(July 2001 version)
This Code replaces an earlier document, Questions of Procedures for Ministers which was amended substantially following the Nolan Committee in 1995 and other Parliamentary inquiries.
The Ministerial Code consists of ten substantive parts. These are available in full at the Cabinet Office web-site. Below are some extracts of the most important provisions.
Ministers of the Crown
1. Ministers of the Crown are expected to behave according to the highest standards of constitutional and personal conduct in the performance of their duties. In particular, they must observe the following principles of Ministerial conduct:
i. Ministers must uphold the principle of collective responsibility;
ii. Ministers have a duty to Parliament to account, and be held to account, for the policies, decisions and actions of their Departments and Next Steps Agencies;
iii. It is of paramount importance that Ministers give accurate and truthful information to Parliament, correcting any inadvertent error at the earliest opportunity. Ministers who knowingly mislead Parliament will be expected to offer their resignation to the Prime Minister;
iv. Ministers should be as open as possible with Parliament and the public, refusing to provide information only when disclosure would not be in the public interest, which should be decided in accordance with relevant statute and the Government’s Code of Practice and Access to Government Information;
v. Similarly, Ministers should require civil servants who give evidence before Parliamentary Committees on their behalf and under their directions to be as helpful as possible in providing accurate, truthful and full information in accordance with the duties and responsibilities of civil servants as set out in the Civil Service Code.
vi. Ministers must ensure that no conflict arises, or appears to arise, between their public duties and their private interests;
vii. Ministers should avoid accepting any gift or hospitality which might, or might reasonably appear to, compromise their judgement or place them under an improper obligation;
viii. Ministers in the House of Commons must keep separate their role as Minister and constituency Member;
ix. Ministers must not use resources for party political purposes. They must uphold the political impartiality of the Civil Service, and not ask civil servants to act in any way which would conflict with the Civil Service Code.
Ministers must also comply at all times with the requirements which Parliament itself has laid down. For Ministers in the Commons, these are set by the Resolution carried on 19 March 1997 (Official Report columns 1046-47), the terms of which are repeated at ii. to v. above. For Ministers in the Lords the Resolution can be found in the Official Report of 20 March 1997 column 1057.
Cabinet and Ministerial Committee Business
3. Cabinet and Ministerial Committee business consists, in the main, of:
Matters wholly within the responsibility of a single Minister and which do not significantly engage collective responsibility as defined above need not be brought to the Cabinet or to a Ministerial Committee unless the Minister wishes to have the advice of colleagues. A precise definition of such matters cannot be given; in borderline cases a Minister is advised to seek collective consideration. Questions involving more than one Department should be examined interdepartmentally, before submission to a Ministerial Committee, so that the decisions required may be clearly defined.
Ministerial Committees
4. The Cabinet is supported by Ministerial Committees (both standing and ad hoc) which have a two-fold purpose. First they relieve the pressure on the Cabinet itself by settling as much business as possible at a lower level; or failing that, by clarifying the issues and defining the points of disagreement. Second, they support the principle of collective responsibility by ensuring that, even though an important question may never reach the Cabinet itself, the decision will be fully considered and the final judgement will be sufficiently authoritative to ensure that the Government as a whole can be properly expected to accept responsibility for it. When there is a difference between Departments, it should not be referred to the Cabinet until other means of resolving it have been exhausted, including personal correspondence or discussions between the Ministers concerned.
5. If the Ministerial Committee system is to
function effectively, appeals to the Cabinet must clearly be infrequent. Chairmen of
Committees are required to exercise their discretion in advising the Prime Minister
whether to allow them. The only automatic right of appeal is if Treasury Ministers are
unwilling to accept expenditure as a charge on the reserve; otherwise the Prime Minister
will entertain appeals to the Cabinet only after consultation with the Chairman of the
Committee concerned. Departmental Ministers should normally attend in person meetings of
Committees of which they are members or to which they are invited; unless they make it
possible for their colleagues to discuss with them personally issues which they consider
to be important, they cannot - except where their absence is due to factors outside their
control - expect the Prime Minister to allow an appeal against an adverse decision taken
in their absence.
Collective responsibility
16. The internal process through which a decision has been made, or the level of Committee by which it was taken, should not be disclosed. Decisions reached by the Cabinet or Ministerial Committees are binding on all members of the Government. They are, however, normally announced and explained as the decision of the Minister concerned. On occasions it may be desirable to emphasise the importance of a decision by stating specially that it is the decision of Her Majesty's Government. This, however, is the exception rather than the rule.
17. Collective responsibility requires that Ministers should be able to express their views frankly in the expectation that they can argue freely in private while maintaining a united front when decisions have been reached. This in turn requires that the privacy of opinions expressed in Cabinet and Ministerial Committees should be maintained. Moreover Cabinet and Committee documents will often contain information which needs to be protected in the public interest. It is therefore essential that, subject to the guidelines on the disclosure of information set out in the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information, Ministers take the necessary steps to ensure that they and their staff preserve the privacy of Cabinet business and protect the security of Government documents.
18. The principle of collective responsibility
and the need to safeguard national security, relations with other countries and the
confidential nature of discussions between Ministers and their civil servants impose
certain obligations on former Ministers who are contemplating the publication of material
based upon their recollection of the conduct of Government business in which they took
part. They are required to submit their manuscript to the Secretary of the Cabinet and to
conform to the principles set out in the Radcliffe Report of 1976 (Cmnd 6386).
Parliamentary statements and other Government announcements
27. When Parliament is in session, Ministers
will want to bear in mind the desire of Parliament that the most important announcements
of Government policy should be made, in the first instance, in Parliament.
Changes in Ministerial Responsibilities
33. The Prime Minister is responsible for the overall organisation of the Executive and the allocation of functions between Ministers in charge of Departments. His approval should therefore be sought where changes are proposed that affect this allocation and the responsibilities for the discharge of Ministerial functions. This applies where the functions in question are derived from statute or from the exercise of the Royal prerogative, or are general administrative responsibilities.
34. The Prime Minister's written approval should be sought where it is proposed to transfer functions:
a. between Ministers in charge of Departments (unless the changes are de minimis, can be made administratively and do not justify public announcement ...
b. within the field of responsibility of one Minister - eg by "hiving off" the discharge of some functions to a Non-Departmental Public Body where the change is likely to be politically sensitive or to raise wider issues of policy or organisation;
c. between junior Ministers within a Department when a change in Ministerial titles is involved...
35. In addition, the Prime Minister's written approval should be sought for proposals to allocate new functions to a particular Minister where the function does not fall wholly within the field of responsibilities of one Minister, or where there is disagreement about who should be responsible.
36. The Prime Minister will also determine
questions where there is disagreement eg because one Minister has proposed a transfer of
functions that is not accepted by the other(s) affected.
Parliamentary Private Secretaries
48. Ministers should ensure that their
Parliamentary Private Secretaries are aware of certain principles which should govern the
behaviour of Parliamentary Private Secretaries in the House of Commons. Like other Private
Members, Parliamentary Private Secretaries are expected to support the Government in all
important divisions. However, their special position in relation to the Government imposes
an additional obligation which means that no Parliamentary Private Secretary who votes
against the Government may retain his or her position. Parliamentary Private Secretaries
should not make statements in the House or put Questions on matters affecting the
Department with which they are connected. Parliamentary Private Secretaries are not
precluded from serving on Select Committees but they should not do so in the case of
inquiries into their own Minister's Departments and they should avoid associating
themselves with recommendations critical of or embarrassing to the Government. They should
also exercise discretion in any speeches or broadcasts which they may make outside the
House, taking care not to make statements which appear to be made in an official or
semi-official capacity, and bearing in mind at the same time that, however careful they
may be to make it clear that they are speaking only as Private Members, they are
nevertheless liable to be regarded as speaking with some of the authority which is
attached to a member of the Government. Generally they must act with a sense of
responsibility and with discretion; and they must not associate themselves with particular
groups advocating special policies.
Special Advisers
50. The employment of Special Advisers on the one hand adds a political dimension to the advice available to Ministers, and on the other provides Ministers with the direct advice of distinguished "experts" in their professional field, while reinforcing the political impartiality of the permanent Civil Service by distinguishing the source of political advice and support. With the exception of the Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers may each appoint up to two Special Advisers. The Prime Minister may also authorise the appointment of one or two Special Advisers by Ministers who regularly attend Cabinet. The Government expects the appointment of experts normally to be made to permanent or temporary Civil Service posts in accordance with the rules of the Civil Service Commissioners. Where, however, an individual has outstanding skills or experience of a non-political kind which a Minister wishes to have available while in a particular post, the Prime Minister may exceptionally permit their appointment as a special expert adviser above the usual limit of two advisers per Cabinet Minister. All appointments require the prior written approval of the Prime Minister, and no commitments to make such appointments should be entered into in the absence of such approval. Any departures from the rule of two Special Advisers per Cabinet Minister will need to be explained publicly. All such appointments should be made, and all Special Advisers should operate, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Model Contract for Special Advisers and the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers.
51. The appointment of an unpaid adviser is to provide
advice to a Minister in their ministerial capacity. Such appointments are exceptional, and
the prior written approval of the Prime Minister should be sought for any such appointment
before a commitment is entered into. These appointments carry no remuneration or
reimbursement from public funds. The appointment of an unpaid adviser is a personal
appointment by the Minister concerned and there is no contractual relationship between
such an adviser and the Department. In making an appointment Ministers must ensure that
there is no conflict of interest between the matters on which the unpaid adviser will be
advising and their private concerns. A letter of appointment must be issued by the
employing Minister making this clear. The letter should indicate the subjects with which
an unpaid adviser may (or may not) deal and their access to papers. The normal rules of
confidentiality also apply. Unpaid Advisers are subject to the Official Secrets Act and
Business Appointment Rules. Aside from the provision of a furnished office, use of a
telephone, and access to typing facilities, a personal computer and internal departmental
messenger system, an unpaid adviser should constitute no cost to the public purse.
Ministers and civil servants
58. Ministers have a duty to give fair consideration and due weight to informed and impartial advice from civil servants, as well as to other considerations and advice, in reaching policy decisions; a duty to uphold the political impartiality of the Civil Service, and not to ask civil servants to act in any way which would conflict with the Civil Service Code; a duty to ensure that influence over appointments is not abused for partisan purposes; and a duty to observe the obligations of a good employer with regard to terms and conditions of those who serve them. Civil servants should not be asked to engage in activities likely to call in question their political impartiality, or to give rise to the criticism that people paid from public funds are being used for Party political purposes.
Speeches
97. Ministers cannot speak on public affairs for themselves alone. In all cases other than those described in paragraph 69 they speak as Ministers; and the principle of collective responsibility applies. They should ensure that their statements are consistent with collective Government policy and should not anticipate decisions not yet made public. Ministers should exercise special care in referring to subjects which are the responsibility of other Ministers. Any Minister who intends to make a speech which deals with, or makes observations which bear upon, matters which fall within another Minister's responsibilities should consult that Minister.
Press articles
105. Ministers may contribute occasionally to a book, journal or newspaper (including a local newspaper in their constituency) for the purpose of supplementing other means of informing the public about the work of their Department provided that publication will not be at variance with their obligations to Parliament and their duty to observe the principle of collective Ministerial responsibility. Any Minister wishing to practice regular journalism, including the contribution of weekly or fortnightly articles to local newspapers in their constituencies, must have the prior approval of the Prime Minister. In cases of doubt, and in all cases where a Minister is contemplating the contribution of an article going beyond the strict confines of his or her Departmental responsibility, the Prime Minister should be consulted, before work has begun and in any case before any commitment to publish is entered into. In all cases where an article contains material which falls within the Departmental responsibility of another Minister, that Minister must be consulted. Ministers should not accept payment for writings, either on their own or on their Department's account, or with a view to donating the fee to charity. If the organisation receiving the Minister’s written contribution insists on making a donation to a charity then it should be a charity of the organisation’s choice. This is to avoid any criticism that a Minister is using his or her official position to influence or take the credit for donations to charity.
106. Ministers are advised not to engage in controversy in the correspondence columns of either the home or the overseas press. Ministers may however see advantage in correcting serious errors or misstatements of fact which lead to false conclusions. Such letters should be brief and confined to the exposition of facts.
Books
107. Ministers may not, while in office, write and publish a book on their Ministerial experience. Former Ministers are required to submit their manuscript to the Secretary of the Cabinet and to conform to the principles set out in the Radcliffe Report of 1976 (Cmnd 6386) ... Ministers may not receive payment for a book written before becoming a Minister if the decision to publish was taken afterwards.
Last updated, 1 November 2001
hc-www\min-7.htm