Abstract: Quantitative as well as qualitative research studies on topics of education vary in their level of quality. However, unlike researchers working with quantitative empirical methods, not all of their qualitatively oriented colleagues do recognize a mutual set of quality standards for their studies. In order to determine the degree to which we can reliably learn from a qualitative investigation, it is necessary to reach agreement on standards of quality within the qualitative paradigm. Neither a laissez-faire attitude of “anything goes” nor the attempt to create “alternative” standards to the “traditional” ones does contribute to the reputation of the qualitative approach. Its extensive establishment as indispensable research methods of obtaining sound information depends on the acceptance and use of agreed-upon general criteria for determining the quality for procedures.

Since the 1970ies a renaissance of qualitative methods in educational research can be noted. Initially the “new” qualitative and the “traditional” quantitative methodology hardly recognized each other. They were known to be far-reaching incompatible. Their strengths and weaknesses were diametrically confronted by their protagonists and antagonists in an exaggerated form. This dispute style in form of a “methodological paradigm-war” (Flick 2004, p. 67) was encouraged by qualitative methodologists. They often formulated their attempts in a brusque contrast to quantitative methodology (Banister et al. 1994) and distanced themselves from a distorted picture rather than from the reality of quantitative research. Some quantitative oriented researchers refused to even regard qualitative methods as empirical procedures.

In the meantime, the original confrontation has subsided to a careful convergence on both sides. Three indicators for this are:
(1) Ideological barriers fall: Common grounds of the two areas of research are emphasized stronger than fundamental differences. The insight increasingly spreads that only a hollow controversy is led with a supposedly strong distinction between both camps (Helmke/Schrader 2006; cf. Ludwig 2004; Menck 2005). As this is not about „religious belief“, there is no necessity to alternatively and principally either commit oneself or to refuse one of the two methodical traditions (Niegemann 2006). Rather the prevailing research object and the present state of knowledge decide on the suitability of a research methodology. Fundamental methodology preferences would limit the view of certain formulations of questions unnecessarily and contraproductively.

(2) Meanwhile quantitative oriented scholars also plead for the use of qualitative methodology (e.g. Klieme/Bos 2000; Renkl 1999; Roeder 2006; Seale 1999) and vice versa. In textbooks introducing general (quantitative) research methodology qualitative processes are discussed as well (e.g. Cohen/Manion/Morrison 2007).

(3) The compatibility of both methodological areas is emphasized (e.g. Hammersley 1996, pp. 167-168; Creswell 2003; Groebe 2006; Finkbeiner/Ludwig et al. 2006; Ludwig 1999, pp. 229-230; Schnaitmann 2004). With Denzin (1970; Denzin/Lincoln 1998) the pluralistic integration of these two methodological areas can be referred to as “methodical triangulation”. This term has become customary. But it is unfortunately ambiguous and its number “trí” a bit unusual for the meaning to mostly combine just two areas.

In summary, nowadays the methodological „zeitgeist“ complies with the qualitative methodology. A certain degree of establishment of qualitative research is achieved. There has been quite a lot of approval at least in educational science rather than in psychology.

Even though, the general acceptance of qualitative methodology is still out of the question. Many authors state that the qualitative approach has only gained marginal meaning in many areas of educational research so far (e.g. Blömeke 2004; Leutner 1999; Reichertz 2000). Scientific structural features like an own publication body, persistent conferences and professorships at universities, are indications for a certain spread of the affiliation circle and not – as often stated - inevitably for a wide recognition outside this circle. Groebe (2006, p. 8) sees quantitative methodology in psychology as the “mainstream” and the qualitative as the “offstream”. In education the ration may be slightly more balanced. He even thinks that the qualitative approach is to be blamed for “its own irrelevance itself”.

In order to reach the esteem of the entire scientific community three jobs have still to be done: It is necessary (1) to explain what is meant by the vague terms “qualitative” and “quantitative” research (cf. Ludwig 2004), (2) to clear what a mutual “metatheoretical basis” (Klieme/Bos 2000, p. 361) could look like and above all (3) which mutual standards of quality should be regarded as valid. With the following it is intended to contribute to the latter job.

1. Viewpoints on how to deal with standards

In the tradition of empirical methodology a number of scientific criteria has been drawn up and discussed. These include that scientific arguing is done systematically and methodically (for instance also considering alternative theses). Scientific statements are justified and comprehensible. They can be examined. Recognizable separations between results and personal interpretations should be carried out and described as such. Error sources and deficits are displayed. The production of statements should follow the ideals of objectivity, generalizability, repeatability, testability and falsifiability (e.g. Kerlinger 2000).

This type of criteria is widely undisputed among quantitative researchers as guiding ideas or as a regulative frame. In research processes these criteria are considered and they are subjects of checks (e.g. Beck/Krapp 2001, pp. 48-52; Roeder 2003). According to Flick (2004, p. 100) and Lüders (2000, pp. 633-634) however, among qualitative researchers no extensive agreement to these or other standards of research can be recognized yet.

Qualitative research, as far as it is conceptualized as a counter-concept to the quantitative one, claims of testing progressive ways by breaking down criteria of „traditional-conservative“ empirical methods that are regarded of being restricting. Actually, it does not seem appropriate for such an emancipated spirit to restart a new discussion about regimentation. Possibly that may be the reason why the topic “quality standards” (which go beyond single qualitative approaches and claim validity for the entire qualitative direction) is made to a taboo subject (Steinke 1999, pp. 10-12; cf. Kvale 1995; Mayring 1999). To boost this debate the online-journal “Forum Qualitative Social Research” has established a series of articles since 2000 (Breuer/Kölbl et al., no year).

In qualitative research three different positions are being taken towards quality standards (Flick 2002, p. 319; Elliott et al. 1999; Steinke 1999, p. 50; 2000, pp. 319-321; Saldern 1995; Seale 1999):
(1st) the rejection of any standards whatsoever, mostly based on postmodern or constructivistic viewpoints
(2nd) the development of own “alternative” standards while “conventional” standards are refused
(3rd) the recognition of the same („traditional“) standards which form the basis of the quantitative research and are generally accepted there

The soundness of these three viewpoints will be examined in the following.

When discussing research standards, the simple distinction of the research process into two phases as supposed by Reichenbach (1938; 1951) is very helpful. He referred to the first phase as "the context of discovery" and the second one as the "context of justification". The first comprises of explorative discovery with the goal of generating assumptions, hypotheses or investigation questions and new speculative ideas, constructing or elaborating theories or models. The second phase deals with hypotheses testing or finding sound answers to research questions. Having been a philosopher at the University of California at L.A., Reichenbach did not have empirical research in mind while creating this distinction. But it can be and it has been applied to empirical procedures by others.

The following considerations to quality standards mainly refer to the second research phase: the context of justification. The context of discovery as mainly a intuitive mental process underlies not necessarily specific rules. This research phase does not have to fulfill any strict regiment. The context of discovery is like investigational police work in which free assumptions can be made about where the stolen money was hidden. Even esoteric methods could be applied there (e.g. support by a psychic). However, the evidence gathered against the suspect presented in court - as an analogy to the context of justification - has to be strong.

It is popular to assign qualitative research to the context of discovery (e. g. Flick 2002; Klauer 2001; Roeder 2006). One of the strengths of qualitative research may indeed lie in thorough analyses for gaining assumptions. Nevertheless this restriction to the level of “pre-studies” in principle does not correspond to the way many qualitative researchers see their work themselves. This is understandable. The development of “good” hypotheses may be a very valuable contribution to a research field. However, the core tasks of empirical educational research are the testing of hypotheses or the loadable replying to questions, because in the context of justification, empirical know-how cannot be replaced by plane creativity or rationality, as in the context of discovery (cf. Lamnek 1995, pp. 223-236). It is not only expected from investigations to raise significant questions or plausible
assumptions – this can be done by practitioners or theorists in many research lines as well – but to give reliable answers or substantiate assumptions, and by this turning a speculation into a sound statement of practical value (cf. Lodge 1978, p. 45). [This corresponds with an evidence-based reform in education as demanded by Robert Slavin (2002; 2007; 2008; cf. Bridges 2008) in his keynote address to the European Conference on Educational Research at Ghent University in September 2007.] As soon as qualitative research is settled in the terrain of justification context, the following considerations on research criteria are effective.

2. Foundation of the requirements of quality standards

The total rejection of standards in the context of justification of research processes is a difficult position to hold. Science in the modern sense, in general, is an open enterprise (Popper 1945; 1959). Not only the pool of scientifical knowledge changes by extension or correction, even scientific (self)comprehension is not written down rigidly but is subject to a slow historical change. Nonetheless, science in general as well as single scientific disciplines can only be constituted over one set of acknowledged “rules” within one period of time.

Critics of standards may perceive formulated rules for scientific work like an artificial straitjacket. The methodological postmodernism, the anarchistic philosophy of science of Feyerabend (1979; 1983) as well as Rombach in educational theory (1965) stand for such “method tolerance”. Feyerabend wanted to throw off the yoke of the supposedly narrow-minded selection of trustworthy methods in science with his laissez-faire motto of „anything goes” borrowed from the title of Porter’s musical (1934). (Feyerabend thought more of natural and formal sciences, nevertheless, scholars of humanities and social sciences seem to be attracted to such principles more; cf. Bamme 1986; Seale 1999, p. 188; Elliott et al. 1999, p. 225). Methodological freedom, however, is only useful within certain boundaries because exaggerated openness is only one step away from detachment and in turn from randomness, arbitrariness and insignificance, lastly to the verification of the ironical aphorism which states that the “state of art” in science is simply the “currently valid error”.

Researchers who plead for such total openness get into severe trouble of being not able to determine the identity of scientific work and with that, contrasting science from non-, para- or pre-scientific knowledge as produced by educational amateurs, self-help literature, religion, art or politics. (Could
journalistic investigation advance to “research” as well?) That way science would lose its societal function, being the refuge of the principally approvable state of knowledge. Though this state of knowledge depends on the state of research and is therefore unfinished and temporary, it is still binding because it represents currently the best possible base for public communication and decisions.

The question what science is, can only be answered on the base of the rules of scientific thinking. The agreement in regard to a certain minimum stock of such rules defines the maturity of a discipline. Such guiding principles submit an orientation to evaluate studies and the value of their findings. In general, there is freedom in the decision of how strong or mild we want to determine scientific standards. But the consequences of this decision are established. The higher the standards are set for a discipline, the more reliable are their research findings and the bigger is her relevance for society and her public reputation. The more open and gentle the criteria are held, the more insignificant are their research results. Studies that are too loose with their standards, participate undeservedly in the assets of public trust in science that was produced by other studies which fulfilled more sophisticated standard levels.

Dealing with research standards in a detached way, can only be perceived as smugness by people not belonging to a discipline. Only with a great deal of cynicism could some of the arguments for methodical freedom be transferred to (e.g.) medical research. The carefree appeal to the methodological detachment may seem easier in a social and behavioral scientific context, because the practical consequences of false statements adjust slower there. Therefore, in a particular case, a particular action can seldom be made responsible for those consequences. This does not separate science from its responsibility for its profit in any way.

3. Objections to „alternative“ standards

The supporters of own alternative „qualitative“ standards see in the recognition of conventional rules a subjugation under a quantitative dominance (cf. Groeben 2006). However, there is no such thing as „quantitative standards“, but only such which are recognized by the quantitative approach. Only the procedures of checking the compliance with these rules are partially of quantitative nature; e.g. the evaluation of interrater-
objectivity by correlation coefficients. One who accepts the usual standards, agrees with generally and rationally well founded methodological arguments.

The approved standards in quantitative methodology are partly based on the extensive experience with sources of error and research artifacts, often proofed by meta-experimental studies, e.g. influence of prejudice and social stereotypes, effects of social desirability, interviewer and rater bias, bias of question formulation, reactivity of the measures or selective perception. There is no reason to assume that the risks of these errors and artifacts are less frequent in qualitative research. Ignoring such nuisance potential is no good strategy, as such sources of error cannot be eliminated by not taking notice of them.

The recommendation for alternative standards will be discussed in the following regarding a central differentiation of quality standards, namely the three classical quality criteria: Objectivity, reliability, and validity (Lamnek 2005, pp. 138-179). Steinke (1999) partially rejects these quality criteria for qualitative research. She demands the development of “specific evaluation criteria”, which claim no general validity, but should be used just for specific studies. Others suggest setting up “method-adequate quality criteria” as a substitute for the classic ones which are being used only for specific research methods (Flick 2004).

These ideas have to be objected to. Essential criteria which are basic constituents of science are neither replaceable nor can they be just used for some research methods and for some not. Like laws are based on the constitution, standards are based on the quality criteria as the „constitution“ of research. That means: criteria determine which methods can be used and not the other way round. Knoblauch (2000) pleads for the development of alternative criteria because he fears the loss of specific contributions of qualitative research through the recognition of conventional criteria. This argument can hardly convince because it turns the priority logic of research criteria and research methodology on its head. (The attempt of substituting crucial criteria would be comparable to a pharmaceutical company refusing to mention binding information on the side effects of medication, but then “alternatively” insuring the patient that the product information has been printed on recycled paper.) Method-adequate use of criteria would correspond to not setting up a general legal alcohol limit for car drivers according to the public security on roads, but to adjust this limit individually to the drinking habits of different persons, because otherwise it would be differently difficult for individuals to obey the law.
The mutual recognition of a pool of research standards is a precondition for an agreement of quantitative and qualitative methods. The idea of “criteria” for the evaluation of research quality implies that they are respected in all research fields within one discipline. Only the position of a uniform body of methodological rules is convincing here because it is the nature of standards to raise universal claim. Scientific knowledge is absolutely oriented towards finding general recognition, not just the approval of a special group. Therefore, “private standards”, valid only for individual scientists, individual methods, or even individual projects, are no standards in the normal sense. Like legal rules they cannot be personally tailored. The agreement about a minimum pool of standards however does not exclude its completion by methodological specific standards through which the specific accomplishments and possibilities of individual procedures could become visual. Special rules may be helpful to display an individual quality claim in the sense of additional voluntary commitment.

Meta-theoretical postulates which reclaim special rights for qualitative research by assigning themselves to alternative specific judgement criteria, present this method far under value. Oddly, some “alternative” or “methodologically specific” standards which are suggested, e.g. reliability, traceability, replicability, the documentation of the investigation process or doing research according to explicit rules, are congruent with general criteria anyway (see Mayring 1996, p. 117; 2000, p. 111; Flick 2002, pp. 333, 343; Lüders 2000, p. 633).

Objectivity, reliability and validity are a moderate operational substitution for what is usually called “truth”. Therefore there is no way to ignore or replace them. Someone who rejects these quality criteria, dismisses scientific arguing. Seriously rejecting these criteria would mean that it would be regarded as irrelevant whether collected data is really the one which should be collected. It would mean to tolerate that data is collected in an arbitrarily inaccurate mode and to simply shrugg the discrepancy aside in case that secondary analyses or replication studies of the same data come to totally different results. Quality criteria cannot be rejected without simultaneously smudging the concise contours between science and non-scientific knowledge and ideologies.

However, it does not object to the principal appreciation of quality criteria in any way,

(1) that new investigation methods and scrutiny technics for the three classical quality criteria are being developed (Diekmann 2001; Flick 2002, pp. 319-321), like the “communicative validation” (Even some of the usual
operationalizations of quality criteria, e.g. split-half or retest-reliability are only regarded as makeshift in the quantitative area, cf. Mayring 1996, p. 116; 2000, p. 110),

(2) that in particular studies low levels of these standards are accepted, as far as there are no other more appropriate or economical alternatives available or

(3) that data collection measures are used which has not been checked yet.

This action is quite often applied in quantitative studies, e.g. the simple, direct measuring of variables with 1-item ad-hoc scales with a convincing face-validity (e.g. Kunter et al. 2002).

It makes a great difference if quality criteria are *principally* declined and thereby declared nonrelevant or if they are acclaimed but one is ready to risk violations in *single cases* since there is a lack of more adequate collecting procedures. (In quantitative instruction research there is a trend to tolerate explicit, high-inferential, meaning little objective, investigation instruments). Criteria whose compliance are not or cannot be tested, are appreciated accordingly when potentially or possible violations against them are pointed out. Evaluation criteria that are disclaimed as quality standards would not be worth mentioned.

The mostly controversial quality criterion might be objectivity. Critics of the objectivity requirement allege that research as a human activity is always executed by subjects and insofar “subjective” (cf. Depaepe 1999). Objectivity in that sense does not mean “without subject affinity“, but “rater independence” e.g. the degree of freedom (as much as possible) from individual-specific assessment.

Objectivity – or better unambiguously referred to as “inter-subjectivity” – is remarkable as a guiding concept, well aware that it can rarely be totally corresponded to in the behavioral and social sciences. Descriptive theories claim to model reality as authentic and “truthfully” as possible. Describing statements which radically dismiss this claim may be of aesthetical value. They are of blank significance for giving orientation. What good is a portrait, if it does not try to copy the person to its best? The radical constructivist’s doubt of an objective world does not change the importance of objectivity. Even if the commonly experienced reality “out there” is only a global auxiliary construction, every day experience already shows that this construction is not only possible but is necessary as a communication base. Empirical research is inevitably limited to this global auxiliary construction (cf. Hammersley 1992, pp. 50-52; Seale 1999, p. 23, 157; Cohen/Manion/Morrison 2007).
4. Defence of the unity position towards research standards

The body of scientific criteria in the sense of idealistic guidelines, as accepted and respected by quantitative methodology, has not been developed historically by chance through exchangeable influence constellations or fashion currents. Much more this list of criteria can be rationally founded to an extent that it can raise claim on general acceptance. Some of these standards are explicitly appreciated by the report of the National Research Council 2002 on the state of educational research in the United States (Feuer/Towne/Shavelson 2005, p. 31). Not only quantitative research in educational science and its related disciplines as psychology and sociology orientate themselves on it, but all human-referred sciences, e.g. medicine and economics as well.

The consensus worthiness of these research criteria can be demonstrated easily through the exclusion of mental reversion: Any contrary claim would be absurd. Nobody has ever claimed for research a maximum of unsystematic subjectivity, irrationality, unreplicability, non-reliability or non-testability. Qualitative research can hardly flee from these standards. She is – like it or not – assessed according to them anyway.

5. Consequences of the absence of a standard consensus

Qualitative as well as quantitative studies can be distinguished by their different levels of methodical quality and by the power of their outcomes. In other words: There are strong and weak studies in both areas. Within the qualitative paradigm Eisner distinguishes between two quality levels: the „scientific“ and the „artistic“ approach (1981). In the quantitative field an assessment of these different quality levels is possible because there are commonly shared standards of quality. In short: There we can distinguish between good and bad studies. Unfortunately this is not valid for the qualitative area to the same extent because here standards of quality are not widely shared among researchers. Therefore, Knoblauch states that „one of the basic problems of qualitative research is the evaluation of her findings“ (2000, p. 628). Research outcomes, which cannot be assessed, are almost useless, because we never know how much we can trust them.

The lack of recognition of standards may contribute to the fact that – according to Elliott - the qualitative area tends to attract methodically less experienced people (Elliott et al. 1999, p. 218). Wellenreuther states that
(2000, p. 14) pure dilettantism is often disguised behind the mask of the term „qualitative“.

6. Demands on qualitative research

The establishment of a culture of research standards could profit by discussing the following list of statements and postulates. These statements are derived from deficits which can typically be found in weak qualitative studies which are settled within the context of justification.

(1) The analysis of qualitative data should be done hypotheses-directed or directed by research questions or aims. Just to look open minded if “something interesting” can be found, does hardly lead to concrete results (Mayring 1999, p. 296; Seale 1999, p. 192).

(2) Qualitative material should also be analysed fallibilistically. That means: One should search for negative instances, for disconfirming evidence in the same way as searching for facts “being nice to your hypothesis” (Seale 1999, p. 73). To work empirically means to take the risk that “beautiful hypotheses” are killed by „ugly facts“ as Thomas Henry Huxley (1870) puts it. Popper’s Critical Rationalism demands from scientists to name a-priori possible findings that would make them reject their hypotheses. The wider this window of falsification potential is opened, the deeper the level of (“qualitative”) significance is established and in turn the stronger the decision for the acceptance of the (alternative) hypothesis is protected against the „type I error“ (Cohen/Manion/Morrison 2007, pp. 116, 197, 221). This principle can be transferred to qualitative testing as well.

(3) Empirical results should be derived relatively close and compelling from raw data (Seale 1999). Too loose interpretations may supply valid statements but on the investigator, rather than on the participants.

(4) It is necessary to provide information which makes it possible to assess the degree of validity and objectivity of the results. The idea of assessing a “probability of error” while accepting a hypothesis can be transferred to qualitative research in a figurative (non-numerical) sense.

(5) Qualitative research processes should clearly proceed result-directedly. During analysing raw data or information has to be reduced to non-trivial main results which can be communicated short. Readers of a research report should not be condemned to browse through hundreds of pages just to obtain a first impression of a study. Major findings “hidden” in a text jungle of detailed single-case depictions are almost as inaccessible as unexplored
topics. Most useful results are appropriate, but small, simplified images of a complex reality. Compressions and simplifications are inevitable. The attempt to describe reality totally or “holistically”, runs aground if not on the tireless effort of the researcher than on the patience of most readers. Nobody needs „a roadmap of Argentina in the size of Argentina“ (Schnabel 1999, p. 336).

(6) Qualitative studies, even single-case studies, should comment on the generalizability of their main results as well (Seale 1999, pp. 106-118; Lamnek 2005, p. 180).

(7) Research is obliged to deal with resources economically. There should be a balanced relationship between the expenses of a study in time, staff and money and the degree of reliability of its results. Sometimes it seems that a part of the expensive time some qualitative researchers are prepared to invest in gaining just hypotheses would have been invested better in the subsequent hypotheses testing. At times it is not plausible that assumptions, produced by an enormous empirical effort by studies in the context of discovery, are better than those produced by the “Three-B-method”: in bathroom, in bed, on bike (Bortz/Döring 1995, p. 329).

7. Conclusion and desiderata

In the quantitative approach a vital “self-correcting” tradition of mutual critical scrutiny is established regarding the development and application of methods (e.g. summarized by Rost 2005; Stelzl 2005; Roeder 2006, p. 642; Cohen/Manion/Morrison 2007). This is not valid to the same extent for the qualitative area. There, researchers and methodologists of different schools tend – with few exceptions - to a friendly, but unrelated co-existence and tolerance towards each other’s work (cf. Groeben 2006). This may originate in the fact that there is hardly any agreement drawn on standards. Therefore, there are no mutual quality measures available from which evaluations could be taken. Such an Anything-Goes-Attitude is of little value to research cooperation. The absence of a mutual methodological point of reference may be one of the reasons why qualitative research projects stay mostly isolated, follow-ups are hardly carried out and inter-institutional networks are rarely established (Krüger 2000, p. 337). Therefore, a stronger promotion of a culture of mutual criticism seems to be very promising. Such a culture would have a selfprotective function: With a clear demarcation it can avoid that the label “qualitative” could be misused for methodologically questionable studies (cf. Kardorff 1995; Lüders 2000).
Educational research in the context of discovery produces assumptions and speculations. It shows how the world of learning could be. The claim of knowledge in the context of justification however is describing how this world is. Applied empirical research with this purpose underlies quality standards as it aims at the generation of sound knowledge and, in turn, at making evidence-based education possible.

Research approaches actually establish themselves not by programmatic-methodological depictions but by “convincing gains of knowledge which are achieved through their methods” (Hopf/Müller 1995, p. 67). After a developmental and testing phase research methods must tolerate to be assessed by their contributions to the research fields. For the evaluation of the power of different qualitative methods it would currently be more necessary to have critical reviews on the best-practice application of methods via a collection of exemplary selected high-quality studies with reliable findings of practical value, rather than more of pure methodological literature. This selection of studies requires an agreement of quality standards.

In sum: It is desirable that the already begun discussion about quality standards (e.g. Elliott et al. 1999, pp. 219-222; 2000; Seale 1999) will be held more persistently within the qualitative approach and that a mutual position will be strived to find. In the view of Elliot and colleagues this would contribute in a greater extent to the legitimation and to a wider acknowledgement of qualitative research (Elliott et al. 1999, pp. 219-220; 2000; Seale 1999). This debate, however, is still very underdeveloped (Breuer/Kölbl et al., no year; Flick 2002, p. 343, 394; Lamnek 2005, p. 145).

Even if it would be impossible to find an agreement among qualitative researchers, great progress would have already been achieved as far as the individual qualitative research schools would provide clear statements on which standards would be regarded as binding for the use of their methods. This way the readers of their studies would know to which extent it can be expected that the applied procedures can be placed within the frame of the generally accepted understanding of scientific nature and thus to what extent their findings can be theoretically and empirically assigned to the state of the art of a research field. “Only when the standards of scientific quality evaluation are firmly established and differentiated in qualitative research”, the qualitative methodology program has “a chance to stay on the market and survive” (Reichertz 2000, p. 8).
References


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