ABSTRACT. The Hardinian taboo is that complex `gatekeeper of the mind' which prevents humanity from solving its 'population problem', {1} and which, among other effects, renders demographic entrapment taboo. This taboo is now so severe inside academic demography that certain aspects of it are gravely corrupted. (Charles dissociates himself  from this statement out of deference to the colleagues)  Unrelieved demographic entrapment ends in the `malignant uproar' of slaughter and food riots. Abolishing the taboo is expected to result in the 'benign uproar' of heated argument globally, which could do much to ensure the behaviour changes that are necessary to mitigate Northern lifestyles and Southern fertility, relieve entrapment, and solve the `population problem'. The reasons for the taboo are examined and `disentrapment programmes' are outlined. These are only practicable in the context of a 1-child world, and are the major argument for it. Ethical issues, the role of economic failure, human rights, and the limits to migration are discussed. Related issues are explored in appendices.
 

KEYWORDS. Hardinian taboo, population problem, demographic entrapment, uproar, human rights, disentrapment programme, disentrapping agents, 2-child paradigm {2}, 1-child world, photon-efficient diet  {3}, CAIRO II.

INTRODUCTION. Aid agency executives have been discussing informally something they call `demographic entrapment', {4} at least since the 1970s and increasingly often recently, yet it has only once been formally recognized by the UN agencies (WHO, 1988:31). What do these executives mean? What relevance has it to demographic theory, and what can be done about it in development practice? {5} It appears that they see `an entrapment paradigm' or `1-child paradigm', which is in stark contrast to the current `2-child paradigm' (King and Elliott 1995), and which has such grave ethical and political consequences that it is taboo. Paul Demeny has called this the `Hardinian taboo' {6} - that curious form of self imposed `thought police' which presents us humans from reacting rationally to our `population problem'. Snow has argued that our survival as a species now requires that we overcome this reluctance to control our population numbers. {7} Hardin (1993) described the taboo that the general public applies to many aspects of the population problem. However, he did not point out that it applies at least as strongly to demographers themselves, and to development economists.
 

                We argue that:        (i) The `Hardinian taboo' is now so grave inside critical aspects of academic demography, that it must be considered corrupted as a science- to the incalculable detriment of development practice, and to the rational development of UN policy, especially that of UNFPA. We argue that the evidence for the entrapment of Rwanda {8} is irrefutable (King and Elliott 1996a), as is that for Malawi (UN in Malawi 1993). {9} There is also demographic opinion of the highest eminence  (Jack Caldwell) which holds, privately, that the demographic entrapment of Africa is massive  - without agreeing to be quoted. We consider that to hold to one academic opinion privately, but its reverse publicly (double-think) is a grave flaw in the discipline, and are aware that double-think is widespread (King and Elliott 1993). We assign no blame ad hominem, but suggest that corporate solidarity within demography has reached the point at which no demographer dare break ranks without ostracism. Since entrapment is `politically incorrect' to the many academics who move between academia and the UN agencies, it is officially invisible to these agencies also, which are unable to adjust their policies accordingly. We see academic and journalistic integrity - absolutely free from all relevant taboos - as the sine qua non for mitigating `the population problem' which should be demography's greatest concern.

                   (ii) We find it tragic that demographers seem so reluctant to discuss the alternatives to the Malthusian checks to population increase that have already begun in Rwanda. Hardin (1993:276) considers that the population problem is `solution-ready'  (by other than Malthusian processes), although he has not indicated what the solution might be, and has suggested that change, once it starts, could be rapid. We think we see at least a partial solution. We are also told that we are saying what everyone else, who is thinking, is thinking about. We sense a groundswell going in our direction, and are hopeful for speedy change.
 

               The thesis of this paper is that the that the forces necessary to solve, or at least mitigate, the `population problem' are inherent in the `benign uproar', that can be expected to ensue from abolishing the Hardinian taboo and recognizing entrapment.    {10} We examine the nature of this uproar, welcome it, and argue that far from there being a choice between uproar and no uproar, the reality is the choice between two particular kinds of uproar.

               Is it to be the benign uproar of the heated argument as the necessary prelude to global behaviour change, or is it to be the malignant uproar of slaughter after the manner of the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa, and of urban food riots?
 

           We argue that benign uproar is far from being merely fortuitous, since it would have to be inherent in any remedy for the population problem. We have fewer doubts about the effectiveness of benign uproar once liberated, than about the difficulty of breaking the taboo, and liberating the necessary uproar in the first place. Since the many conflicting premisses exposed by lifting the taboo cannot be realigned without it, benign uproar is to be welcomed as a sign that a new dynamic compromise between these premisses is being reached. Double-think has kept entrapment repressed for at least 20 years, so that its release is unlikely to be completely silent.

               We argue that the benign uproar that would follow the recognition of entrapment is a necessary instrument for simultaneous change in:

               (i) Southern fertility, in that (a) trapped Southern communities when confronted with their own entrapment would have fewer children, and (b) that the North, seeing them entrapped, would provide them with more family planning and development aid, now grossly deficient.

               (ii) The Northern lifestyle, in that the North when confronted with the plight of the South, and its own 50-fold resource consumption, would be faced with a powerful force to moderate that lifestyle.

               Overall, we see the Hardinian taboo as stifling urgently-needed innovation and adaptation, and view the recognition of entrapment as the powerful engine of a new radicalism in a world that is in the direst need of it. To those who argue that the recognition of entrapment would be destabilising, we reply that there can be no long-term stability unless it is recognised.

           We do not expect this uproar to be without its `downside' including loss of life, perhaps even that of ourselves, nor to we see it as being instantly successful (it is largely too late in Rwanda), nor do we necessarily know where it is going to end, nor can we be sure that the uproar which we hope will be benign will inevitably always be so. Still less can we be sure that there will be enough benign uproar.

           However, when we look at the status quo we see among other alarming trends, the following, none of which are presently opposed by remotely adequate countervailing forces:

           (i) Incipient and possibly worsening of the global food situation, in that continuing a 30 year trend, the rate of increase of global grain yield has now fallen to less than 1% during the last three consecutive years, whereas the current rate of population increase is 1.5%, thus suggesting that the world as a whole may be trapped (King and Elliott 1996b). [Actually it is worse than this, since this is an old paper -  see Page19. Figure 4] Incidentally, we suggest that this is not without considerable advantages - see below.
 

               (ii) The rising global temperature, with all its consequences, due mostly to fossil fuel consumption in the North. This is already such that there is a 3-4[degrees]C rise built into the system [reference needed].

               (iii) Increasing disparity between rich and poor, and between North and South which is such that 500 people now own as much wealth as the poorer half of humanity.{11}

                   We argue that the recognition of entrapment could be just such a countervailing force, and that benign global uproar is urgently necessary, in the hope that malignant uproar - which is otherwise inevitable - can be minimised.

                    We have been told that there is  `no overt constituency' for the recognition of entrapment. We reply that there is a considerable constituency `waiting to come out of the woodwork' *as soon as entrapment begins to be publicly recognised.

                 This paper builds on several others  which have examined:

               (i) The conflict between the interests of the child and the community(King and Elliott 1993).

                (ii) The case for a 1-child world, in that if we are to counsel any community to have 1-child families as a necessary means of disentrapment, we should have them ourselves, irrespective of what might be happening to global grain (King and Elliott 1995).

               (iii) The demographic entrapment of Rwanda (King and Elliott 1996a).

               (iv) The case for recalling the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), or `Cairo I', as `CAIRO II', since it considered demographic entrapment taboo, and took global food security for granted (King and Elliott 1996b), quite apart from the fact that it was rigged.

               (vi) The entrapment of Uganda (King 1996).

               (vii) The Hardinian taboo, and especially its politics, in a form suitable for non-specialists (King and Elliott 1997). [The Lady M series Pages 2 and 3, Ed]

                First, we develop our previous definition of entrapment (King and Elliott 1993).

      Some definition of entrapment is required that can be used to diagnose it sufficiently early for preventive action to be taken in particular communities. We argue that a local population should be considered demographically trapped if starvation, and or slaughter occur, or can be expected to occur, from an unfavourable combination of these five variables:

           (i) A circumscribed ecosystem.

           (ii) Its finite carrying capacity .

           (iii) The large size of the present or the projected population that it has to support.

           (iv) Lack of adequate opportunities for migration out of it.

          (v) The inability of the economy within it to produce the necessary exports,and therefore the necessary imports - especially food.

           The diagnosis of entrapment can readily be avoided if these variables are not taken together, and one or more of them is neglected. Items (iv) and (v) describe the links that a community has with the rest of the world, or their absence. It is useful to have a term which combines these, for which we suggest the term 'connectedness, and its opposite 'disconnectedness'; entrapment resulting both from inadequate carrying capacity and from disconnectedness.

            [The first three of these variables can be combined in a single one, leaving  a total of three, the deadly triad]

           A severely trapped population faces the three tragedies of entrapment (in effect Malthus' `misery' or positive checks) in varying combination. Depending on local cultural, political and ecological factors people can:

           (i) Become progressively stunted (as in Malawi), and/or starve. {12}

           (ii) Die from disease.

           (iii) Slaughter their neighbours in a variety of ways (see below). Mortality increase could occur as a sudden population crash (Mumford 1994:366), or as a continuing process, or as some combination of the two. {13}
 

         Since endangered populations are growing rapidly as the result of their high fertility, the critical part of the definition is "...or the projected population...", and concerns the ultimate size of a population in relation to its carrying capacity and its connectedness, at the end of its demographic transition when its demographic momentum is exhausted. The effect of this momentum should not be underestimated, since on average half of all future population growth will occur after replacement fertility (2.2 children) has been reached(Cassen, 1994).  [This statement is uncertain and is presently being researched, Ed] A major constraint is time, and particularly whether such measures as female education and empowerment, etc. have time to bring the birth rate down, and attain sustainability, before carrying capacity and connectedness are exceeded.
 

 
    In theory,  the concept of entrapment implies that it is possible to:

           (i) draw a boundary round a particular ecosystem (area of land),

           (ii) measure its carrying capacity,

           (iii) estimate the present and project the future population inside that ecosystem,

           (iv) measure the flows of people (migration) and goods and services (especially food) across its boundary,

           (v) do all this in a way which is sufficiently valid to be useful.

           Theoretically, the ecosystems could be of any size - individual farmsteads, districts, regions, nation states, continents, or the world as a whole. The particular ecosystem to be studied depend on where meaningful boundaries can be drawn, across which flows can be measured, and within which carrying capacity can be estimated.

            The concept of flow implies that something, whether of people, goods and services or food, is moving from one place to another across a boundary. The limitations in these flows are primary, and the boundaries that these limitations define are secondary. Since the factors that limit the flows are political and economic, as well as geographic, strong political tensions and grave ethical problems are commonly associated with the disconnectedness they cause.

            To take the limiting case: if there were no boundaries and all parts of the world were equally connected, there would be no entrapment, except of the world as a whole. If, hypothetically, such a perfectly connected world were to exceed its carrying capacity, all communities would starve (or fight) slowly, equally and simultaneously. In the real disconnected world, some starve and fight before others. Entrapment is thus the geography of disconnectedness in the presence of carrying capacity which has been exceeded.

                In practice, since data are usually collected for states, we have used state boundaries (Rwanda and Malawi) for convenience. African state boundaries are however remarkably porous. So is Rwanda to be considered in isolation? Or Rwanda with Burundi? Or the great Lakes Region, as a whole, in that the Belgian administration was also concerned about the carrying capacity of Kivu (Wils 19986), and there is evidence that Uganda may also be trapped. Or is the unit to be studied the entire continent of Africa, or the world as a whole?

               We argue that, porous though the borders maybe, there are sufficient impediments of one kind or another to prevent population pressure equilibrating across them, and causing it to build up inside them. Since borders are so porous, and the impediments to migration so complex, the interface between trapped areas and non trapped (or less trapped) ones is best seen as an irregular gradient, rather than as a sharp line. We also argue that the data are sufficiently valid to indicate the gravest entrapment of some areas.

           We see in parts of Africa a process of disordered and largely frustrated migration that increasingly fails to relieve both starvation (and near starvation) and the incentive to slaughter. Since much of this is still either silent (the starvation) or small scale (the slaughter), it is seldom reported. Thus Malawi's land-holdings are so tiny that half  it's children are quietly stunting. Nor is not generally recognised that land-hungry slaughter has already started in isolated pockets (so far) of Kenya (King and Elliott; 1996), Uganda (King 1997) and Ghana [reference needed]. Meanwhile the economic connectedness of African countries with one another, and with the world is minuscule and declining [UNDP 1998].

            Governments usually try to relieve entrapment and increase connectedness by encouraging areas in surplus to feed those in deficit. Such assistance, although it is apt to be slow, inadequate and highly politicised, serves to blur entrapment at the sub-national level. Countries vary greatly in the efficiency with which they do this, India for example, is much better at doing it than Ethiopia.

           All cities have exceeded the carrying capacity within their city limits, yet connectedness with their rural hinterland and with other countries is normally so good that there is no entrapment until this becomes national. Cities per se are thus unlikely to be trapped - unless the entire country is trapped.

             We see the causes of slaughter as being a complex `black box' in which entrapment is merely one cause, albeit a powerful one, since it implies a combination of intense population pressure, severe land hunger and high unemployment, with little possibility of escape (migration). Which of the two major `Malthusian checks' is to dominate on a particular occasion , starvation or slaughter, is likely to depend on whether there are already major social or tribal tensions. We see the slaughter in which entrapment plays a greater or lesser role as taking various forms,  which include, in increasing order of severity, and commonly in complex combination:

           (i) Isolated violence and armed robbery, as presently in Kenya and Malawi as symptoms of the social malaise, to which entrapment is contributing.

           (ii) Isolated instances of land-hungry neighbours killing one another, as recently in Uganda (King 1997 [more details are needed here]).

          (iii) Localised `land wars' as in Ghana [reference needed].

           (iv) `Disordered tribal slaughter' as in Burundi.

           (v) Urban food riots as in Zambia [Alan Howarth, personal communication], especially if cities have been swollen by extensive migration from the rural areas. If severe, this could result in great destruction of society and the infrastructure, and even of the state itself as a community implodes in anarchy. We see this as the ultimate fate of a trapped city, the likely trigger being a failure of food imports or food aid.

           (vi) Systematic genocide as in Rwanda, which we expect will be an exceptional event.

             Carrying capacity has been explored by Cohen (1996: 257) and others. We are not impressed by the `exemptionist argument' that carrying capacity does not apply to man, and agree with Hardin (1993: 204) that, with due consideration for connectedness (or its absence), and taking the `welfare referenced standard of living' to be that necessary for mere survival, carrying capacity is only too meaningful for us too.

           Our concern is not what the carrying capacity of the world, or any particular ecosystem within it, could be, if it was farmed ideally, but what it actually is, or is going to in the fairly near future, with practical limitations duly considered. Thus we are not concerned with Rwanda's carrying capacity where it farmed with the greatest skill and with the best technology, but what it presently is or could reasonably become with the assistance which we hope will be available. As to the 'welfare referenced standard of living' which is to be extracted from a particular ecosystem, we take for the purposes of argument and calculation, merely that which is necessary for survival, without suggesting that this is the desirable one.

             We distinguish between carrying capacity, which is a matter of hectares, the food produced, and the people eating it, and lebensraum*, or the territory a group see as theirs, for social or ideological reasons. For example, in Rwanda we see problems of carrying capacity and lebensraum, and in Bosnia of lebensraum only, since carrying capacity and the economy appear to be adequate, so that it is not demographically trapped.

             Entrapment has so many relationships with poverty that they are sometimes considered identical. Individual poverty is a cluster of social factors with complex causal relationships between them, such that the possession of one factor makes the possession of the others more likely. These factors include: a poorly paid job or unemployment, an inadequate diet, high fertility, lack of education, bad housing, poor health and a decreased expectation of life. To be in poverty is to have a high score for most of these factors, but not necessarily to have all of them. If at the same time one's community is exceeding the capacity of its ecosystem, one cannot migrate, and the lack of an export economy makes employment even more difficult, these additional factors will make one's poverty worse. Entrapment is thus another factor in the nexus of the determinants of poverty that has previously been neglected in the large literature on poverty (Jean Dréze and Amartya Sen 1990). We see it as a major factor determining poverty, and particularly in widening the gap between the rich and the poorest.

            Entrapment is merely a sufficiently large mass of the poor for the ecosystem they occupy to have an identifiable carrying capacity which has been exceeded, and a definable boundary across which there is disconnectedness. Although the mass of the poor could be quite small, migration within states is often not difficult, with the result that the members of a rural family, which has exceeded the carrying capacity of its farmstead, are able to melt away by migrating to an under-populated area, if one can be found, or to the city if it cannot. Here, although they may be `trapped by poverty', they are not constrained by an identifiable boundary, and so are not demographically trapped - unless the city and the territory containing it is also trapped.

         The Tongan word `taboo' was introduced by Captain Cook in 1777, as meaning something forbidden without explanation, either by custom, or by the edict of a chief, the infraction of which is associated with severe penalties from the rest of society. Whereas the Tongans are said to have expressly said "Taboo!" as the reason for not doing something, the custom now is merely not to do it, while saying nothing. We suggest that, since everything in society is connected to everything else, all powerful taboos have important structural roles in society, in that removing one is likely to be followed by major social change - for better or worse.

        Whereas Hardin has amply explored the extent of the taboo on the population problem as it applies to the general public rather than demographers, he has not explored the reasons for it. We have called these reasons the `foundations' of the Hardinian taboo. We suggestthat there at least 17 of these foundations. We see them as being linked in greater or lesser degree, in that to alter one stresses the others. If the 2-child paradigm ever shifts, all of these foundations will need to shift, at least in part, or be severely stressed. As these foundations shift, many other changes in society will either follow spontaneously, or need to be encouraged to follow. {14}  Some of these foundations are so substantial, particularly the second third and fourth, that removing the taboo on entrapment challenges the ethical, political and economic foundations of the present global society.

(1) The fear of (benign) uproar has already been discussed, and appears to be a major factor in the minds of some senior UN executives.
 
 

(3) Entrapment challenges the ever increasing resource consumption of the North    that this economy now provides. This is advertisement-driven to promote ever more luxurious and unsustainable lifestyles, with all the implications that these have for fossil fuel consumption and global warming. This requires that advertisement now be controlled - one of the most urgent and difficult of all the requirements of the new paradigm (Paul Virilio. 1995).

(4) The means of employment that the Northern lifestyle provides, in that to alter it, unless other radical and difficult changes are also implemented at the same time, is likely to increase unemployment.

(5) Northern food habits, which are integral to this economy and lifestyle, and which are such that there is a four-fold difference in per capita grain consumption, between India for example, and the United States (Brown 1993 Table 10-5).

(6) Current notions of human rights, particularly as they relate to human reproduction (see below).

(7) The attitudes to abortion       held by the Holy See and some protestant fundamentalists.

(9) The cultural attitudes of the South that favour high fertility.

(10) The assumption that economic development will take place everywhere, when there are many communities in which there is no sign of it occurring in time ('the starting line taboo' - see below).

(11) The current high status of `the child' in western liberalism, a status which is threatened by the conflict between the interests of the child (and the fetus) and the community that entrapment exposes (King and Elliott 1993).

(12) The metaphysical position of late capitalist man (see below).

(13) The social mechanism whereby those in charge of the discussion, both senior academics and the editors of journals, are less likely to be motivated by logic than by self interest, in that they face sanctions, particularly peer-group disapproval if they break the taboo. We suggest that although the editors of journals may  themselves wish to lift the Hardinian taboo,  they  may have difficulty carrying their staff with them, and face 'benign uproar' in the office if they don't.

(14) A dread of `the future' in that abolishing the taboo acknowledges that `the population future' now approaching us at nearly a billion a decade, is already upon us.

(15) The large measure of inertia  associated with the maintenance of the status quo, and the disinclination to think and act.

(16) The feeling of hopelessness, due to the lack of any coherent policy as to what might be done. We like to think that we have outlined just such a policy.

(17) The political interests of the United States  State Department, and the apparent role of academic demography as an instrument of US hegemony. The policing of political correctness in respect of the maintenance of the Hardinian taboo on entrapment  is probably the critical factor. If  it had lifted in   US academia, the dialogue would at least have opened, so that  it  would probably now be lifting  elsewhere also. 

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The challenges to the market economy  presented by (2) to (5) above would not seem quite so daunting if there was indeed any alternative to it even on the horizon (Dun 1994). The fact that there is at present no such alternative does not prevent us from stating the need for one, or from hoping that one might develop. Indeed it is to be expected, that if one is to develop, the recognition of entrapment might be a powerful engine for its development, and the basis for a new radicalism. Some way or other, such an alternative, if it develops, will have to take account of entrapment.

Some previous paradigm shifts  {15}have faced intransigent religious opposition, but this one would appear to be unique, not so much in the strength of the religious opposition to it, but in the breadth as well as the strength of the forces opposing it. The proponents of previous paradigm shifts have faced threats to their personal safety and this one is no exception.

           Most of those who are presently 'double-thinking' probably seldom realise that the taboo they maintain is supported by all this. A major problem is that disturbing the foundations of the taboo disturbs everyone, North and South, in greater or lesser degree. Every individual and every group is split on at least one of the issues that it raises. The South, for example, which would welcome the more equal distribution of resources, would find 1-child families particularly difficult, as would the Catholic church which might otherwise be attracted by the call to compassion. Not surprisingly, 1-child families have no lobby.

                To cling to the old paradigm, or to adhere to the new one, is thus ultimately a political act - does one favour change, or doesn't one? It is also an ethical one - how much does one care for the rest of humanity, and for the other inhabitants of our ecosystem, present and future?  See also

'Are we are dealing with a single Hardinian taboo or with several?'  Although we refer here to a single 'Hardian taboo' it is likely  to be complex with different 'foundations' operating singly or together in different ways on different occasions, in a way that should be susceptible to analysis.

           We list the taboo on abortion as merely number seven of the 'foundations of the Hardinian taboo. It is however  usually considered a taboo in its own right.   Hardin (1996:13) has warned against the error of trying to tackle more than one taboo at a time.  If he  is correct, the strength of the 'Hardinian taboo-complex' is daunting indeed. Or can a collection of taboos somehow all lift  together?
 

 For references,  see     Continued on Page 6a     Main index          Detailed index