be added)
- (iii) the reference where Eudemus' name occurs;
- (iv) the text (*CAG*; critical apparatus where it may affect the meaning);
- (v) a translation (all translations are tentative).
- (vi) a brief commentary; its parts are labelled POSITION (i.e. in Simplicius, and in relation to known fragments) CONTEXT and COMMENTS; the comments are primarily historical and philological.³⁰

²⁷ De Lacy 1957, 270 n.1. As far as I know he was the only reviewer to indicate omissions of this kind.

²⁸ Gottschalk 1973, 98. To fr. 7-8: cf. Olympiodorus, *in Cat.* 13.25; to fr. 79: cf. Philoponus, *in Phys.* 541.71; to fr. 80: cf. Themistius, *in Phys.* 119.25; to fr. 100: cf. Themistius, *in Phys.* 182.24.

²⁹ Here I would like to present some examples to back this up. We may provisionally distinguish three categories: (a) texts found in Wehrli and Spengel, not in *CAG* (e.g. fr. 43W = 11 Sp., fr. 103 = 65 Sp., fr. 111 = 71 Sp.); (b) texts found in Wehrli, but not Spengel nor in *CAG* (e.g. fr. 54b and 70W); (c) texts not found in Wehrli or Spengel, but in *CAG* (e.g. *in Phys.* 11.17, 118.6,9,19; 120.6; 121.9,13; 138.29; 433.13; 725.23 [all noted by De Lacy]).

³⁰ I should mention that to establish my approach here (and in 2002b) I have benefited enormously from examining the methodology and the approaches in more recent fragment editions (e.g. I. Kidd, *Posidonius* 1987-1999; P. van der Eijk, *Diocles of Carystus* 2001), but also from participating in the working group preparing the new edition of the Early Stoics under the guidance of J. Mansfeld (1990-1996) and the work on FHSG fr. 225-45 (forthcoming) in cooperation with W.W. Fortenbaugh, R.W. Sharples, P. Huby and D. Gutas (since 1987). And as always the TLG has been an invaluable resource.

An attempt to present a synthetic appreciation is made in the conclusion, but given my focus on the individual texts and given the disparate nature of the texts discussed, such a ‘synthesis’ can only be very tentative and provisional.

A. Short references by name (T1-7)

T1. *in Phys.* I.2, p.11.16-17 Diels (name at 11.17)

POSITION: Text is found between name-references at 10.23 (fr. 32W) and 22.15 (fr. 33aW).

CONTEXT: Since it is a short reference containing Simplicius’ objections, it does not seem necessary to print more text. The lemma at issue for S. is Ar. *Phys.* 184a10 and deals with the *archai*; the views of Theophrastus (9.7-10), Porphyry (9.11ff. and 10.25ff.), Eudemos (10.3ff.) and Alexander (10.12ff.) are given on the issue of the different kinds of *archê* and the difference between *archê* and *aition*.

τούτων δὲ ἡμῶν ἱστορημένων πρὸς μὲν τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ πρὸ τούτου |¹⁷
πρὸς τὸν Εὐδήμιον ῥητέον, ὅτι ...

Now that I have reported these views, against Alexander and before him against Eudemos must be stated, that ...

COMMENTS:

16 Ἀλέξανδρον] In the commentary Alexander and Eudemos are mentioned together quite a number of times, but there is a conspicuously uneven spread across the whole commentary (*in Phys.* book 1: 10.3, 13; 11.17; 42.14; 60.22, 27; 83.28, 31; 133.21; book 6: 930.35) and often Eudemos’ view is preferred (cf. Sider 1981, 24). In this case Alexander was quoted earlier (10.12) as following Eudemos (fr. 32W) in the view that ‘cause, while being defined in four ways, is said to be element with regard to matter’ (10.13f.). A little later S. also argues against Porphyry on the same issue (πρὸς μὲν τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ... at 11.17 is answered by πρὸς δὲ τὸν Πορφύριον, ἔτι ... at 11.23). S. exhibits a clear historical awareness of *relative* dates (but he is inaccurate in his indication of absolute dates).

T2. [ad fr. 34W] *in Phys.* I.2, p.48.26-29 Diels (name at 48.26, 28)

POSITION: Concluding statement to fr. 34W.

CONTEXT: The lemma (184b25) reads: ‘the question whether being is one and unmoved does not belong to the inquiry into nature’ (46.9-10).

ταύτην τὴν τοῦ Εὐδήμιου λέξιν σαφῶς ἐκτιθεμένην τὴν τῷ |²⁷ προβλήματι προσήκουσαν ἀπορίαν ὅλην παρεθέμην τοῖς ζητητικωτέροις. |²⁸ καὶ ὁ μὲν Εὐδήμιος τὴν ἐπικρισιν, ὡς εἶπον, εἰς τελειότερας πραγματείας |²⁹ ἀνεβάλετο.

26 τὴν] μὲν Spengel, post Εὐδήμιου collocant τὴν DE | 27 ζητητικωτέροις a :
ζητητικωτέροις D : ζητικωτέροις EF | 28 ἀπόκρισιν a

I have added to the more problematic questions this quotation from Eudemos in its entirety which has so clearly expounded the *aporia* relevant to the problem. The decision Eudemos also defers, as I said, to a treatise of a more accomplished nature.

COMMENTS:

27 παρεθέμην] There is strong indication that in the commentators παρατίθεσθαι (cf. παραγράφειν) is almost always used to introduce (fairly) accurate quotations (exceptions exist, see e.g. Themistius *in de Anima*, p.107.30 Heinze [*CAG* V.3] παραθέσθαι); cf. below **T7** and e.g. one of the famous Empedocles passages from his poem (31B17 DK) which is introduced with the same verb (τὰ εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ παρατεθέντα, Simpl. *in Phys.* 161.14); see also Martin and Primavesi 1998, 112 n.5 ('cité'), and Wildberg 1993, 193f. (with notes), who translates 'ganz genau zitieren' (but not *verbatim*, *ibid.* n.20) and points out the very interesting implication that S. does not distinguish between the basic meaning of παρατίθεσθαι/παραγράφειν, 'marking a text with signs' (in the margin) and 'quoting', so that it is possible that Simplicius himself marked citations (adducing *in Cat.* 64.20-25). One may add τὰ εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ παρατεθέντα, cf. Simpl., *in de Cael.* 135.15, 637.12, 644.5; *in Phys.* 161.15 [less relevant 225.22, 1173.32]; also *in Phys.* 83.28 + 725.23 μετ' ὀλίγον παραθήσομαι, 97.9 παραθέσθαι, 175.33 παρεθέμην, and 432.20f. [announced in 431.5-6: μετ' ὀλίγον ἔσται δῆλον, ὅταν τὴν Πλάτωνος | ῥῆσιν παραθῶμεν] ἀλλὰ καιρὸς μοι λοιπὸν ἔστι τὴν Πλάτωνος παραθέσθαι ῥῆσιν τὴν ἐν Τιμαίῳ γεγραμμένην ... (quotes *Tim.* 57e-58c); 433.14 πρὸ ὀλίγου παρεθέμην, 733.4 μετ' ὀλίγον τῶν ἥδη παρατεθέντων γέγραφεν (subject is Aristotle, and a quote follows); 1165.20 παρεθέμην πρὸ ὀλίγου τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος αὐτὰ ῥήματα 1132.26f. παραθέμενος δὲ καὶ τοῦ Θεμιστίου τὴν παράφρασιν ταύτης τῆς λέξεως λέγουσαν (quote follows); 1333.33 (after a long quote from Philoponus) ταῦτα τοσαῦτα παρεθέμην, ἵνα καὶ τὴν ἕξιν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τούτου παραδείξω). Cf. Plutarch *Aristides* 26.4 παρατίθεσθαι τοὺς ἱστοροῦντας on the use of documentary evidence (quoted and translated in Higbie 1999, 47). In his comments on marginalia N.G. Wilson (1984, 108) discusses two cases, one from late 7th c. AD, the other from c. 800 AD, where the verb 'indicates the normal position of notes in the margin without implying anything about their origin or complexity'; they are the basis for marginal commentaries on classical texts.

28 τὴν ἐπίκρισιν] The word picks up on 48.9 κρίνει, it implies a decision on the question whether each discipline is able to find its own *archai* (cf. Arist. *Top.* 1.2 101a34-b4).

28-9 ὡς εἶπον, εἰς τελειότερας πραγματείας ἀνεβάλετο] With the ὡς εἶπον S. is referring to line 7 (indicated by Diels *ad loc.*) as is clear from the restatement of the introduction to fr. 34W, p.48.7 τὴν δὲ λύσιν εἰς ἄλλας πραγματείας τελειότερας ὑπερτίθεται [*om.* DE]). The 'treatise of a more accomplished nature' must refer to the *Metaphysics* (cf. line 3).

T3. in Phys. I.2, p.63.19-20 Diels (name at 63.19)

POSITION: Belongs to fr. 140W (*in Phys.* 60-63) but is not printed; it is the closing statement to *in Phys.* 63.10-18 (see Wehrli, p.62, lines 1-7).

CONTEXT: In the long fr. 140W, reporting passages from Eudemus' *Geometrikē historia* book 2, Wehrli has selectively omitted lines from *CAG*. He follows Diels in all but two demarcations of Eudemian passages (his commentary, p.118, 2nd paragraph; cf. above **T2** COMMENTS). On pp.58-66 (*SA* 1969) Wehrli prints as a continuous text a number of

passages which are only divided by short breaks with dots and the phrase ‘Simplicii interpretatio’ (he only sporadically adds the ‘Simpl. interpr.’ as text, noting on p.117 of his commentary: ‘Unser Text läßt die erläuterenden Zwischenbemerkungen des Simplicius aus, soweit sie als solche evident sind.’ It is the last part of the remark that gives us an inkling of how Wehrli made decisions about inclusion or exclusion of material). [NB The omitted lines are: p.54.12-55.28; 60.18-61.9; 61.14-27; 61.34-62.1; 62.5-8; 62.10-23; 62.30-63.7+8-10 Simpl. interpr.; **63.10-18**; 64.7-24; 65.9-10+10-23 Simpl. interpr.; 65.7-8 + 65.24-66.2; Simpl. interpr. 66.3-6; 66.6-12; 66.14-67.6; 67.11-68.3; Simpl. interpr. 68.3-6; 68.6-11; Simpl. interpr. 68.11-13; 68.13-32; 68.32-33 (Simpl. concluding statement).]

τὸν δὲ τοῦ μηνίσκου τούτου τετραγωνισμὸν παρήκεν ὁ Εὐδημος ὡς |²⁰
σαφῆ οἶμαι.

The quadrature of that lune (= crescent-shaped figure) Eudemus skipped as unproblematic it seems to me.

COMMENTS:

19-20 παρήκεν ... ὡς σαφῆ] A passing remark in which S. reports Eudemus’ silence on the quadrature of the lune. It can be asked whether S. found Eudemus actually *saying* that the matter was clear and therefore needed no comment. Given the brevity of Eudemus in general (see above p.4) it seems more likely that Eudemus’ silence is *interpreted* as intended, as οἶμαι suggests. On the actual proof see Heath (below **T4** COMMENTS).

T4. in Phys. I.2, p.69.18-24 Diels (name at 69.22)

POSITION: Comes between name-references at 63.19 (fr. 140W) and 74.18 (fr. 35W).

CONTEXT: Text is connected to the discussion of **T3** on the squaring of the circle.

... πῶς οὖν ὅτι ψευδογραφεῖσθαι δόξει ὁ τοῦ Ἴππο|¹⁹κράτους
τετραγωνισμός, εἰ μήπω εὐρήσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐνομίσθη |²⁰
λέγοντος ἐν Κατηγορίαις: “οἶον ὁ τοῦ κύκλου τετραγωνισμός εἰ ἔστιν
ἐπι|²¹στητός, ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστι πω, τὸ δὲ ἐπιστητόν ἐστι”,
καίτοι |²² τοῦ Χίου Ἴπποκράτους πρὸ Ἀριστοτέλους ὄντος, ὥστε καὶ τὸν
Εὐδημον |²³ ἐν τοῖς παλαιότεροις αὐτὸν ἀριθμεῖν. μήποτε οὖν οὐ καθόλου
πᾶς μηνίσκος |²⁴ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἴπποκράτους ἐτετραγωνίσθη.

19 εἰ aE^b : ἢ D | 20 Κατηγορίαις c.7 p.7b31 εἶγε Aristoteles | 21 οὐκ ἔστι οὐδέπω,
αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπιστητόν ἐστι Aristoteles, καίτοι aE^b : καὶ D | 24 ἐτετραγωνίσθη ὑπὸ
τοῦ Ἴπποκράτους a

(22-3) ... since even Hippocrates the Chian lived before Aristotle, for which reason also Eudemus counts him among the earlier mathematicians ...

COMMENTS:

23 ἐν τοῖς παλαιότεροις] This (scholarly?) note on chronology probably belongs to the *Geometrikê historia*. The proof discussed at p.54-55 (see **T3**) was attributed to Hippocrates of Chios, *fl.* end 5th c. BC (p.55.27). For a full discussion of the whole passage—including the scholarly literature, and the mathematical details of the quadrature of lunes and of the circle—see Heath 1921, I.182-202, 220-22.

T5. [ad fr. 35W] in Phys. I.2, p.74.29-30 Diels (name at 74.29)

POSITION: Closing statement to fr. 35W.

CONTEXT: The lemma is concerned with *Phys.* 185a20 ‘the most proper *archē*’.

ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ τοῦ Εὐδήμου προσιστόρηται,³⁰ τὰ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐπιστάσεως ἄξια προσθετέον.

29 ἐπεὶ D | 30 τὴν om. D, προθετέον a

But now that the words of Eudemus have also been related, we should add what is worth knowing in connection with the passage.

COMMENTS:

29-30 προσιστόρηται] In fr. 35W, after paraphrasing Porphyry with approval (καλῶς δὲ ὁ Πορφύριος ... 74.5-18) S. discusses Eudemus (74.18-29) whom he quotes as giving a more concise analysis of the problem (ὁ μέντοι Εὐδημος συντομώτερον οὕτως ἐπιχειρεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, 18f.) another indication of his usefulness for a commentator.

T6. [ad fr. 86W] in Phys. IV.11, p.717.14-20 Diels (name at 717.15)

POSITION: Concluding statement to fr. 86W (‘third book of Eudemus’ *Physics*)

CONTEXT: Discussion of time as number of change (*Phys.* IV.11) and Eudemus’ aporia.

ταῦτα σαφῶς |¹⁵ οὕτω τοῦ Εὐδήμου γεγραφότος ἄξιον ἐπιστήσαι τί τὸ καθόλου τοῦτο. εἰ |¹⁶ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐν ὑποστάσει ἢ καθόλου κίνησις, διὰ τί μὴ καὶ ἄνθρωπος |¹⁷ καὶ ἵππος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον; διὰ τί δὲ μὴ ὥσπερ ἢ κίνησις ἢ μὲν |¹⁸ καθόλου, ἢ δὲ ἴδιος, οὕτω καὶ ὁ χρόνος ὁ μὲν κοινός, ὁ δὲ ἴδιος; εἰ δὲ |¹⁹ τὸ καθόλου τῆς κινήσεως ἢ οὐδὲν ἢ ὕστερον, ὡς δὲ ἔχει ἢ κίνησις ἔχει |²⁰ καὶ χρόνος, καὶ οὕτως ἄρα ἢ οὐδὲν ἢ ἐπινοίᾳ μόνον.

Since Eudemus has written these things so clearly, it is worth our while to take note of what this general <change> is. For if general change subsists, why <does> not man and horse and each of the other <substances> also <subsist>? For what reason should there not be general time and particular time, just as there is change in general and in particular? If the universal of change either is not(hing) or posterior, and as is change, so also is time, then that too is either not(hing) or in thought alone.

COMMENTS: Fr. 86W deals with time and Eudemus’ comments in his book 3.

14-15 σαφῶς ... γεγραφότος] The Eudemian remarks on the discussion of time are praised for clarity (fr. 86W = *in Phys.* 717.6-14); S. next paraphrases and develops this in his own words. Here he clearly relies on Eudemus’ explanation for developing his own argument.

15 τὸ καθόλου] E. speaks of κοινὸν τῆς κινήσεως (*in Phys.* 717.9) and καθόλου (*ibid.* 717.11). The Neoplatonic view of time in the world, and time as ‘supernatural’ no doubt underlies his remarks here. Eternity existed before time in the physical realm and is as such immune to change in the ordinary sense.

T7. in Phys. IV.12, p.725.19-28 Diels (name at 725.23)

POSITION: Comes between name-references at 723.36 (fr. 87W) and 732.24 (fr. 88W).

CONTEXT: The remark is too brief to be clear unless one adds some of the preceding lines.

καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀλίγον προελθὼν ἐρεῖ, ὅτι ὥσπερ ἡ κίνησις τῷ ²⁰ εἶδει ἢ αὐτῇ τῷ πάλιν καὶ πάλιν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ χρόνος. τὸ δὲ οὕτως τῷ ²¹ εἶδει τὸ αὐτὸ ὡς κατὰ μηδὲν εἶναι διάφορον, καὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ πως τὸ αὐτὸ ²² δοκεῖ, ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μονάδων εἴρηται πρότερον. καὶ μετ' ὀλίγον τὸν ²³ **Εὐδημιον** μάρτυρα παραθήσομαι. διόπερ οὐδὲ πάνυ δοκεῖ σκληρὰ ἢ πρὸς ²⁴ τὴν στιγμὴν καὶ τὸ φερόμενον ὁμοιότης τοῦ νῦν. πρὸς δὲ τὸ δεύτερον τῶν ²⁵ ζητηθέντων ῥητέον, ὅτι τὸ κίνημα πέρας ἐστὶ κινήσεως, οὐ μέντοι οὔτε ²⁶ ἀρχὴ κινήσεως οὔτε αἰτία. ὡς αἴτια οὖν τὴν τε στιγμὴν καὶ τὸ νῦν ὑπο²⁷τιθέμενος, τὸ μὲν τῆς γραμμῆς, τὸ δὲ τοῦ χρόνου, εἰκότως τούτοις ἀνάλογον ²⁸ τὸ φερόμενον ἔλαβεν.

(22-3) And a little further along I shall quote Eudemus as (additional) witness.

COMMENTS:

22 μετ' ὀλίγον ... παραθήσομαι] On the verb see my remarks to **T2**. The announcement of a quotation further on is an interesting aspect of Simplicius' procedure. The phrase μετ' ὀλίγον/-α is not used very often for this kind of reference ahead: most cases concern the order of exposition *in Aristotle* (a sign of S.'s thorough knowledge of the text), but some may concern matters of doctrine (e.g. related to time, as in 752.3). When it is used for Simplicius's own working-order, μετ' ὀλίγον is hard to interpret (cf. Barnes *et. al.* 1991, 4 n.25 regarding Alexander) but remarkable nevertheless. In this case the reference ahead is to p.732 (= fr. 88W, noted by Diels in *CAG* index) which means 7 pages (!) later in our present edition. On other occasions it may be less: as Perry notes (1983, 202) at 43.19 μετ' ὀλίγα means 'a jump of 45 lines of an OCT text', while at 180.8 concerning Parmenides 'it is unclear how many verses <he> omits'. See also Wehrli's comments (p.105-6).

23 μάρτυρα] Cf. **T8**, and fr. 37bW and 59W; S. seems to have regarded quotation as an essential part of his argument (see Baltussen 2002a). Perry (1983, 128, 264-5, 267) points to some interesting examples of quotations where this is more or less implicitly stated; S. often introduces these by saying that it will be useful and appropriate to 'listen to the words' (ἀκούειν, e.g. 644.25) or he reproaches others for not 'listening carefully' to the doctrines of the ancient philosophers (e.g. *contra* Alexander at 80.16-17). This cannot be explained only by saying that these notes were meant to be read and listened to (cf. Praechter 1910; Hadot and Hoffmann (2001), introduction to *in Cat.*; Barnes *et. al.* 1991, 6; Schenkeveld 1992; Opsomer and Sharples 2000; for this particular point of how S. marks out quotations with specific verbs see Baltussen 2002a).

B. Paraphrase and (approximate) quotation (T8-12)

This section discusses longer passages containing Eudemus' name and 'quotations'. Inverted commas indicate that we may encounter several degrees of

supposed reporting of Eudemus' words, ranging from paraphrase to approximate quotation to fairly accurate quotation. The deliberate use of quotation by Simplicius is discussed in Baltussen (2002a).

T8. in Phys. I.3, p.118.5-20 Diels (name at 118.6, 9, 19)

POSITION: This text (as **T9** and **T10**) is found in S. between 115.11 (fr. 43W) and 133.21 (fr. 44W). Perhaps Wehrli did not include this passage, because it is a comment on Parmenides, i.e. not representing Eudemus' view on Aristotle; **T8-10** are fr. 11 Spengel (p.1144^b CAG index).

CONTEXT: Discussion of Parmenides' ἐν τὸ ὄν thesis. The problem of unity and being was a particularly important one for the Neoplatonists (see e.g. Plotinus *Enn.* 5.1; Dodds 1923; Wallis 1971, 55).

κἂν μοναχῶς δέ τις ὑπόθῃται τὸ ὄν λέγεσθαι, ὡς |⁶ μνημονεύει **Εὐδημος**, ψεῦδος καὶ οὗτος λαμβάνει· οὐ γὰρ μοναχῶς τὸ ὄν, |⁷ εἴ γε δεκαχῶς. ἔπειτα οὐδὲ οὕτως συμπεραίνει ὅτι ἐν τὸ ὄν. κἂν ὑπόθῃ⁸ται δέ τις μηδὲν ἄλλο παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι, οὐδὲν κωλύει οὐσίας μὲν |⁹ εἶναι μόνας, πολλὰς δὲ ταύτας, ὅπερ καὶ **ὁ Εὐδημος** ἐδήλωσε διὰ τοῦ |¹⁰ “οὐδὲ εἴ τις αὐτῷ συγχωρήσειε μοναχῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ ὄν” καὶ τὸ ἐξῆς |¹¹ “ὡς γὰρ εἰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα καλὰ εἶη καὶ μηθὲν εἶη λαβεῖν ὃ οὐκ ἔστι |¹² καλόν, καλὰ μὲν ἔσται πάντα, οὐ μὴν ἐν γε τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ πολλὰ (τὸ μὲν |¹³ γὰρ χρῶμα καλὸν ἔσται τὸ δὲ ἐπιτήδευμα τὸ δὲ ὀτιδίποτε)”, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ |¹⁴ ἐπὶ το λευκοῦ ἔδειξεν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ὄντα μὲν πάντα ἔσται, |¹⁵ ἀλλ' οὐχ ἐν οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτό· καὶ ψευδῆς ἡ ἐπιφορὰ ἡ λέγουσα “ἐν ἄρα τὸ |¹⁶ ὄν” καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῶν κειμένων συνηγμένη. κἂν γὰρ μοναχῶς τὸ ὄν, οὐκ |¹⁷ ἤδη ἐν τὸ ὄν· μοναχῶς γὰρ λέγεται καὶ γένει καὶ εἴδει· ἑκατέρως δὲ |¹⁸ πολλὰ. καὶ συμβήσεται τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ καλὸν παραδείγματος ὑπὸ **τοῦ** |¹⁹ **Εὐδήμου** εἰρημένον ὅτι “καλὰ μὲν ἔσται πάντα, οὐ μὴν ἐν τὸ καλόν” τῷ |²⁰ ἀριθμῷ.

If anyone posits that being is defined in one way (only) he too would be wrong, as Eudemus reminds us. For being <is> not <defined> in one way, rather in ten ways. Next, the argument will not even in that case reach its conclusion that being is one. If anyone assumes that there is nothing else besides substance, there is nothing to prevent there being substances alone, but many of them, which is what Eudemus explained by the words “but if one admits that being is defined in one way”, and the following “for if all existing things would be beautiful and one could not imagine anything that is not beautiful, everything will be beautiful, but even so beautiful will not be *one* thing just (the) one as the beautiful, but many (for the color will be beautiful, and the behaviour, and the whatever-it-may-be)”, and Aristotle has shown the same with regard to the white, ... [*Phys.* 186a27?] and the statement ‘for being is one’ is false and cannot be deduced from the premisses [cf. 186a24]. For even if being is spoken of in a unified way, it is still not one; for ‘in a unified way’ is said both generically and specifically, yet in both cases there is many. And what is said by Eudemus about the example according to the beautiful will also apply, i.e. that “there are many beautiful things, but still the beautiful will be one” numerically.

COMMENTS: S. is giving a detailed (though not very sophisticated) clarification of Eudemus' critical comments of a certain type of interpretation of being; the terminology here, alluding to the ten categories (δεκαχῶς), is basic and spells out the issue of the 'one and many', i.e. the problem of participation and how the Form of Beauty can have many instantiations without being divided (physically).

9 ἐδήλωσε διὰ τοῦ] Does this introduce a paraphrase? If the interpretation of παρατίθεσθαι (above **T2**, **T7**) is correct, the present report would qualify as paraphrase (this does not immediately solve the issue of accuracy, and it does make the task of separating out E.'s words more difficult). The substantiated phrasing of the report (διὰ τοῦ κτλ) is not uncommon, but still less frequent than examples introduced with verbs of speaking or writing (cf. **T9-10**).

10 καὶ τὸ ἐξῆς] On occasion S. will indicate a 'jump' in his referencing; when it concerns his own narrative we can infer that it may differ in size from some lines to several pages (cf. **T7**).

14 ἐπὶ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἔδειξεν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης] Diels refers to 186a27 but only λευκοῦ is found there. That is why, *pace* Diels/Wehrli, I leave out the quotation marks (on λευκοῦ cf. comments to **T9**).

T9. in Phys. I.3, p.120.1-12 Diels (name at 120.6)

POSITION: See remark to **T8**; a partial doublet with 115.25-116.4 = fr. 43W (which may be the reason why W. omitted it). Fr. 43W is a fuller quotation according to Perry 1983, 101.

CONTEXT: Discussion of Aristotle's very formal refutation of Parmenides (186a22ff., as with Melissos immediately before at 186a4ff.) concerning the multiplicity of being.

τοῦτο δέ, φησί, Παρμενί²δης οὔπω ἔώρα [186a31-2], ὅτι δυνατὸν τὰ τῆ ὑποστάσει ἐν ὄντα λόγους διαφόρους |³ ἔχειν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο πολλὰ εἶναι. καὶ οὐδὲν μὲν ἦν θαυμαστὸν τοὺς |⁴ κανόνας τῶν λόγων μήπω τότε διακεκρίσθαι, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον φωραθέντας ἐξ |⁵ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως ἐξενεχθῆναι πρὸς πλείονα συντελοῦντας |⁶ ἀκρίβειαν ὡς καὶ ὁ **Εὐδημος** μαρτυρεῖ λέγων “Παρμενίδου μὲν οὖν ἀγα⁷σθείη τις ἀναξιοπίστοις ἀκολουθήσαντος λόγοις καὶ ὑπὸ τοιούτων ἀπατηθέντος |⁸ ὁ οὔπω τότε διεσαφεῖτο. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ πολλαχῶς ἔλεγεν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλὰ |⁹ Πλάτων πρῶτος τὸ δισσὸν εἰσήγαγεν, οὔτε τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ συμβε¹⁰βηκός· φαίνεται δὲ ὑπὸ τούτων διαψευσθῆναι. ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ τῶν λόγων καὶ |¹¹ τῶν ἀντιλογιῶν ἐθεωρήθη καὶ τὸ συλλογιστικόν. οὐ γὰρ συνεχωρεῖτο, εἰ |¹² μὴ φαίνοντο ἀναγκαῖον οἱ δὲ πρότερον ἀναποδείκτως ἀπεφαίνοντο.”

6 μὲν οὖν] οὖν om. D (cf. 120.6) : μὲν οὖν <οὐκ ἄν> DK 28A28 | 7 ἀναξιοπίστοις F : ἄν ἀξιοπίστοις DE : ἄν ἀναξιοπίστοις a

But this, he [= Aristotle] says, Parmenides did not yet understand [*Phys.* 186a3-12], that it is possible for the things that are one in real existence to have different accounts and be many in accordance with this. And it was thus not surprising that the set meanings(?) of the words had not (yet) been distinguished then, but were developed after their discovery from the things themselves towards a greater accuracy in this way. And Eudemus also testifies to this,

stating: “One may wonder at Parmenides’ obsequiousness to reasonings unworthy of belief and his being deceived by these kind of things, which were not yet clarified then. For nor did anyone speak of ambiguity—Plato being the one who first introduced ambiguity (τὸ δισσὸν)—nor of inherence or the contingent; it would seem he was misled by these. These <concepts> were investigated from arguments and counter-arguments, as was deductive reasoning. For they were not admitted, if it did not appear necessary. Those before then made claims without (offering) proof.”

COMMENTS: The interpretation S. is proposing is backed up with Eudemus’ comment.

4 κανόννας] Originally ‘rod, bar to keep a thing straight’ (*LSJ* s.v. I.1), it came to be used for anything fixed as a standard in several areas, whether philosophy (cf. the *Kanon* of Epicurus on logic), art, or grammar. The latter discipline can use it as ‘general rule’ (*LSJ* s.v. II.3). This could lead to a translation ‘rules for (the proper use of) words’ (based on a suggestion by Malcolm Heath) or my slightly looser rendering which tries to capture the notion of *linguistic* standard.

6 ὡς καὶ ὁ Εὐδημος μαρτυρεῖ λέγων] E. is invoked as witness to the interpretation of Aristotle’s words. It is not quite clear to me where the quotation ends (see below).

7 ἀναξιοπίστοις] The word is rare (twice in S.: here and 115.25) and the present case may be the earliest occurrence (if it is Eudemus’); cf. Aristoxenus fr. 51.5 (*ap. Cyrill. Contra Julianum* VI 208), Alexander in *Metaph.* 317.15.

11 τὸ συλλογιστικόν] This term found only here and at 51.20, ὁ τρόπος τῆς συνθέσεως ὁ κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ συλλογιστικὸν ἡμάρτηται; hence we may suggest σχῆμα as ellipse here. S. often schematizes arguments beyond the original text, in an attempt to connect Aristotle’s argumentative practice with his theory (*APost.*; see also συλλογιστικῶς at 266.5, 384.3, 436.7 etc). The term could be an indication that the quote ends earlier (e.g. after διαψευσθῆναι) or that there is more paraphrase here than is apparent from μαρτυρεῖ λέγων.

T10. in Phys. I.3, p.121.5-17 Diels (name at 121.9)

POSITION: Between name-references 115.15 (fr. 43W) and 133.21 (fr. 44W).

CONTEXT: A discussion of the meanings of ‘is’ in relation to absolute concepts (Forms) and their instantiations (participation: μετέχον 8-9); the quote occurs in lines 13-17 (after γράφει δὲ οὕτως).

ἀκριβο⁶λογουμένῳ δὲ οὐδὲ τούτων τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ὄνομα, εἴπερ τὸ μὲν λευκόν, τὸ ⁷ δὲ λευκότης, καὶ τὸ μὲν ποιόν, τὸ δὲ ποιότης. διὸ καὶ ὀριζόμεθα τὴν μὲν ⁸ λευκότητα χρῶμα διακριτικὸν ὄψεως, τὸ δὲ λευκὸν σῶμα λευκότητος με⁹τέχον. ταῦτα δὴ συνιδῶν ὡς ἔοικεν ὁ **Εὐδημος** οὐκ ἐβιάσατο ἐπὶ ταύτῳ ¹⁰ τῇ ὑποστάσει ἐνὸς δεῖξαι τὴν τῶν λόγων διαφορὰν, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ κοινοῦ τινος ¹¹ τοῦ καλοῦ τὴν δεῖξιν ἐποιήσατο πολλοῖς κατὰ λόγον διαφέρουσιν ἐφαρμότ¹²τοντος, ὥστε πάλιν τὸ δοκοῦν ἐν εἶναι τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν κοινότητα, πολλὰ ¹³ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς λόγους. **γράφει δὲ οὕτως:** “ὥσπερ δὲ εἰ πάντα εἶη τὰ ὄντα ¹⁴ καλὰ καὶ μηθὲν εἶη

λαβεῖν ὃ οὐκ ἔστι καλόν, καλὰ μὲν ἔσται πάντα, οὐ¹⁵ μὴν ἔν γε τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ πολλά (τόδε μὲν γὰρ χρῶμα καλὸν ἔσται, τόδε δὲ ἐπιτήδευμα ὀτιδήποτε), οὕτω [δὲ] δὴ καὶ ὄντα μὲν πάντα ἔσται, ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἔν¹⁶ οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτό· ἕτερον μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὕδωρ, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ πῦρ.”

To someone who is giving an accurate description a name of these things is not the same either, if the white is one thing, whiteness another, and the qualified one thing, quality another. For this reason we define, on the one hand, whiteness as color dispersing (or decomposing) sight (διακριτικὸν ὄψεως), the white as a body participating (μετέχον) in whiteness. Eudemus, understanding these distinctions, it seems, did not forcibly try to show the difference of the words in view of the same existent one, but he set up a proof in view of some common feature of the beautiful as fitting many different things according to proportion, so that again what seems one is that in respect of the common feature, but is many in respect of their relations (to the common feature?). And he writes as follows: “similarly if all existing things would be beautiful and one could not imagine anything that is not beautiful, everything will be beautiful, but even so beautiful will not be *one* thing just (the) one as the beautiful, but many (for this <thing> will be a beautiful colour, and this <a beautiful> behaviour whatever-it-may-be), so also all things that exist <will be beautiful>, yet not <as> one nor <as> the same; for water is a different thing, and fire (yet) another.”

COMMENTS: Note Diels *in app.* to line 13: ‘cf. 115, 22. 118, 11.’ The reference to 115.22 is to fr. 43W; 118.11 is not in Wehrli (only as a brief reference *in app.* p.29).

8 χρῶμα διακριτικὸν ὄψεως] The phrase is also at Arist. *Top.* 119a30-1 (cf. 107b28, 153a38) and *Metaph.* 1057b8-9 (but *not* in *Phys.*). S. may be conflating information from different treatises, perhaps as a result of working from memory.

13-15 ὥσπερ δὲ εἰ ... ὀτιδήποτε] Apart from a few elisions these lines are almost identical to **T8**, 11-13.

13 γράφει] The verb does not guarantee accuracy, but for Simplicius it usually does indicate reliability, better than λέγει and equivalent to παρατίθεσθαι (see **T2**, **T7**).

T11. in Phys. I.3, p.138.25-139.5 Diels (name at 138.29, 30)

POSITION: Between name reference at 133.21 (fr. 44W) and 143.5 (fr. 45W); cf. Diels *CAG* ad 138.30 (app.): ‘fr. 7 p.14.8 Sp. cf. p.97.11 [= fr. 37aW]’, a partial doublet.

CONTEXT: Zeno’s thesis against plurality (‘argument from dichotomy’, Arist. *Phys.* 187a1, cf. *Simpl.* 138.3 Diels), and Eudemus’ role in Alexander’s interpretation.

εἰ δὲ αὐ²⁶τὸς ὁ Ζήνων ἀνήρει τὸ ἐν πολλά εἶναι δεικνύς, οὐκ ἐδεῖτό τινος συνηγορίας |²⁷ ὁ λόγος, εἰ μὴ ἄρα λέγοι τις ὅτι ὡς ἀντιθέτου τούτου τοῦ λόγου τοῦ λέ²⁸γοντος πολλά μόνον εἶναι τὰ ὄντα ἐμνημόνευσεν. |²⁹ ἀλλ’ ἔοικεν ἀπὸ τῶν **Εὐδήμου** λόγων ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος δόξαν περὶ τοῦ |³⁰ Ζήνωνος λαβεῖν ὡς ἀναιροῦντος τὸ ἐν· λέγει γὰρ ὁ **Εὐδήμος** ἐν τοῖς φυ³¹σικοῖς “ἄρα οὖν τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔστι δὲ τι ἔν; τοῦτο γὰρ ἠπορεῖτο.” |³² καὶ Ζήνωνά φασιν λέγειν, “εἴ τις αὐτῷ τὸ ἐν ἀποδοίη τί ποτέ ἐστιν, ἔξειν |³³ τὰ ὄντα λέγειν. ἠπόρει δὲ ὡς ἔοικε διὰ τὸ

τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν ἕκαστον ||^{139.1} κατηγορικῶς τε πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ μερισμῶ, τὴν δὲ στιγμὴν μηθὲν τιθέναι. |² ὁ γὰρ μήτε προστιθέμενον αὖξει μήτε ἀφαιρούμενον μειοῖ, οὐκ ᾔετο τῶν |³ ὄντων εἶναι”. καὶ εἰκὸς μὲν ἦν τὸν Ζήνωνα ὡς ἐφ’ ἑκάτερα γυμναστικῶς |⁴ ἐπιχειροῦντα (διὸ καὶ ‘ἀμφοτερόγλωσσος’ λέγεται) καὶ τοιούτους ἐκφέρειν |⁵ λόγους περὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀποροῦντα: ...

138.30 ἐν om. F τοῖς om. D | 32 τί ποτέ ἐστιν, ἔξιν [ἔξ---v cum litura F] DEF : τί ποτέ ἐστιν, λέξιν a | 33 μὲν (post τῶν) om. E | 139.1 λέγεσθαι] γενέσθαι E, μηθὲν DE : μηδὲνα aF : μηδὲ ἐν p.97.15

If Zeno himself abolished the one, showing that it is manyfold, the account would not be in need of any advocacy, unless someone would say that he called attention to that argument (that existing things are many) as a (possible) counter-argument. But Alexander seems to take a view about Zeno from the words of Eudemus, as if he does away with the One; for Eudemus says in his *Physics*: “does that [i.e. *the* one] then not exist, yet *a* one does? For that is the subject of his aporia.” They also state that Zeno says, <that> “if someone would explain to him what the one [unit] is, that he would be able to say what things are like. He was puzzled, it seems, with the fact that because each perceptible thing may be called many both predicatively and in virtue of having many parts, while the point may be supposed to be nothing. For that which, when added <to something>, will not augment it nor, when taken away, will diminish it, he considered not to belong to being.” And it was likely that Zeno attacked <the position> in a dialectical practice mode (hence the name ‘double-tongued’) and formulating an aporia setting out such arguments on the one ...

COMMENTS:

138.26 ὁ Ζήνων] Here S. refers Alexander’s position on Zeno back to Eudemus, an indication that Alexander does not always acknowledge the source of his interpretation (note line 29: ἔοικεν ἀπὸ τῶν Εὐδήμου λόγων ... λαβεῖν). It is unclear here whether S. takes Eudemus’ view from Alexander or from Eudemus himself, but as we saw in other passages (cf. pp.3-6) we need not doubt that S. had Eudemus’ work.

138.30 ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς] ‘In his *Physics*’; for references to titles see p.3-4 above. Title and direct speech support the assumption that this is a genuine quotation.

139.4 ἀμφοτερόγλωσσος] Zeno was credited with the invention of dialectic, the art of speaking ‘in both directions’ (for and against a thesis) by Aristotle (D.L. 9.25).

T12. in Phys. III.2, p.433.13-18 Diels (name at 433.13)

POSITION: Comes between name-references at 431.6 (fr. 60W) and 439.17 (fr. 61W).

CONTEXT: Since Simplicius offers a short recap here (he refers back to and repeats 431.10-12) some lines are printed before and after. In his commentary (p.99) Wehrli refers to p.430.12 and 432.21; the passage repeats part of fr. 60W (p.431.10-12). [NB The commentary on fr. 60W (see p.99) is run together with that of fr. 59W due to a printing error.]

καὶ ὁ γε **Εὐδημος** σαφέστερον ἐξέθετο τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους ἀπόδειξιν, |¹⁴ οἷς πρὸ ὀλίγου παρεθέμην διὰ τοῦ “παρούσης γὰρ δοκεῖ κινήσεως κινεῖ|¹⁵σθαι τὸ ἐν ᾧ. ἀνίσου δὲ ὄντος ἢ ἀνωμάλου προσαναγκάζειν ὅτι κινεῖται, |¹⁶ γελοῖον”. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τὴν ἀνισότητα οὐδὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν οὐδὲ τὰ τούτων |¹⁷ μετέχοντα κινήσιν εἰκὸς λαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνίσωσιν καὶ οὐσίωσιν ἢ |¹⁸ ἀνουσίωσιν. αὗται γὰρ εἰσι κινήσεις, μεταβολαί τινες καθ’ ἕκαστον γένος κτλ.

And Eudemus has set out Aristotle’s proof more clearly, in the words I quoted a little earlier thus: “when change is present that in which (it is present) seems to be changed. But when it is unequal or uneven, it is ridiculous to try and prove in addition that it changes.” Likewise ...

COMMENTS:

13 σαφέστερον ἐξέθετο τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους ἀπόδειξιν] The previous reference to the phrase that follows does not qualify it as σαφέστερον. Is the term a comparative form (‘more clearly’) or should it be taken in an absolute sense (‘rather clear’)? It is probably the former, and if so, we must assume clearer than Aristotle: ‘rather clear’ is hardly worth mentioning, while the general trend in the commentary is to use E. to improve our understanding of Aristotle. Note that ‘clearer’ implies that Aristotle says pretty much the same thing, but formulates it in a way which may not be clear to everyone. The commentators construed Aristotle’s unclarity as intentional, in part to fend off the uninitiated (Baltussen, forthcoming 1).

14 ἐν οἷς πρὸ ὀλίγου παρεθέμην] Must refer to 431.10-12 = fr. 60W (for the verb, used for signalling a quotation, see T2).

C. Texts not from Simplicius (T13-16)

T13. (cf. ffr. 7-8W) Olympiodorus, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories* 13.23-35

POSITION: Could be placed near fr. 7-8W (= fr. 71F FHSG, see vol. 1.127-8).

CONTEXT: Discussion of authenticity starting at line 7 (mentioning 3 ways for corruption to occur); brief mention of the writing of *Categories*, and possible mistaken authorship (by similarity of titles).

δι’ ὁμωνυμίαν δὲ συγγραμμάτων ἐνοθεύοντο τὰ βιβλία, |²⁴ διότι μὴ μόνος Ἀριστοτέλης ἔγραψε Κατηγορίας, **ἀλλὰ καὶ Θεόφραστος καὶ** |²⁵ **Εὐδημος**, οἱ τούτου μαθηταί. πολλάκις οὖν τις περιτυχὼν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις |²⁶ Θεοφράστου, εἰ τύχοι, ἐνόμισεν αὐτὰς εἶναι Ἀριστοτέλους. ἔσθ’ ὅτε δὲ |²⁷ οὐδὲ διὰ ὁμωνυμίαν συγγραφέων ἐνοθεύοντο τὰ βιβλία οὐδὲ διὰ ὁμωνυμίαν |²⁸ συγγραμμάτων, ἀλλὰ διὰ ὁμωνυμίαν ὑπομνημάτων, διότι πολλάκις ὑπόμνημά |²⁹ τις ἐποίησεν εἰς ὁμώνυμον πραγματείαν καὶ ἐνομίσθη ἄλλης εἶναι· ὡσπερ|³⁰ οὖν καὶ **Θεόφραστος** ἐποίησεν ὑπόμνημα εἰς τὰς οἰκείας Κατηγορίας, καὶ |³¹ πολλάκις τις ἀποπλανᾶται ὅτι τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπόμνημα. ἢ |³² πολλάκις ἐντυγχάνων τις τῷ ὑπομνήματι **Ἀλεξάνδρου** τοῦ Ἀφροδισιέως εἰς |³³ τὰς Κατηγορίας

ἐνόμιζεν αὐτὸ πάντως εἶναι τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους, λανθάνον |³⁴ ὅτι οὐ μόνον γέγραπται αὐτῷ εἰς τὰς Ἀριστοτέλους ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰς Θεο|³⁵φράστου.

By homonymy of the writings the books' authorship has become problematic, because not only Aristotle wrote a *Categories*, but also Theophrastus and Eudemus, his students. So often whenever somebody happens by chance to come across a <work entitled> *Categories* of Theophrastus, he thought it to be by Aristotle. Sometimes books are considered spurious neither by homonymy of authors nor of the writings, but by homonymy of commentaries, because often someone wrote a commentary on a treatise of the same name and <then> it was considered <a commentary> of another (work); as for instance Theophrastus also wrote a commentary on his own *Categories*, and often someone erred (in thinking) that it is the commentary to Aristotle's (*Categories*). Or many a times someone coming across the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias to the *Categories* kept thinking that this is to Aristotle's <*Categories*>, not aware of the fact that he not only had written one on Aristotle's, but also on Theophrastus' <*Categories*>.'

COMMENTS: Given that Olympiodorus' comments concern Theophrastus in the following lines, mention of E. looks rather perfunctory, though the emphatic 'his students' may point to a more conscious choice of adding both (the point about confusion over titles of works would presumably be even stronger if *three* authors are involved). According to a search on TLG-E Theophrastus is only mentioned three times in this work (all on p.13), while his name occurs eight times in Olympiodorus' commentary on *Meteorology* (18.15; 47.10; 80.31; 97.7;102.2; 156.28-158.8; 175.6ff.; 178.6; 266.36).

23 ἐνοθεύοντο] νοθεύω, the cognate of νοθός, means 'to be impure, a bastard', hence 'spurious'; this aspect of ancient works refers to one of the preliminary issues ('isagogical issues', Mansfeld 1994) dealt with in the Platonic school when discussing Aristotle's works: authenticity. It is of course interesting to see that by the 6th c. AD there was an awareness of the possible confusion over authorship. Same point found in David, *On Porphyry's Isagoge* p.13 (= 71B FHSO), ps.-Elias *On Porphyry's Isagoge* p. 13 (= 71C FHSO), Abu-al-Farag Ibn-at-Tayyib, *On Aristotle's Categories, Introduction* (p.82 Basawi in Mohagegh and Izutsu) (= 71H FHSO).

28 συγγραμμάτων] There is a marked distinction between σύγραμμα and ὑπόμνημα (29 etc.) in this passage. The first is usually the more generic 'writing, work', while the second is a technical term for a set of notes or comments/commentary (see Dorandi 1991).

T14. (cf. fr. 79W) Philoponus, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 541.2-9 (Vitelli)

POSITION: Near fr. 79W (= Simpl).

CONTEXT: *Physics* IV.4 is part of the discussion of place, where Aristotle by elimination comes to the conclusion that place is not form, matter or extension, but 'the remaining <option> of the four, the limit of the surrounding body' (212a2-6). Here Philoponus comments on *Phys.* 210b32-211a6.

τὸ δὲ χωριστὸν εἶναι κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν |³ ταύτην ἀντὶ τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος, ἀλλὰ ἐκτός εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας |⁴ αὐτοῦ καὶ μηδὲν εἰς αὐτὴν συντελεῖν. τέταρτον τὸ τὸν πάντα τόπον |⁵ ἔχειν τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω, οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἕκαστον τόπον (ἕκαστος γὰρ |⁶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα ἢ ἄνω ἐστὶν ἢ κάτω) ἀλλὰ ἐν τῷ παντὶ τόπῳ ἐστὶ τὸ |⁷ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω. προστιθέασι δὲ καὶ πέμπτον τι οἱ ἐξηγηταὶ αὐτοῦ, τὸ |⁸ ἀκίνητον εἶναι τὸν τόπον, ὅπερ καὶ αὐτὸς μικρὸν ὕστερον προστί⁹θησι.

2 χωριστὸν ἐστὶ K | 4 τὸν πάντα] πάντα Aristoteles (cf. p.513.7) | 5 καὶ οὐχ M | 8 cf. Philop. 3^v28

‘Being separable’ according to this text stands for ‘the thing being nothing’ (211a1), but being outside of substance itself and in no respect on its way to becoming complete. A fourth <point> the holding of all place above and below, not simply every place (for every one of the individual cases is either above or below), but in every place is above and below. His exegetes add a fifth <point>, that place is immobile, which he himself also adds a little later.

COMMENTS: Philoponus’ commentary on books 1-4 survives in Greek, with books 5-8 only in fragmentary form (*CAG XVII*) and in an Arabic summary (translated in Lettinck 1994). Eudemus is mentioned in the latter (Philop. [Arabic summary] 656.10ff.) which corresponds to his mention in *Simpl. in Phys.* 973.21-974.8; 977.31-978.16.

7 ἐξηγηταὶ] Admittedly this is an ‘anonymous’ reference, but to take *exegetai* as referring to Theophrastus and Eudemus (noted in the apparatus by Vitelli) is made highly probable on the grounds of content which concurs with another passage, *Simpl.* 566.17 (= fr. 79aW). Their addition seems redundant, given that Aristotle presents the point himself later (212a18-19: βούλεται δ’ ἀκίνητος εἶναι ὁ τόπος). Cf. Morison 2002, 148-66, esp. 155-61.

T15. Themistius, *Paraphrase of Aristotle’s Physics* 119.17-120.2 (Schenk)

POSITION: Close to fr. 80W.

CONTEXT: Discussion of place (τόπος) and the motion of the heaven (is it in a place or not?) (Arist. *Phys.* IV). Eudemus is basically in agreement with Aristotle. Cf. Morison 2002, 170.

πῶς οὖν κινεῖται ὁ οὐρανὸς μὴ ὄν ἐν |¹⁸ τόπῳ; ἢ ἔστι μὲν ὡς κινεῖται, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ; ὅλος μὲν γὰρ οὐ κινεῖται. |¹⁹ οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀμείβει τὸν ὅλον τόπον (αὕτη γὰρ κίνησις τῶν ὅλων ὡσπερ τῶν |²⁰ ἐπ’ εὐθείας μεθισταμένων) κύκλῳ δὲ κινεῖται. αὕτη δὲ κίνησις τῶν |²¹ μορίων ἐστὶν καὶ τούτοις ἐστὶ τόπος· ἐκάστη γὰρ σφαῖρα τῶν ἐν κύκλῳ |²² φερομένων ἀμείβει τῆς ἐφεξῆς σφαίρας ἐκείνης τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν. ταύτης |²³ οὖν καὶ τόπος ἐστὶν· περιέχονται γὰρ ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ πᾶν |²⁴ καὶ τὸ ὅλον αὐτὸ μὲν οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ, τὰ μόρια δέ. τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν |²⁵ κύκλῳ κινεῖται, τὰ δὲ ἄνω καὶ κάτω, ὅσα ἔχει πύκνωσιν καὶ μάνωσιν. |²⁶ ταῦτα δὲ **Εὐδήμος ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν αὐτοῦ φυσικῶν** παρίστησι, λέγει δὲ οὕτως: |²⁷ “αὐτὸς δὲ πότερόν ἐστὶν ἐν τόπῳ ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν; ἢ πῶς ἐκάτερον; |²⁸ ὅλος μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τόπῳ, εἰ μὴ ἔστι τι ἐκτός· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν περι²⁹έχοιτο· τοῦτο δὲ ἐπισκεψόμεθα. τὰ δὲ ἄστρα καὶ ὅσα ἐντὸς τοῦ

ἐξωτάτω |³⁰ σώματος ἐν τῷ ἐκείνου πέρατί ἐστιν, ἢ περιέχον ἐστίν. τὰ δὲ οὕτως ἔν ||^{120.1} τινι ἐν τόπῳ λέγεται, ἐν ᾧ δὲ τὰ μέρη καὶ τὸ ὅλον λέγομεν εἶναι. |² οὕτω μὲν οὖν εἴη ἂν ἐν τόπῳ, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως πού ἐν τοῖς μορίοις |³ γάρ ἐστι τὸ ὅλον, πολλαχῶς δὲ τὸ ποῦ.”

How then does the heaven move while not being in a place? Or is it the case that it sometimes moves, sometimes not? For it does not move as a whole. It does not change its place as a whole (for that is the motion of things fully displaced in a straight line) but it moves in a circular motion. This is the motion of parts and they have place: for each sphere of things borne around in a circle exchanges the surface of the subsequent sphere. Of *that* there is a place; for they are contained by each other. Likewise the universe itself is not in a place, but its parts are. Some of them move cyclically, others (which possess compression and expansion) up and down. These things Eudemus adds in the third book of his *Physics*, commenting as follows: “is it [i.e. heaven] in a place or not? Or how can it be either of these? For in a general sense it is not in a place, if there is nothing outside; for in this way it would not be enclosed, that is the point we are investigating. The stars and all that is within the outermost body, are (with)in the limit of that, in so far as they are enclosed. These are thus said to be in a place, in which we say the parts and the whole are. In this way it would be in a place, but it is also somewhere in another way; for the whole is in the parts, the ‘where’ is defined in many ways.”

COMMENTS: Themistius’ paraphrases are more than just that: he offers interpretive summaries with added materials (Todd 1996, 2-4; 2003, 1-2). This passage discusses the question how the heaven moves if it is not in a place. The problem arises out of the Aristotelian definition of place as something delimited by things external to it; the heaven has nothing outside it, hence it is assumed that it is not in a place. This paradox, as Wehrli signals, was not addressed by Aristotle. A globe which moves in its location may not be said to move at all (i.e. no *locomotion*), except in a restricted sense, as it is also stationary.

When Wehrli comments: ‘Die Kommentatoren sind befremdet, daß Aristoteles in seinen allgemeinen Bestimmungen von Topos (Physik 210 b 32) die Unbeweglichkeit übergeht, diese dann aber 212a18 als selbstverständlich behandelt. E(udemus) und Theophrast korrigieren diese kleine Unausgeglichenheit gemäß ihrer allgemeinen Straffung des Werkes (cf. zu fr. 31-123)’, he could also have pointed out that Aristotle does discuss ‘nuances in meaning’ of *akinêtos* in *Phys.* IV.2, 226b10-15 (Morison 2002, 156). We need not assume that Theophrastus and Eudemus overlooked this passage, since the point is that they want to justify what Aristotle seems to take for granted.

26 Εὐδημος ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν αὐτοῦ φυσικῶν] A reference to the third book of the *Physics*, corresponding to the subject matter of Aristotle’s book 4, ‘on place’. Explicit references to book 3 in Simplicius are found 533.14 (fr. 75W), 662.25 (fr. 81W), 710.33 (fr. 85W), 717.6 on ‘time’ (fr. 86W), 723.36. For references to the discussion of τόπος by Eudemus in Simplicius, see 566.18 (fr. 79aW), 583.10 (fr. 79bW).

26 παρίστησι] ‘Adds, contributes’.

T16. (ad fr. 100W) Themistius, *Paraphrase of Aristotle's Physics 182.23-7*

POSITION: Cf. fr. 100W.

CONTEXT: 'Fr. 100 enthält ein zusätzliches Argument für den Satz des Aristoteles, daß die Teile eines Continuum unbegrenzt teilbar seien, cf. Physik 231b10' (Wehrli p.108).

... ἀλλὰ οὐκ εἰς ἀδιαίρετα (καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἀδιαίρετων συγκέοιτο ²⁴ ἄν, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον ἀπεδείχθη), εἰς ἀεὶ τοίνυν διαίρετά. ἔτι εἰ μέγεθος ἐξ ²⁵ ἀμερῶν, καὶ γραμμὴν μείζω σημείῳ γραμμῆς δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ εἰ ²⁶ τοῦτο, δίχα διαιρεθήσεται τὸ σημεῖον.

... but not towards indivisibles (for it would be composed of indivisibles, which has been shown to be impossible), but rather infinitely divisible. Moreover, if a magnitude consists of partless things, a line could be bigger than <another> line by a mathematical point, but if that <is the case>, the mathematical point will be divided in two.

COMMENTS: Another anonymous reference, but already spotted by Schenkl *in app.* as coming from Alexander (*ex Alexandro*) and quoted by Simplicius 930.34ff. (= fr. 100W). In fr. 98-100W (on Arist. *Phys.* 234a24) Eudemus discusses the issue of divisibility of 'now'. As Wehrli indicates in his commentary, lines 24-6 give an added argument: ἔτι εἰ μέγεθος κτλ corresponds to Wehrli 44.16-21, with minor differences relating to direct speech (E.) vs indirect speech (Themistius). Interestingly, Themistius seems to elaborate with an example of a circle not mentioned in Aristotle. Konstan (1989, 23 n.13) also notes that Themistius' version makes it appear that Eudemus is referring 'to area, not the circumference, of circles and semi-circles'.

25 σημείῳ] = στυγμή, *LSJ* s.v. III: Arist. *APost.* 76b5, *Phys.* 240b3; Euclid *Def.* 1.

5. Concluding remarks³¹

I would like to conclude by summarizing the insights emerging from this material with particular emphasis on two aspects: (a) the justification for adding these texts to the fragment collection, and (b) how the analysis of the added texts and the approach of Wehrli may have implications for a new fragment edition.

(a) On the basis of the material studied I conclude that the shorter references (**T1-6**) should be added to our collection for the sake of completeness (cf. n.7), even if they do not produce new insights of major import. It is not surprising that our knowledge does not increase dramatically, because the material is limited and taken from the same source as most of the known texts. They can nevertheless be taken as further evidence that Simplicius is reading Eudemus' notes *closely alongside* Aristotle's text, as the brevity of such references suggests that Simplicius is on the look-out for useful comments and adding them whenever they occur (e.g. **T8**). Moreover, some of the closing statements, which follow (and fall outside) the actual quotations, do teach us more about Simplicius' method of demarcating (or 'bracketing') his quotations and draw attention to certain features of Eudemus' approach (**T2-3**, **T5**, **T7**). We also found details which further

³¹ This section is partly based on, and further develops, Baltussen 2002b, 'Conclusion'.

clarified aspects of Eudemus' role in the exegetical tradition. For instance, in **T1** we see Simplicius formulate objections against both Eudemus and Alexander, an unusual move since he normally prefers the former to the latter and in general only disagrees with Alexander in a limited number of cases (roughly a quarter out of c. 700 references, to be discussed more fully in Baltussen, forthcoming 2). In **T2** and **T6** Eudemus' value in clarifying a problem is noted. These insights arise from including more of the context of the source text, thus using a broader approach towards the study of fragments which is a fairly recent phenomenon (see n.30).

The longer passages (**T8-12**) yielded five further 'quotations', or at least passages supposedly reporting Eudemus' words: as explained at **T2**, παρατίθεσθαι justifies thinking of them as quotations (as do verbs such as γράφειν, λέγειν). They give us additional glimpses of his working method, such as his discussion of Being (**T8**), of Parmenides (**T9**), of predication (**T10**), and of how he deals with Aristotle's arguments (**T12**). Further quotations in other authors outside Simplicius (**T13-16**) added to our knowledge of the engagement with and transmission of Aristotle's text among the immediate successors (and also signals the further absence of Arabic sources in Wehrli): **T15-16** (Themistius, Philoponus) confirm a text we have from Simplicius (fr. 79-80W), while **T15** offers an additional quotation. Above all, most additions offer quite valuable insights relevant for the transmission, interpretation and editing of the Eudemean fragments.

I have also further developed the view (hinted at by Wehrli, above n.16) that it was the value of the Eudemean material as an *exegetical aid* for Simplicius that ensured that so much material has survived. Simplicius almost treats him as a 'colleague' who also aimed at clarifying Aristotle's difficult prose. The higher ratio of references (c. 132) as compared to Theophrastus (36) might be an indication for that: Eudemus' clarifications of Aristotle's thought in physics can be regarded as more useful and therefore found their way into later exegetical writings.³² My previous suggestion (2002a), that Simplicius perhaps thought of Eudemus' comments as a useful cure for Aristotle's unclarity, would explain the emphasis placed on the clear exposition (the frequent σαφῶς), perhaps to counteract Aristotle's—supposedly intended—unclarity (ἀσαφεία, see esp. in *Cat.* 7.1-22).³³ Specific reference to the mode of expression in Eudemus also indicates that he makes confident and reliable contributions: he is a 'witness' (**T7** μάρτυρα, **T9** μαρτυρεῖ λέγων) who skips bits (**T3**, **T13**), recounts or clarifies (**T2** τοῦ Εὐδήμου λέξιν σαφῶς ἐκτιθεμένην, **T8** μνημονεύει, ἐδήλωσε, **T12** ἐξέθετο), understands (**T10** συνιδῶν), and states things (**T11** λέγει) in writing (**T6**

³² Blumenthal 1996, 10 has expressed the paradox well: 'The general consensus of the commentators after Themistius seems to have been that Theophrastus was a major figure in the history of philosophy whose opinions could nevertheless be ignored on most matters' and adds as a possible reason 'for Theophrastus gave no help to those seeking to impose Platonist constraints on Peripatetic psychology'. Whether this holds for Eudemus needs further analysis.

³³ On ἀσαφεία in Aristotle and the commentators see Barnes 1992, 268-70 and Mansfeld 1994, 24, 29 etc. (see his index s.v.).

γεγραφότος, T10 γράφει). All in all, he is a reliable contemporary source offering an authoritative contribution to the explication of Aristotle's text.

(b) The transmission of Eudemus' work seems to be a fairly straightforward one, depending almost completely on the later commentators, in particular Alexander, Proclus, Philoponus and Simplicius. The omission of a small number of references presented above is only one of several reasons to re-evaluate the method and form of Wehrli's edition, whose methodology is too implicit (Baltussen 2002b) and an example of an outdated approach to fragments, in which the focus is primarily (and unrelentingly) on the so-called quotations; nowadays much more attention is given to context, providing a more comprehensive textual and intellectual embedding of the passages. Insofar as knowledge of the source author's method can (and in many cases will) influence our reading of the reported views, even doublets may be of interest; in this case it also assisted *our* understanding of Simplicius' approach. Context is an important factor in work on fragment editions and needs to be given a role in the editorial process. Renewed interest in Eudemus has already resulted in a fine collection of essays (Fortenbaugh and Bodnár 2002) in which his work is given philosophical and historical context, thus making his thought more easily available to a wider audience. It is hoped that the present study may contribute to a new edition of the Eudemean fragments.³⁴

³⁴ With thanks to the editor for helpful comments on the final draft, and to Verity Harte (then at Kings College London) for suggesting to publish these texts.

Appendix I: *Addenda Eudemea*

A listing of all the known fragments missing from Wehrli, *SA* vol. VIII. Nos. [1], [2], [15], and [16] were indicated by Gottschalk 1973 (above n.28).

Alphabetical by author:

OLYMPIODORUS, <i>Commentary on Aristotle's Categories</i>	
[1] 13.25	T13 (cf. fr. 7-8W)
PHILOPONUS, <i>Commentary on Aristotle's Physics</i>	
[2] 541.71	T14 (cf. fr. 79W)
SIMPLICIUS, <i>Commentary on Aristotle's Physics</i>	
[3] I.2, p.11.16-17 Diels (name at 11.17)	T1
[4] I.2, p.48.26-29 Diels (name at 48.26, 28)	T2
[5] I.2, p.63.19-20 Diels (name at 63.19)	T3
[6] I.2, p.69.18-24 Diels (name at 69.22)	T4
[7] I.2, p.74.29-30 Diels (name at 74.29)	T5
[8] I.3, p.118.5-20 Diels (name at 118.6, 9, 19)	T8 (quotation)
[9] I.3, p.120.1-12 Diels (name at 120.6)	T9 (quotation)
[10] I.3, p.121.5-17 Diels (name at 121.9)	T10 (quotation)
[11] I.3, p.138.25-139.3 Diels (name at 138.29, 30)	T11 (quotation)
[12] III.2, p.433.13-18 Diels (name at 433.13)	T12 (quotation)
[13] IV.11, p.717.14-20 Diels (name at 717.15)	T6
[14] IV.12, p.725.19-24 Diels (name at 725.23)	T7
THEMISTIUS, <i>Paraphrase of Aristotle's Physics</i>	
[15] 119.25	T15 (cf. fr. 80W)
[16] 182.24	T16 (cf. fr. 100W)

Appendix II: Textual issues in Eudemos' *Physics*³⁵

Obiter lecta on textual matters, omissions and errors in *Physics* fragments culled from reviews of the 1st edition of Wehrli, *SA* vol. VIII. On misprints see also De Lacy 1957, 271 n.2.

φυσικά (fr. 31-123 Wehrli)

fr. 36 comm.: ‘at p.91, on fr. 36, read “μέρη διωρισμένα und συνεχή” (Rees 1957, 332)

fr. 37a: ‘(p.27, n.1) the lemma should be τάδε’ (De Lacy 1957, 271)

fr. 43.8: ‘later conjectures of Diels [FVS] ought to have been mentioned’ (Kerferd 1957, 33)

fr. 60.25: ‘later conjectures of Diels [FVS] ought to have been mentioned’ (Kerferd 1957, 33)

fr. 68: the thought of the fr. becomes obscured because W. starts in the middle of the sentence ‘with the resultant loss of the object of κατασκευάζει’ (De Lacy 1957, 270).

fr. 72: ‘(p.36, n.[sic] 13) Diels reports that F repeats ἐν τισι and omits τῶν ἀντιγράφων’ (De Lacy 1957, 271) [should be ‘line 13’]

fr. 74: add two more lines (referred to in commentary) (De Lacy 1957, 270)

fr. 77: because σημειωτέον is omitted one can be misled in thinking that φησι is governed by ὅτι (De Lacy 1957, 270)

fr. 123b: ‘There is no reference to some rather interesting similarities between some of the fragments and Proclus’ *Institutio physica* (compare for example Proclus’ first proposition, δύο ἡμέρη [sic] οὐχ ἄψεται ἀλλήλων [1.1], with fr. 123b)’ (De Lacy 1957, 271)

³⁵ Part of Appendix 1 in Baltussen 2002b.

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