given by Derek Fatchett MP on 20th June, 1998
Many thanks for those kind words of introduction. I hope that this morning I can live up to those words and stimulate some debate and discussion.
To be invited to give this Convocation Lecture represents for me a process of turning the clock back. Firstly to the times that Anthony has already pointed out, when I used to lecture at this University and secondly, and maybe more importantly in this morning^Òs context, to those days prior to my ministerial existence when I had occasionally to think for myself. For this lecture I have no one to blame. I cannot point an accusing finger at a civil servant providing me with an unconvincing or unentertaining draft. I am out on my own, assuming all responsibility, so I hope it works.
For fifteen years now, I have been Member of Parliament for Leeds Central. In that time I have seen this University change in many ways, and in many ways for the better. Student numbers are significantly higher, standards have been preserved and indeed improved, and the University is much more open to the local community. If then these fifteen years have on balance brought satisfactory change to this University, I find it difficult to say exactly the same about my constituency as a whole.
My theme today will be to set out briefly the social changes which have taken place in my Leeds Central constituency; to suggest that the pattern of Leeds is reproduced in other countries and in other cities; to argue that these changes are raising questions about the legitimacy accorded to our political system and to offer some thoughts as to how we might respond to the twin challenges of social exclusion and political alienation. It is a substantial agenda and you can probably understand why a Minister is speaking rather than an official.
Literally a few hundred yards away from this lecture theatre you will experience and see the sharp contrast of inner-city life. In Leeds city centre £1 billion of capital investment has been brought this decade leading to a new quality of life with a real feeling of affluence. At the same time, no distance away you can easily come across the stereotypical inner city community, where life chances are scarred by poor housing, long term unemployment, low educational expectation and lower life expectancy. These are sadly not just assertions or political rhetoric: the social data presents a very depressing picture.
Perhaps I can give you two sets of Leeds based statistics. These I think will suffice for my purpose. Firstly in Leeds, city wide unemployment covering the eight parliamentary constituencies stands just around the current national average of about 5%. But for inner city Leeds Central, that figure increases to 12% with male unemployment at 17%. I also have no doubt that the above statistics conceal the reality. For instance, recorded female employment at 5% is, in my view, more a function of non- registration than of female labour market activity. We know that for many, employment has scarcely been an option since leaving school. We are fast approaching in inner city areas, a situation in which whole families are into the second generation of unemployment. In parts of certain estates in my constituency, the employed person is now in the minority. There is simply no sense of stakeholding in the labour market.
To add to the feeling of being outside the labour market, graphically, the motorway into Leeds seems to represent yet another barrier. For those who use them to travel to work into city centre Leeds there are well rewarded secure jobs, but for those living alongside the motorway in the inner city, cars always bring others to work. Those cars never take them to work.
Education statistics further illustrate this division. For the overwhelming number of young people in my constituency, the University never registers as of any relevance. It is a dream that is wholly unreal. For them educational ambitions are still low. They are almost structurally reinforced into a pigeon hole of low attainment. Inner city secondary schools are struggling to achieve a 15% success rate of A to C GCSE passes. Indeed the recently reformed Copperfields College in my constituency is starting from a base where only 3% of the age group gained five or more GCSE^Òs at grades A to C and just under 40% attained no GCSE grades of any description. Whilst in this setting of a University lecture theatre it is easily possible and tempting to slip into the language of education as a liberating force. For many inner city young people, their parents and indeed possibly even their teachers, education is yet another low expectation, lower attainment experience. Far from liberating, education often simply confirms low self perception and low ambition. It should not be such, but I fear that it is.
The figures I have quoted so far are figures for Leeds Central. There is sadly nothing unique about the inner city of Leeds. The exclusion to which I have just referred and which sits cheek by jowl in the city with real pockets of affluence is reproduced across the country and across the economy. There is no need here for me to repeat the arguments in detail, the statistics speak for themselves. Let me just give you a few. At the end of 1997, 5 million people of working age lived in homes where nobody worked. Secondly, over 1 million people have never worked since leaving school. Thirdly, it is estimated that 100,000 children are simply not attending school. Fourthly, half of all reported crime takes place in 1/10 of neighbourhoods across the country: there is a real concentration of crime. Fifthly and finally, just as a brief summary of these statistics, even life expectancy is structured by social class. In 1997, men from social classes one and two lived an average 5.2 years longer than those from social classes four and five. This gap incidentally widened between 1976 and 1991.
In summary, it is estimated that 3 million of our fellow citizens live in housing estates characterised by multiple deprivation of rising poverty, unemployment, education failure and crime. These are the stark statistics and figures of social exclusion, the emergence of a sub-class reflecting the 1/3 2/3 splits to which Galbraith referred earlier this decade. Or in other language the 30/30/40 split to which Will Hatton referred, with the first 30% being marginalised in relation to the labour market and many other social structures.
There is also growing evidence to suggest that social exclusion goes hand-in-hand with political alienation. There has always been that small minority divorced from our political system, who have regarded politicians as useless or corrupt or indeed even both. All MP^Òs will tell you of the many occasions in which they have been accused of being a waste of time, or words to that effect. Indeed I vividly remember being told last year on May 1 by one woman that I, along with all the other candidates, was useless. Indeed I can say her language might have been slightly stronger than that. I later saw her leaving the polling station. I fear to tell you that I did not have the courage to ask her for which of the useless candidates she had just cast her vote. But the truth is that she had at least voted.
The 1997 general election had a disturbingly low turnout. 71% nationally bothered to vote in the 1997 election. That is the lowest participation in a general election since 1935. Just to give you the contrast, whilst Brackon and Radrickshire achieved an 82% turnout, Liverpool Riverside came right at the bottom with only just over a half casting a vote.
I am sad to tell you that Leeds Central had the sixth lowest turnout in Great Britain. It is reasonable to conclude from the statistics that you can describe as inner city all of the 50 constituencies had the lowest turnout figures. These figures sadly, only partially reflect the lack of involvement in the electoral process. Non-registration may be an equally important indicator. Some estimates suggest that several million of our fellow citizens simply do not bother to register to vote. These estimates in turn encapsulate, in my view, broader changes in inner city life. I am increasingly struck by the extent to which a noticeable percentage of my constituents are constantly on the move. They lead a transient life beyond the scope of any form of bureaucracy. This is particularly true for young people, especially so for young men. Perhaps this also merits an aside comment. The changes in family composition are now extensive in inner city areas, with the traditional family unit if not a thing of the past, certainly not the current norm.
If the figures of non-registration are anywhere near accurate, they, together with the turnout figures, point to Members of Parliament being elected with the involvement of less than half of their constituents. For councillors, the figures would be dramatically lower. I believe this would be true regardless of the electoral system in operation.
My thesis then is that not surprisingly social exclusion is consequently, even intimately, linked to political alienation. For millions our political system is seen as irrelevant to their needs. Perhaps a further aside may also be relevant at this point. If my concern about political alienation and low involvement is well founded, then it is further incumbent on politicians to follow the highest possible ethical standards. A mixture of low expectation of the system in general and of politicians in particular would be potentially very corrosive for political legitimacy.
You might of course ask why we should be concerned about all of this. Galbraith^Òs 2/3 is probably represented here today and broadly satisfied with your lot. I am not saying that as a criticism because I note that the Government^Òs popularity continues to remain high, so why should I say it as a criticism. So why should we bother with the other one-third ?
Let me offer four reasons as to why I think we should be concerned. Firstly, a modern economy which will increasingly depend upon people for its success simply cannot afford to write off so many people. Again my own Leeds Central constituency illustrates this point very well. Skilled job vacancies are high. So in many areas is unemployment. Yet the two simply do not match. The unemployed do not possess and, sadly, have had little chance of possessing the required skills. There is an economic price for us all to pay as a result of this.
Secondly, a divided society impinges upon us all. Remember the earlier figures that I quoted about the recorded level of crime and its concentration. The fear of crime is strong across society, but it does not accurately reflect the risk as shown by the concentration figures. The perception which is there with much poll data is of an all pervasive risk of crime caused by the social exclusion to which I have referred. The lack of social cohesion in that context then impinges upon us all. We are all poorer as a result of the development of social no go areas.
Thirdly, there is every reason to fear that social exclusion and political alienation are the parents of extremism. Absolute simple answers are always attractive, never more so when the current political system fails to produce results. We should never be so complacent in Britain to believe that because political extremism has not taken root in the past, it will never do so in the future. Combating social exclusion is the best way to defeat political extremism. This incidentally is scarcely a modern 1998 conclusion. With justification you could argue that the combination of Keynesian economics and social welfare policies introduced in the late 1930^Òs and followed in the war and post- war period gave a new legitimacy and cohesion to our political system.
Fourthly, a society which writes off a significant percentage of its own citizens is always going to lack the moral glue which provides for social cohesion. It is difficult to believe both in value terms and empirically that a society that starts from the assumption that certain groups or individuals can and should be written off has any long term prospect of developing the necessary cohesion for future social and economic success.
The arguments then for trying to tackle the problems caused by Galbraith^Òs divided society are in my opinion overwhelmingly powerful. However, if I can add a discordant note of cynicism, my views might not always be shared by the hard headed political manager. The election turnout figures plus the other indicators of non-participation show that elections can be, and indeed have been won without the support of the socially excluded. Indeed it is possible to argue that within the United States this has been the pattern for several decades now. American presidents are elected by a socially narrow profile of the United States. Their electoral success has been achieved without the socially excluded. This to me stimulates a further question arising out of the American experience. Simply, is it possible to achieve long-term social cohesion without regard to the issues of social exclusion.
My analysis of political alienation implies also a lack of leadership from within those groups who are currently socially excluded. Here I believe a significant social change has taken place over the last decade or more. Previously, when there was a much closer symmetry between a traditionally defined working class and the socially excluded, there existed through primarily the trade unions a means by which a relevant political agenda could be raised and pursued. Acknowledging and recognising that the leadership was nearly always from a male manual manufacturing background, it nevertheless provided a home- grown confidence and focus. It was also a voluntary leadership which stretched from the workplace into the local community, often finding its expression through the local labour party and then through local government. Indeed the social history of much of 20th Century Yorkshire is dominated by individuals from this background. Now I believe the configuration of social forces which gave rise to this labour leadership increasingly appears to be a thing of the past. The reasons for this are not difficult to discern.
Firstly, the trade unions weakened in their traditional sources of membership strength, have in turn come more and more to represent white collar and public sector employees. In addition any ideological cutting edge which previously existed in the trade union movement, has been blunted into an increasingly bread and butter pragmatic American style unionism.
Secondly, again reflecting the broader social changes which have restructured employment and trade unionism, the local Labour party has become more the home of the professional middle class employee. The town hall labour boss from a trade union background is in truth more likely to be a feature of social history or some TV play rather than of contemporary politics. Reflecting this point it is possible to argue that some of the beneficial changes in class structure, which can be associated with wider participation and opportunity may paradoxically reinforce the isolated position of a social underclass. The sons and daughters of the previous generation of skilled workers may have fled the social class net leaving behind them those who, isolated and under pressure, feel unable for a variety of good reasons to occupy indigenous leadership roles.
Thirdly and maybe most importantly, the very term social exclusion also implies that there are no immediate indigenous organisations able to provide both leadership for a political agenda and leaders from within who are able to give confidence to the community. Just again look at those estates to those I referred earlier in the statistics about social cohesion. I know from experience it is easy to predict with confidence that overwhelmingly these estates lack tenants^Ò groups and other similar organisations. In this context we are witnessing communities atomised into isolated alienated individuals.
There has been a great deal of media comment in recent years about a new politics. Maybe I could throw a word of caution into the debate. I suggest that maybe there is a new risk of new politics, but one not built upon hope and optimism. On the contrary it is a politics distorted by disaffection and dissatisfaction. This new politics does not presently dominate our political system. But in my view, if we are not careful and caring, it is a politics which could eat at the very heart of our system.
To sum up so far it is possible to infer from what I have said two main conclusions. Firstly, that social exclusion and political alienation are real issues and problems which have to be tackled if we are to be taken seriously about social cohesion. Secondly, that from within those groups who might be deemed to be socially excluded, there is limited immediate potential for the type of leadership which would ensure that the relevant issues assume a high priority on the political agenda.
Now if these two conclusions are accepted, they in turn define a new set of challenges for our political system and especially I believe for my own party - the Labour Party. In effect two challenges are being established. Firstly, to be re-elected after a period in office and secondly to reduce social exclusion and consequently demonstrate to the socially excluded that there is a value in the political system itself. In the medium and long term it is possible to argue that meeting these two challenges is entirely consistent. In other words, a successful government is one that addresses the issues of social cohesion. We are at this point in my analysis moving strongly towards what I will refer to as the classic social democratic dilemma. How do political parties of the left or left of centre win elections whilst at the same time persuading the better off to address collectively through the political process the problems of those who are the most disadvantaged?
In the United Kingdom context, to reinforce this social democratic dilemma the alleged impact of John Smith^Òs shadow budget in the run up to the 1992 general election has become almost part of the folklore. Incidentally, if I can say this, I display yet another personal prejudice when I argue that the dilemma is mainly one for left of centre social democratic parties. In the late 1980^Òs, the right put forward their own social justification for their policies by arguing that essentially the only responsibility of government was to establish the conditions for wealth creation. Once the appropriate conditions were in place, it was suggested that almost like some new iron law, wealth and opportunities would trickle down to the most disadvantaged. This, in my view, was a remarkable cosy theory. For those doing well they could feel confident, that without a ounce of extra effort and responsibility they were helping others. Not only cosy, this approach can also be regarded as amoral, lacking as it did any appreciation of the necessity for social cohesion and for shared objectives and values. Indeed much quoted at one point, Margaret Thatcher went even further by arguing that there was no such thing as society.
Trickle down economics and social policies ran out of steam in the early 1990^Òs, as the then Conservative government looked for other unifying central ideas. Notions such as back to basics were not simply a reflection of an immediate electoral need for a softer image. More importantly this was a debate which reflected the realisation that trickle down economics had failed. Long term unemployment, high crime and poor housing might be the lot of the disadvantaged, but concerns about public services such as education, health, the railways and transport became much more universal. Will Hutton concluded that the collapse of social cohesion had produced a fall in the growth rate. He also went on to say that marginalisation, deprivation and exclusion had proved economically irrational. He argued that the social consequences of this were profound. This backdrop may help to explain why consistency through the 1990^Òs opinion poll data showed a majority in favour of more government spending on certain key services, such as education, health and transport.
To return to my theme then, how can the European social democratic parties square the circle of electoral success and the need to contribute a high priority to social cohesion? I believe that there are two requirements.
Firstly, we must encourage and develop a political language with an emphasis upon social cohesion. The last two decades have been marked by the hegemony of individualism. That hegemony simply has to be challenged. We know that there^Òs a strong relationship between social cohesion, social justice and individual life chances. Against that background we must show a confidence in making the argument about the need for society to have a unifying set of values.
In this way, the language by recognising the priority of addressing the issues of social cohesion, will aim to be inclusive saying to all our fellow citizens that their needs form a part of any legitimate political agenda.
Language alone will not eliminate political alienation. I accept that. Nevertheless, language is an important first step. The language also has to speak to the advantaged as well as the disadvantaged. Given the social democratic failure over the last two decades to win the argument about social needs and collective actions, there is a long way to go. But as a prerequisite for successful policies on social exclusion, we have to appreciate that we all have a social, economic and moral interest in these policies. In this respect the language of shared interests might prove more effective then the rhetoric of the hair shirt.
In this context maybe Hattersley^Òs language may be of some relevance to us. When talking about the prospect of Labour election victories, he argued that there was a need and I quote ^ÑTo offer a reasonable resolution which both captures the country^Òs enthusiasm for change and allays the fears that change might cause disruption^Ò.
In addition to language and ideas government again has to assume an active role in directing resources for specific policies for the benefit of defined social groups. I do not believe we need to whisper this. We are here though talking about the classic social democratic role for the state. The current government has already announced policies which fall wholly within this definition: the new deal and the long term unemployed; the social exclusion unit and the emphasis upon educational achievements and improving ambition and expectations for all our children. Active government therefore is a prerequisite for reducing social exclusion.
In developing these policies for active government we must avoid one fundamental error of the past. However worthy the intentions, policies are not likely to be successful if they are imposed upon communities from the outside. We must give serious thought as to how we can encourage delivery mechanisms which allow for real ownership and involvement. It would be foolish to suggest that such an objective can easily be achieved. Far from it, as we have already noted, the decline of traditional working class leadership has left a vacuum which has not been filled and will not be easy to fill. The policies which aim to secure processes as well as outcomes are much more likely to address both social exclusion and political alienation.
If I can sum up. As a practising politician in an inner city constituency, I am acutely aware of the characteristics of disadvantage and exclusion. My own personal fear is that for too long the political system has failed to respond to these challenges. Indeed sometimes the impression has been given that these are relatively unimportant issues. I hope that in this lecture I have been able to impress upon you both the social and economic costs of exclusion and the challenge to the legitimacy of our political system. We are for some of our fellow citizens close to a politics of despair and of pessimism. To turn a blind eye to this development is in my view extremely dangerous. That is why we need to construct a politics of hope for all. Rather than the politics of prosperity for some and alienation for others.
Derek was a lecturer in industrial relations at the University for 12 years.