[Aristotle's Poetics: Introduction] [Aristotle's Poetics: Seminar Notes]
As a preliminary, it is worth reviewing Aristotle's references to Sophocles' play:
(i) ch. 11 (52a22-26) discusses the
play's reversal;
(ii) ch. 11 (52a32-33) comments on the
combination of recognition and reversal;
(iii) ch. 14 (53b29-32): the plot-type
in which a terrible action is followed by recognition;
(iv) ch. 16 (55a16-18): the recognition is of the
best kind;
(v) ch. 15 (54b6-8), ch. 24 (60a27-30): Oedipus’ ignorance of the circumstances of Laius' death is an example of irrationality that is acceptable because it is outside the play;
(vi) ch. 26 (62b2): extending the play to the length of the Iliad would produce a 'watery' effect;
(vii) Rhetoric 3.14 (1415a12-
21): cites Oedipus' expository speech ('My father was Polybus...').
There are also some more general references to the story of Oedipus:
(i) ch. 13 (53a11, 53a20): Oedipus is an example of the kind of
person suited for best kind of tragedy;
(ii) ch. 14 (53b7): hearing the
story of Oedipus would make one shudder.
1. Given the leading role of plot in Aristotle's theory, one important task in thinking about Oedipus in Aristotelian terms is to see how the abstract framework of his analysis of plot applies to this play.
2. Aristotle's basic criteria for a well-formed plot are connection and closure; closure implies a beginning and an end, while connection implies a middle with a series of events following by necessity or probability one from another to link them (ch. 7). Somewhere in this series of events we would expect a change of fortune (ch. 7), the beginning of which marks the pivotal point between the complication and resolution (ch. 18). We know too that the plot may contain events which occur outside the play (ch. 18).
3. We know that Aristotle saw the scene with the Corinthian messenger as the play's reversal (ch. 11, 52a22-26). At this point, it is vital that we recognise the distinction between reversal and change of fortune: all tragic plots, including simple plots, have a change of fortune, but only complex plots have reversal (ch. 10, 52a14-18). So the two concepts cannot be the same: even if a reversal accompanies or is somehow bound up with the change of fortune, there must be an additional element in the reversal over and above the change of fortune.
4. Aristotle's reference to the messenger in Oedipus as an illustration of reversal may help to clarify his rather vague definition of the concept. In fact, the account of the Corinthian messenger scene which Aristotle gives here is slightly telescoped (the messenger does not, as Aristotle says, come to reassure Oedipus about his mother, but to report the death of his father Polybus: the issue of his mother only arises incidentally from the conversation prompted by that news). However, the basic point is clear and sound: the messenger sees himself all along as bringing news that will be welcome or reassuring; but his revelations in fact lead to a terrible revelation - more terrible than the one Oedipus had previously feared. Presumably, therefore, reversal in general will involve actions which had one outcome in view, but which lead to the opposite outcome; that unexpected outcome will provoke the sense of astonishment which Aristotle discussed shortly before introducing the concept of reversal (ch. 9, 52a1-11).
(In what sense is the outcome ‘unexpected’? Someone seeing or reading the play for the second time will expect the outcome, even if they were taken by surprise the first time; but that cannot mean that the reversal has disappeared - after all, the reversal is part of the plot, and the plot remains the same however many times you see or read the play. But we can see that this outcome, though it is inevitable in the circumstances, is not one that an observer not fully cognisant of the circumstances would expect. So one might say that there is a kind of structural unexpectedness, independent of how any particular member of an audience happens to react.)
5. The messenger's news plays a pivotal role: up to now the question being asked was 'who killed Laius?'; from now on the question is 'whose child is Oedipus?' This makes it reasonable to identify this as the reversal - or at any rate as a reversal. For one could see reversal as a broader structure in the plot: for example, Oedipus' attempts to avoid fulfilling the oracle given to him at Delphi (he decides not to return to Corinth) lead to his fulfilling it (he goes to Thebes, killing his father on the way, and marries his mother); near the beginning of the play Oedipus invokes a curse on the killer of Laius has, and in doing so unwittingly curses himself; Jocasta's attempt to reassure Oedipus after the quarrel with Teiresias and Creon is what gives him the first suspicion that he might indeed have been Laius' killer. So reversal seems to be not so much a single critical event in the plot as a recurrent pattern. One question worth considering, therefore, is what implications this has for Aristotle's theory (is his theory flawed? is it basically sound, but in need of extension? or is it capable of accommodating these points as it stands?).
6. If it is difficult to pin down one reversal, it may also seem difficult to isolate one change of fortune. After all, Oedipus’ fortunes fluctuate quite a lot (born to a royal family, exposed as a baby, rescued, adopted by another royal family, driven to go into voluntary exile...)
7. One radical alternative view would be to say that Oedipus was always unfortunate: from birth he was the person who was going to kill his father and marry his mother - not a position one would choose to be in! (The point that Oedipus was, in a sense, always unfortunate, is made in a light-hearted way in Aristophanes Frogs 1182-96.) Another radical alternative view would be that Oedipus’ fortunes change for the better in the course of the play: by the end he is no longer ignorant, and the knowledge has given him greater control over his own life (for example, he is no longer unwittingly sleeping with his own mother). Obviously, Aristotle could not accept either analysis: why not? And is he right?
8. Even if you agree with Aristotle in rejecting those radical views, there is more than one point at which it could be said that Oedipus' fortune has changed for the worse. Most obviously, the time when he kills his father and marries his mother seems crucially important. After all, if he had died a natural death before he encountered Laius, he would not have been a particularly tragic figure; having killed Laius and slept with Jocasta he has suffered the most appalling misfortune - all that happens after that is that he finds out what he has done.
9. This seems to give us two alternative analyses of the plot using Aristotle's concepts:
(a) One analysis places the change of fortune when he kills his father and marries his mother - i.e. in the part of the plot which precedes the beginning of the play; so the complication leads up to that pivotal moment in Oedipus' fortunes, and the resolution is everything that follows. This would mean that the resolution has already begun before the start of the play - but that is something which Aristotle seems to regard as possible in ch. 18, 55b24-26).
(b) The other analysis places the change of fortune when he discovers what he has done and blinds himself; on this view, the complication includes the first part of the play, and the resolution begins when the Corinthian messenger precipitates the discovery of the truth.
10. Once one has started thinking along these lines, other possibilities might occur. For example, a modification of the second alternative might identify the plague at Thebes as the beginning of the change of fortune, since it is this which makes the ultimate discovery inevitable; the Corinthian messenger is just part of the mechanism. But then it could be argued that the very fact that Oedipus has done such terrible things is what makes the ultimate discovery inevitable - which takes us back to the first alternative. This should not surprise us: if the events of the plot are connected by necessity or probability (in the way that Aristotle recommends), then any moment we might identify as a change of fortune is going to be rooted in earlier events that make it inevitable - which means that it will always be possible to identify some earlier point at which (it could be argued) the change of fortune really began.
11. If we assume, for the sake of the argument, that we do need to make a choice between the two analyses suggested above, can we see any grounds on which Aristotle might argue (rightly or wrongly) in favour of the latter - i.e. that the change of fortune which occurs within the play is crucial? There are several possible lines of argument:
(i) One obvious line of argument would be that, even though killing one's father and marrying one's mother is a terrible misfortune, if you are going to do this it is better to live on in prosperity and in a position of power, unaware of what has been done, and spared the subjective misery that this knowledge entails - and with your eyes not gouged out. What happens in the play enhances or completes Oedipus' utter misery: that seems pretty important.
(ii) Also, the coming together of reversal, recognition (see below), suffering (a further element in Aristotle's theory of plot - also discussed below) and change of fortune seems to be a very powerful combination.
(iii) The fact that these events happen in the play and not before it is also significant. Aristotle is aware (see below) that things that happen in the play have more prominence for and impact on the audience than things that happen outside. This would provide another reason for locating the crucial change of fortune inside the play.
These three points all draw our attention to the overwhelming emotional impact of the climactic events of the play; and since Aristotle links the change of fortune to the effect of fear and pity that tragedy aims at, this suggests that we should follow the analysis (b), placing the change of fortune within the play.
On the other hand, the change of fortune is, according to ch. 13 (53a7-17), the result of an ‘error’; and it seems much more plausible to identify the unwitting parricide and incest as Oedipus’ error than the dogged pursuit of his enquiries within the play. This line of thinking suggests that we should follow analysis (a), placing the change of fortune before the beginning of the play.
12. Alternatively, we might consider whether it is really necessary to choose between the two analyses of the plot offered above. Note that in the discussion of complication and resolution, Aristotle says that the complication is everything up to the beginning of the change of fortune (ch. 18, 55b28-29). This reference to its beginning shows that he regarded the change of fortune as an extended process, not just as a single, decisive and momentary occurrence. Does this mean that Aristotle's theory is already flexible enough to accommodate the problems we have identified in isolating the change in Oedipus' fortune? It may be that the change of fortune begins with the killing of Laius and reaches its climax with the recognition and blinding; both analyses give us part of the truth.
13. Oedipus' discovery of his misfortune means that the play contains recognition (the other distinctive feature of complex plots), as well as reversal; Aristotle admires the combination of the two (ch. 11, 52a32-33). Aristotle says that in some plays there are reciprocal recognitions (ch. 11, 52b3-5); in this play, Jocasta recognises Oedipus and Oedipus recognises Jocasta - and both of these recognitions seem to be examples of Aristotle's best kind, arising out of the plot (ch. 16, 55a16-18). Aristotle admires recognition and reversal because of their emotional impact (this point is already made in ch. 6, 50a33-35, in the argument for the primacy of plot), and complex plots are superior in Aristotle's view because of the greater emotional impact which recognition and reversal give them; Oedipus seems to support for Aristotle's claims in this respect.
14. In addition to the reciprocal recognitions of Jocasta and Oedipus, there is also the preliminary recognition of Oedipus by the herdsman. So we have a series of recognitions in ascending order of emotional impact, making an effective climax. So recognition, as well as reversal, is a recurrent pattern in the plot, and not just a single occurrence.
15. It can also be argued that recognition is built into the play's diction and imagery, e.g. in the recurrent images of blindness and insight. Note too that Oedipus, sighted but ignorant, is confronted by Teiresias - blind but with insight; and when Oedipus acquires insight he blinds himself. Though this is not a reversal in Aristotle's technical sense, there is an ironical inversion in Oedipus' state; so the change in Oedipus' fortune is thus bound up with this pattern of imagery. It might be argued that the failure of Aristotle's approach to tragedy to give us any tools for analysing aspects of the play of this kind is a serious shortcoming.
16. In general, Aristotle recommends that the events of a plot should all follow one from another in accordance with necessity and probability; but he recognises that there may be times when it is appropriate to compromise on this. He knows that the plot of Oedipus is not a perfect example of necessary and probable connection: the fact that Oedipus did not enquire about Laius' death when he became king is implausible (note also that Jocasta seems to know nothing about her husband's past). Aristotle observes that the implausibility here is outside the play (ch. 15, 54b6-8; ch. 24, 60a27-30); this makes it unobtrusive, so that it does not spoil the effect. (Similarly, irrationalities are easier to handle in epic than tragedy, because the audience does not see them happening: that again makes them less obtrusive.) It may be worth noting also the way Sophocles makes an issue of why the Thebans did not enquire into Laius' death, and provides an answer - the Thebans were preoccupied with the Sphinx; does he do this to distract us from the real problem (why did Oedipus not enquire after disposing of the Sphinx?) by answering a superficially similar question?
17. Within the play, note that the arrival of the Corinthian messenger does not follow from anything else (other than the death of Polybus: but that just puts the problem back one step: the timing of Polybus' death is a coincidence - admittedly one outside the play). This is important from Aristotle's view-point: the messenger's arrival introduces the resolution, and contrived resolutions are criticised in ch. 15 (54a37-b2: note too that the arrival of Aegeus in Euripides' Medea, also an unexplained coincidence, is criticised in ch. 25, 61b20-21). No one seems willing to say that this is a major flaw in the play; so either Aristotle's views on the importance of a connected plot are wrong or we must be able to find some Aristotelian defence of what Sophocles has done.
18. The messenger is needed for the plot (if Oedipus' real parents are to be revealed his false ones must be exposed: only the Corinthian can do this). The fact that it is needed for the plot may be necessary for it to be defensible (if it were not needed for the plot, no defence would be possible); but Aristotle does not see this as an adequate defence (ch. 24, 60a33- 34: you should not make the plot like that in the first place).
19. As already mentioned, Aristotle is more willing to tolerate irrationalities where they are unobtrusive - outside the play, or out of view (epic is more able to cope with the irrational because the action is not seen). Another technique he mentions (ch. 24, 60a18-26) is for the poet to trick the audience into thinking that something is necessary by a false inference. This may be what Sophocles does in this case: Jocasta prays to Apollo for relief from their fears immediately before the messenger's entry; so he comes on cue and as if as an answer to the prayer, making his arrival seem a natural next step. (Sophocles uses the technique of the apparent answer to prayer also in Electra: the false report of Orestes' death follows immediately on Clytaemnestra's prayer at 637-59.)
20. Also implausible is Oedipus' failure to respond to clues about the truth. He went to Delphi because someone told him he was not the son of Polybus and Merope; Delphi said he would kill his father and sleep with his mother. Despite this, he does not react when Teiresias tells him what he has done; and when Jocasta tells him about the prophecy of Laius' death at his son's hand he reacts to a different point - that Laius was killed at a crossroads; even when he infers from this that he may have been the killer of Laius he does not raise the question whose son he is. But note that the order of events in the plot and the order of exposition in the play are different: we do not learn about the oracle given to Oedipus until after he has failed to draw the inferences which it seems to make obvious - so the audience is not in a position to register the implausibility when it happens. Sophocles' manipulation of the order in which information is given to the audience could be seen as another technique for making implausibilities unobtrusive.
21. Note too that the messenger happens also to be the man who gave Polybus and Merope the baby - the one person able to reveal that Oedipus is not their child; and the herdsman summoned as a witness to Laius' death happens also to be the man who was given the baby to expose - the one person able to reveal whose child Oedipus really is. (But the latter coincidence is of no structural importance: it would have been possible, though less tidy, to send for someone other than the witness to be questioned about the baby.) Arguably these minor figures do not attract enough attention in themselves for these coincidences to be obtrusive.
22. More fundamentally, it might be thought Oedipus' downfall is rooted in chance: isn't it just a coincidence that the stranger he met on the road was his father? One response to this argument would be that this too is outside the play, and therefore unobtrusive. But in this case we may want to go deeper and say that in some sense the meeting with Laius was not a chance event - it was necessary that Oedipus meet and kill his father, since the prophecy had to be fulfilled. On this view, the apparent coincidence can be explained in terms of some supernatural cause.
23. A supernatural cause also comes into play to explain the plague which affects Thebes. The presence of someone who has killed the previous king (and, worse, killed his own father and married his own mother) has to be brought to light, so that the city can be purified. The plague is the lever the gods use to bring the truth to light.
24. A further layer of supernatural causation may be involved when Oedipus curses Laius' killer: he has unwittingly cursed himself, and this curse presumably has some effect.
25. At this point, we might go back and reassess the apparent coincidence of the timing of the Corinthian messenger's arrival. Perhaps this too can be seen as something contrived by the gods as a means of bringing the truth to light, and is not just a chance event.
26. The implication of this line of argument is that supernatural agencies are at work in the background in this play, at several levels. If we overlook them, then the sequence of events is riddled with meaningless coincidences; for the plot to make sense and the events to be connected with each other, we have to explain them in terms of fate, the gods, the curse.
27. It is a matter of dispute how far Aristotle approves of supernatural agency as a device in tragic plots. Some interpreters have argued that he must have disapproved of supernatural agency in tragic plots, in the light of his critical remarks on resolutions that depend of divine intervention (ch. 15, 54a37-b2), citing the end of Medea as a case in point). But since he accepts the use of traditional gods in ch. 25 (60b35- 61a1), it could be argued that supernatural agency is acceptable provided that it is well-motivated rather than an arbitrary contrivance. In that case, Aristotle's requirement of necessary or probable connection, because it makes coincidences questionable and encourages us to look for explanations, may help us to see implicit patterns of supernatural causation which we might otherwise overlook - and thus sharpen our understanding of the plot.
28. Admittedly, Aristotle himself does not have much to say about the divine and supernatural dimension of the tragic world. Did he think it was such an obvious feature of tragedy that it didn't need to be emphasised? Or was he insufficiently aware of its importance? (If so, why? The critiques of poetic representations of the gods by Plato and others might have made him feel defensive on this point, and so reluctant to recognise how important this aspect of tragedy despite his theoretical acceptance of traditional stories. A further suggestion is that it might have seemed easy to eliminate divine agency from texts which assume ‘double motivation’: in archaic Greek thought, events are seen as explicable on both the human and the supernatural levels simultaneously - but to a later observer, it might seem that one of these levels is redundant.)
If it is true that Aristotle was insufficiently aware of the importance of the gods, then we may have the interesting situation that applying Aristotle's theoretical apparatus helps us to correct shortcomings in Aristotle's own understanding of tragedy.
29. Despite the importance of the supernatural element, no god appears directly on stage - in this respect, Oedipus is unlike many Greek tragedies. Perhaps it is precisely the fact that the supernatural is kept in the background which makes it acceptable to Aristotle (as with the implausibilities that are made unobtrusive by being kept outside the play or out of sight).
30. Also worth considering here are Aristotle's comments on the case of Mitys' killer in ch. 9 (52a6-11): would it be legitimate to infer from this that coincidences which only seem to be purposeful can enhance the emotional impact of events?
31. Oedipus' character can be interpreted in various ways: is this apparent ambiguity because he is a mixture of good and bad, or inconsistent, or not characterised? (But Aristotle ascribes characterless tragedy to more recent poets; and Sophocles was seen by ancient critics as particularly skilful in the imitation of character.) At any rate, Oedipus does not commit his terrible crimes knowingly - a depravity which would preclude pity (in Aristotle's view: but aren't there examples in ancient and modern tragedy of pity evoked for bad characters? If Aristotle is wrong about this, can we explain what might have made him prone to this oversimplification?).
32. But one might argue that Oedipus' attack on Laius' party is imprudent (given what the oracle had told him, perhaps he should become a total abstainer from homicide?) and extreme (did the provocation warrant mass slaughter?). Still, his disaster is not deserved by or caused by imprudence and aggressiveness as such; it is mischance (or fate?) that the victim was his father, not Oedipus' fault. So it seems that Oedipus is the kind of character described in ch. 13: not outstandingly good (he has faults) but falling into misfortune by error (not knowing who the stranger was) not because he is wicked. Note too that Oedipus' faults are typically heroic; compare Achilles' hot temper in Iliad 1 - and see ch. 15 (54b14-15) for Achilles as an example of a character portrayed with faults but also idealised.
33. The consistency of Oedipus' character could be questioned: is the suspicious and violent response to Teiresias and Creon in line with his portrayal as a good man and a good king? But it does show the same impetuosity as the killing of Laius; in that respect Oedipus' character is consistent.
34. Arguably the response to Teiresias and Creon is also well-motivated in itself. Teiresias' apparently treasonable refusal to reveal the identity of the killer surely warrants an extreme reaction (remember that Oedipus has already invoked a curse on anyone who knows but does not reveal the identity of the killer). And what could Teiresias' motive for silence be, other than to protect himself? Also, it was Creon who suggested consulting Teiresias (an exception: normally Oedipus takes the initiative in everything); and since Teiresias had given no hint of knowing anything about it before (and he had had a long time to produce his information if he did know anything), the idea of consulting seems strange on reflection - Oedipus' cross-examination of Creon brings out the implausibility (it is helpful to read this passage as if it were from a law-court). It might be thought that Creon (a native Theban) has a motive for wanting to oust the interloper. And Creon himself recognises that a ruler's position is always under threat; this makes Oedipus' alertness to possible signs of conspiracy reasonable.
35. Oedipus' fate has an impact on us in part because of the human characteristics he shares with us (tragedy, as Aristotle says in 53a4-6, must be about someone 'like' us). Immediately after Oedipus has discovered the truth, the chorus generalise from his fate to the vulnerability of all human kind (see especially 1192ff.). But the generalisation from Oedipus to all of humanity is particularly compelling because Oedipus was so prosperous and so powerful: if even he can fall into disaster, no one is secure. So the fact that Oedipus is greater than us is also relevant: Oedipus is both like us and better than us - and both sides of this equation are relevant to the emotional impact the play has on us.
36. After discovering the truth, Oedipus blinds himself. The appearance of the blinded Oedipus (carefully prepared by the messenger's graphic description of the blinding) introduces another element of Aristotle's analysis of tragic plots, suffering (defined in ch. 11, 52b11-13, as an action that involves destruction or pain, such as death, extreme agony, woundings).
37. This is also a strikingly effective example of the use of spectacle (assuming that the wounds were graphically represented on Oedipus' mask). Aristotle's attitude to spectacle is ambiguous: but this is surely an excellent example of the use of spectacle to reinforce the effect of the plot - and so not something to which Aristotle could reasonably object (which does not mean that he was necessarily fully alive to the importance of this dimension of the play).
38. We do not know enough about production techniques in the fifth century to say for certain how Oedipus after his blinding would have been presented on-stage: but the importance of this moment strongly suggests that some striking visual effect must have been used. In Sophocles' day, it was still customary for tragic poets to produce their own plays; so he would have had control over the presentation. Aristophanes sometimes got other people to produce his comedies, and this may have become common in tragedy as well in the fourth century - hence, for example, the practice (which Aristotle criticises) of using interlude songs, not composed by the poet but chosen by the producer (see ch. 18, 56a27-32). A split between the roles of playwright and producer may also be indicated by Aristotle's argument in ch. 6 (50b16- 20) that spectacle is not part of the poet's job. Elsewhere, Aristotle complains that actors, demanding show-pieces to help them win the actors' competition (see ch. 9, 51b37-52a1; cf. Rhetoric 1403b33), force tragic poets to compromise their standards of plot- construction. The subordination of poet to producer and actor in the fourth century may explain why Aristotle's comments on the primacy of plot have such a sharp, polemical edge.
39. The end of the play does not settle everything. Oedipus' future is left uncertain (Creon refuses to expel him from Thebes at once, as he demands: and the tradition does not seem to have been unanimous as to whether Oedipus did leave Thebes or not). Also, the introduction of the children might make the audience think about later stages in the story - a reminder that there is further misery in store (the death of Antigone, the war between Oedipus' two sons, in which they kill each other). Does the open-endedness of the play cause a problem for Aristotle's concept of closure?
[Aristotle's Poetics: Introduction] [Aristotle's Poetics: Seminar Notes]